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Abstract 
 
Scholars often discuss the ramifications of seed regulations for customary 
dynamics of conservation, use and exchange of local plant varieties in three 
streams of scholarly writing. These are formality and informality of the seed 
system, commons and property notions of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture, and community seed banks. This thesis makes an important 
contribution to these literature, exploring how seed regulation is being shaped 
and what has been the role of networks, community and informality in the 
governance of the seed system in Nepal.   
The thesis shows that Nepal’s formal model of state-led, private-sector 
supportive seed regulation has failed to address customary dynamics of seed 
use and exchange and promote farmer-to-farmer seed exchange networks. A 
key argument is that the role of informality needs to be duly recognised in 
view of its significant contribution to protect local plant genetic diversity and 
the rights of farming communities to save, use and exchange seeds. The role 
of informality is also important in view of Nepal’s legislative initiatives to 
implement the global agreements such as the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food 
and Agriculture. Nepal offers an important site of network confrontation as 
various actors and networks from government, non-government and private 
sectors have been engaged in promoting their own visions of property and 
commons. A key finding of the thesis is that Nepal needs to consider these 
different visions of commons and property and adopt a networked model of 
regulation to create a seed system that addresses local needs.  
The thesis shows that Nepal is also an important site of community seed banks. 
What makes Nepal’s case interesting is the emerging typologies of community 
seed banks that interact with both formal and informal seed systems. The thesis 
argues that if community seed banks continue to tilt towards becoming a 
formal actor like a local seed trading enterprise, there would be implications 
for local initiatives to conserve native plant genetic diversity and promote 
customary practices of seed use and exchange.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Key arguments of the thesis 
This thesis shows that a formal model of state-led, private sector-supportive 
seed regulation has failed to address the local, customary dynamics of use 
and exchange of native and local plant varieties1 in Nepal. The thesis argues 
that the notion of informality does not capture the essence of customary 
practices of using and exchanging farm-saved seeds as commonly shared 
resources and undermines the role of farmer-to-farmer seed exchange 
networks in Nepal.  
A key argument is that there exists a variety of notions of commons and 
property that the regulation of plant genetic resources for food and 
agriculture (PGRFA) needs to consider in view of the local, customary 
dynamics of seed use and exchange, and the rights of local, indigenous and 
farming communities. By developing and using an analytical framework of 
the “PGRFA knowledge commons”, the thesis shows that Nepal’s state-led 
regulation of PGRFA is gearing towards the implementation of restrictive 
types of commons of exclusive nature even though local, customary 
practices continue to represent an example of self-regulation of PGRFA as a 
common heritage or a positive inclusive commons.  
A finding of the thesis is that a complex typology of community seed banks 
is emerging in Nepal. There is a possibility of some community seed banks 
to function more like a local seed trading enterprise of the formal seed 
system than to serve to protect and promote the use and exchange of native 
and local varieties within farmers’ seed system.  
1  The thesis uses the term “native and local varieties” with a note that not all varieties in farmers’ 
seed system may be native to their lands. Some or many varieties may have come from outside 
sources. However, these varieties are referred to as local because farmers keep their seeds within 
their seed system for generations through regular saving and exchange, and over time, these 
varieties adapt well to local environment and/or appear with additional traits developed and 
preferred by local farmers. The thesis, however, acknowledges that to many scholars, these terms 
may have different meanings and values for scientific and other reasons (For example, see 
Andersen, 2007; Zeven, 1998). 
1 
 
                                                 
1.2 Regulatory discourse on local, customary dynamics  
Since the start of agriculture, farmers across the world have been 
domesticating, producing, saving and using seeds of native and local 
varieties. For centuries, farmers have also been exchanging farm-saved 
seeds through farmer-to-farmer seed exchange networks as commonly 
shared resources and not as privately-owned or -controlled resources 
(Halewood, 2014; Halewood et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2007; Lewis & 
Mulvany, 1997; Posey & Dutfield, 1996).  
The conservation, use and exchange of such varieties are considered 
important for generating locally reliable options to ensure seed and food 
security. These practices are also considered important for building trust, 
reciprocity and communication forming – as Ostrom (1990) says – 
important building blocks of collective action across farming populations 
(Gladis & Hammer, 2000; Jarvis et al., 2000; Poudel et al., 2015; Sthapit, 
2012; Sthapit et al., 2008). Due to their socio-cultural values and ties with 
customary practices and knowledge of local and indigenous farmers, native 
and local varieties are also known as indigenous varieties, traditional 
varieties, local varieties, folk varieties, heirloom varieties, farmers’ varieties 
and landraces of local, traditional, indigenous or farmers’ seed system2. 
Over time, the global and national regulatory trends and dynamics of who 
would grow, own and market seeds have been changing. The emergence of 
a new plant breeding and development sector – initially in North America 
and Europe in the early 20th century – has separated the profession of 
farming from seed production. Initially with the involvement of the public 
sector and gradually the private sector, a formal seed system has emerged to 
regulate the use of seeds through seed and intellectual property laws. 
Scholars claim that such regulatory developments have already led the 
world to witness “the seed wars” with technologies like genetic engineering 
and laws like intellectual property (Borowiak, 2004; Dutfield, 2014, p. 4; 
Mooney, 1979). 
2  This thesis uses the terms “local”, “traditional” and “indigenous” interchangeably, though their 
meaning and understanding could be a matter of further discussion and insights (For example, see 
for some insights, Drahos & Frankel, 2012; Sperling et al., 2013). 
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A review of existing literature suggests that there are three streams of 
scholarly writing that are important to the discourse on customary practices 
of use and exchange of local plant varieties and the rights of local, 
indigenous and farming communities over seeds and traditional knowledge. 
The first of such stream of scholarly writing can be located within the 
discourse on formal and informal seed systems (Almekinders, 2001; 
Almekinders et al., 1994; Cromwell et al., 1993; Douglas, 1980; McGuire & 
Sperling, 2013; Sperling & Cooper, 2003; Sthapit & Shah, 2001). In this 
scholarship, it is often argued that due to the Green Revolution initiated 
since the 1960s and the neo-liberal agricultural policies pursued since the 
1980s, seed policies and laws have been paying little attention to the 
protection of local agricultural biodiversity and traditional practices of 
saving, using and exchanging seeds under the farmers’ seed system.  
According to this scholarship, initially through the public and gradually 
through the private sector, seed policies and laws with a unilaterally 
focussed linear model of seed sector development strategies have been 
largely focussing on breeding, multiplication and marketing of new, 
improved seeds of the formal seed system. Such seed policies and laws 
have, however, failed to recognise the significance of farmers’ seed system 
that mostly relies on the use, exchange and conservation of the diversity of 
local varieties. Some scholars have, therefore, called for an integrated seed 
sector development strategy for addressing the crucial needs of both formal 
and informal seed systems and merging indigenous and modern knowledge 
for agriculture development (Husnah et al., 2015; Louwaars et al., 2013; 
Sperling et al., 2013). 
The second stream of scholarship, which emphasises the significance of 
traditional varieties, mostly draws on the regulation of PGRFA focussing on 
commons and property dynamics (Correa, 2014; Dutfield, 2014; Halewood, 
2014; Posey & Dutfield, 1996; Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren, 2008). This 
scholarship argues that such regulation is being highly dominated by the 
two global regimes of intellectual property rights – the Convention of the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). According to this stream 
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of scholarly writing, patents and plant breeders’ rights are the two forms of 
intellectual property rights that establish exclusive, monopolistic rights over 
the production, reproduction and marketing of new plant varieties, and 
restrict the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over seeds 
and traditional knowledge (Drahos, 1996; Matthews, 2011).  
Some scholars in this group perceive the enclosure of commons through 
intellectual property rights – that is, the enclosure of PGRFA which initially 
prevailed as a “common heritage of humankind” or a “global commons” – 
as mostly serving the interests of technology-rich countries of the North and 
multinational seed companies (Andersen, 2008; Halewood et al., 2013; Roa-
Rodríguez & Van Dooren, 2008). They argue that such an enclosure – often 
discussed as the “second enclosure movement” to privatise knowledge 
commons – does not benefit technology-poor and biodiversity-rich 
countries of the South. It rather negatively affects the rights of local, 
indigenous farmers who largely rely on regular saving, use and exchange of 
seeds of local needs and preferences (Adhikari, 2005; Aoki, 1998; Boyle, 
2003; Evans, 2005; Prasad et al., 2012).  
Some scholars within this group have also analysed how the global and 
national intellectual property regimes have undermined the objectives of the 
two other international instruments – the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA) – mainly by undermining the rights of 
local and indigenous farmers (Andersen, 2006; Matthews, 2011; Nair, 2011; 
Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren, 2008; Tansey & Rajotte, 2008).  
The CBD requires the contracting parties to implement measures to protect 
the rights of local and indigenous communities, including their traditional 
knowledge. Recognising states’ sovereignty over generic resources within 
their territories, the CBD also requires the parties to conclude access 
agreements based on mutually agreed terms of, among others, access to 
genetic resources, prior informed consent, benefit sharing and commercial 
use (Le Prestre, 2002; Oberthür & Rosendal, 2013; Ruiz & Vernooy, 2012).  
The ITPGRFA is the first international instrument to provide for the 
protection of farmers’ rights to PGRFA and traditional knowledge, 
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including the rights to save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds. In addition, the 
ITPGRFA establishes a multilateral system of access and benefit sharing 
that includes samples of PGRFA of 64 crops enlisted in Annex 1 of the 
Treaty. The multilateral system aims to facilitate access to such a global 
pool of plant germplasms as a “protected global commons” and share the 
benefits arising from their utilisation in a fair and equitable way (Esquinas-
Alcázar, 2005; Halewood et al., 2013).  
Mainly since the 1990s, another group of scholars, our third category of 
scholarship, has come forward with some empirical cases of seed savers’ 
networks in the developed world and community seed banks in the 
developing world to highlight the importance of the conservation, use and 
exchange of native and local varieties. Initiated as a grassroots-level 
initiative since the 1970s, such seed savers’ networks and community seed 
banks have been emerging as important actors and networks for the 
conservation and use of local PGRFA and traditional knowledge, and are 
already in operation in more than 40 countries (FAO, 2014; Feyissa, 2000; 
Lewis & Mulvany, 1997; LIBIRD, 2010; Phillips, 2008; Van Dooren, 2009; 
Vernooy, 2012; Vernooy et al., 2015). 
This group of scholars highlights the role of seed savers’ networks and 
community seed banks in promoting the use and exchange of non-hybrid, 
open-pollinated seeds of heirloom varieties as a common cultural heritage. 
Some scholars of this group have even conceptualised the community seed 
bank to represent a model of an “open source seed network”. Their idea is to 
promote such banks as a means for building and expanding national and 
international movements that promote an effective open source approach for 
managing PGRFA as a global commons (Ramanjaneyulu & Rajashekar, 
2013; Ramanjaneyulu et al., 2015; Sthapit, 2012).   
1.3 Enquiries and aims of the thesis 
The above-mentioned three areas of scholarships are at the centre of the 
international and national debates on how to effectively regulate the duality 
of the formal and informal within the seed system, and the commons and 
property notions of PGRFA. All such regulatory debates and outcomes are 
inter-related and have implications for each other, more so in the case of 
5 
 
countries that have the features of formality, informality, commons, 
property and community seed banks.  
This thesis examines the following three regulatory trends that relate with 
and/or impact the local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange and 
the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities. The first such 
trend relates to how the formality of the seed system affects local, 
customary dynamics and establishes the notion of informality in the seed 
system. The second trend deals with how commons and property notions of 
PGRFA shape property rights for the state, community and private actors 
and affect local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange. Finally, the 
third trend relates to how community seed banks in the developing world 
and seed savers’ groups in the developed world have emerged to promote 
the use and exchange of seeds among and between farmers.  
With these three lines of scholarship as a background, this thesis conducts a 
case study of Nepal. The thesis seeks to achieve the following analytical and 
normative aims. The analytical aim is to contribute to the understanding and 
analysis of the regulatory trends and dynamics of formality, informality, 
commons, property and community seed banks. The normative aim is to 
make a case for the desirability of a seed regulation that promotes the use 
and exchange of local varieties and protects farmers’ customary practices 
and rights over seeds and traditional knowledge.  
1.4 Empirical insights from Nepal 
The thesis develops its arguments using Nepal as a case study.  Nepal has 
been chosen for a variety of reasons discussed in the next chapter on 
methodology. In order to analyse vague and complex global, national and 
local regulatory landscapes of formality and informality of the seed system, 
commons and property notions of PGRFA and community seed banks, the 
thesis relies on a flexible, qualitative research design drawing on the 
techniques of in-depth, interpretive socio-legal investigation.  
A variety of research methods have been used to gather data from a diverse 
group of actors and networks, involving a total of 118 participants from 
Nepal’s different geographical locations. For primary data, it uses three 
methods: preliminary observation; semi-structured interviews with key 
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informants; and focus group discussions with farmers, managers and 
mobilisers of community seed banks. For secondary data, the thesis relies 
on socio-legal methods to undertake a review and analysis of documented 
information and knowledge on international, national and local regulatory 
trends and dynamics.    
1.5 Theoretical underpinnings, concepts and analytical 
frameworks  
The thesis draws on the theoretical underpinnings, concepts and analytical 
frameworks of formality, informality, commons and property as they form 
the basis of analysis throughout all substantive chapters. The thesis also 
draws on the concepts of networked governance, meta-regulation, self-
regulation, globalisation of regulation and regulatory capture for developing 
a case for a networked regulation of the seed system in the conclusion 
chapter. Below I discuss these concepts briefly in two sub-sections.  
1.5.1 Formality, informality, commons and property 
Formality is about the formal reach of the law through codified and written 
rules, directives and contracts. In contrast, informality stands for cultural 
norms, taboos and values, conventions, customs and practices that are 
reproduced by all members of the society (Etzold et al., 2009; North, 1992).  
This thesis uses the dichotomy between formality and informality, but 
subject to the observation that the concept of informality needs to be 
understood in a positive way, rather than a plethora of negative appellations 
such as hidden, grey, underground, illegal and black market (Feige, 1990; 
Sindzingre, 2006). In the thesis, formality of the seed system refers to state-
led regulations of seeds and intellectual property. Informality of the seed 
system refers to customary norms, values and dynamics of use and 
exchange of native and local varieties within farmers’ seed system. 
Commons and property are important concepts in the regulation of PGRFA 
at global and national levels. Commons has been understood and defined 
differently by scholars, for example, as a shared resource, as a common-
pool resource and as a common property (Ostrom and Hess, 2007). For the 
purpose of this thesis, an analytical framework of PGRFA knowledge 
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commons has been developed based on a typology of intellectual commons 
discussed by Drahos (1996). The four types of PGRFA knowledge 
commons – positive inclusive, positive exclusive, negative inclusive and 
negative exclusive – are the four key concepts used to analyse the shifts in 
common spaces available within the global and national regulations of 
PGRFA.  
For economists, the economic rationale of property rights is that they 
economise on the use of resources, reduce the transaction costs involved in 
such use, and assist in a better allocation of resources (Demsetz, 1967). For 
legal scholars, property is a legally enforceable bundle of rights over 
resources which property rights holders are free to exercise without 
interference, neither by the state nor by an individual (Cooter & Ulen, 
1988).  
This thesis understands property as a social institution; property is 
embedded within society, people and resources (Bromley, 1989). Chapter 5 
explores further the meaning of property rights beyond their economic 
rationale and explains the distinction between commons as a resource and as 
a form of property regime.  
1.5.2 Networked governance, meta-regulation, self-regulation, 
globalisation of regulation and regulatory capture 
The thesis adopts a broad understanding of governance3 as “a wider set of 
control activities than government” (Braithwaite, 2008, p. 1), or broader 
than government, also covering non-state actors and self-governing and 
inter-governmental networks (Rhodes, 1996, p. 660). Governing by network 
is at the heart of the networked governance (Castells, 2000). For example, in 
networked governance, actors from state, private and civil society sectors 
not only form but also operate and interact within governance networks to 
3  The traditional concept of governance relies on hierarchical command and control modes of 
regulation, in which state-promulgated laws are the dominant regulatory tools; the state is a 
dominant regulator; and depending on the nature of the law, non-state actors, including natural 
and legal persons, are merely regulatees. However, such classical modes of regulation have been 
increasingly termed as being inefficient, ineffective and inappropriate under new conditions of 
governance that are emerging in this information age (Crawford, 2006). 
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govern the social systems they inhabit (Burris et al., 2005). According to 
Castells (2000, p. 14):  
“…overall the new state is not any longer a nation-state. The state in the 
information age is a network state, a state made out of a complex web of 
power-sharing, and negotiated decision-making between international, 
multinational, national, regional, local, and non-governmental, political 
institutions.”  
Under conditions of networked governance, the commands of the state are 
not the only source of regulatory power. Instead both state and non-state 
actors and networks develop and enforce (or influence these processes) 
regulatory models to govern complex socio-economic processes. Thus, for 
effective governance outcomes, the networked model of governance 
“requires the state to steer society in new ways through the development of 
complex networks and the rise of more bottom-up approaches to decision 
making” (Stoker, 2006, p. 41).  
In a larger context of networked governance, while governments and 
governance can be understood as providing, distributing and regulating, 
regulation can be conceived as that large subset of governance which steers 
the flow of events and behaviours to regulate social and economic life, as 
opposed to providing and distributing (Braithwaite et al., 2007; Parker et al., 
2004). In networked governance, as third parties, non-state actors monitor 
and influence behaviours, steer the flow of events and enforce rules and 
practices, for example, to achieve social and environmental objectives. This 
is in a way similar to what scholars discuss in the case of meta-regulation. 
Meta-regulation is a claim that third parties are involved in regulation and 
the state is both the object and subject of regulation, that is, regulated by 
others (Coglianese & Mendelson, 2010; Gunningham et al., 1999; Parker, 
2007). In this thesis, meta-regulation refers to the importance of third parties 
in regulation. 
In regulatory discourse, self-regulation too has been defined differently, but 
is often used to mean a rule imposed to regulate one’s own behaviour 
(Coglianese & Mendelson, 2010; Gunningham & Rees, 1997). This thesis 
conceptualises self-regulation to mean the tools and mechanisms developed 
and implemented by actors and networks of society which they own and 
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find beneficial for meeting their needs and preferences of social and 
economic life. 
The thesis undertakes the concept of the globalisation of regulation to mean 
“the spread of some set of regulatory reforms” through actors and networks 
at global, national and local levels and “the extent to which principles, 
standards, rules, guidelines and models of regulation have converged” 
between or among local, national and global regulations (Drahos & 
Braithwaite, 2001, pp. 103, 104).  
Regulatory capture is another important concept of the thesis. Regulatory 
capture means an incident or a trend in which regulations are designed or 
influenced to serve the vested interests of a particular group rather than to 
work towards achieving broader social and environmental objectives. Here 
the role of the actors and networks of public interest groups such as civil 
society organisations become important to play the role of watch dogs or 
even the preventers of any incident or trend of regulatory capture (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1991). 
1.6 Research framework  
Nepal has a history of development planning of more than half a century. 
Since the beginning of the 1950s, its development plans have been 
following the global trends of developing a formal model of seed sector 
development, initially as state-led formal regulatory system and later with 
the involvement of the private sector as a key formal actor. Since the 1990s, 
Nepal has also been involved in international negotiations and agreements 
that regulate the use and exchange of PGRFA through a complex set of 
property rights domains. The global movements of seed savers’ networks 
and community seed banks too have some relevance to the creation, growth 
and typologies of community seed banks in the country.  
Given these regulatory contexts and dynamics at global, national and local 
levels, the following research framework has been designed to capture and 
analyse the issues needed for a comprehensive study of how seed regulation 
is shaping in Nepal and what has been the role of networks, local 
communities and informality.  
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Figure 1.1: Research framework for the case study of Nepal  
 
1.7 Overview of chapters  
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genesis of the idea of this research and the rationale behind the selection of 
Nepal as a case study. It also presents an analysis of the research methods 
used for gathering fieldwork data from Nepal’s different geographical and 
context-specific settings.  
Focussing on global contexts and a case study of Nepal, Chapters 3 to 10 
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Part I analyses the concepts, trends and impacts of formality and informality 
of the seed system. Chapter 3 explores a broader context of the discourse on 
formality and informality; the formality and informality dynamics that have 
evolved to regulate the seed system across the world; and the emergence 
and growth of the formal seed system in Nepal. By evaluating the periodic 
development plans, policies and programmes Nepal implemented since the 
1950s, this chapter shows how the government initially developed a public 
sector-led formal seed system and then gradually started to adopt a model to 
provide more of a role for the private sector to market high-yielding and 
improved seeds.  
Such regulatory trends also indicate that Nepal has been part of the 
regulatory processes of globalisation. Right from the 1960s, global actors 
were key to support the government in introducing improved seeds. They 
also played a major role in supporting the introduction of a state-led seed 
law, which is gradually moving towards a private sector-supportive linear 
model of seed sector development under the neo-liberal development 
paradigm, a phenomenon common in many other developing countries.  
For example, as part of a global trend of improved technology transfer to 
developing countries, the Consortium of International Agriculture Research 
Centres (CGIAR) – the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) and the 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) – 
collaborated with the government to release improved varieties and 
disseminate the seeds of the same varieties to farmers. Similarly, donors 
such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 
the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) and 
German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) supported the government to develop 
infrastructure for seed sector development and introduce policies and laws 
in support of the formal seed system. 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the regulatory features and impacts of the 
formal seed system in Nepal, discussing major regulatory institutions and 
formal actors in various stages such as variety registration and release, and 
quality control, multiplication and marketing of improved seeds including 
hybrids. The chapter shows Nepal’s increased inclination towards the 
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import of varieties from outside for release and dissemination of improved 
varieties and growing reliance on the import of formal seeds, including 
hybrids, for production and use within the country.  
The chapter then discusses the informal seed system, identifying the 
traditionality of agriculture; local, customary dynamics of seed use and 
exchange; and the interaction between formal and informal seed systems as 
three key features of farmers’ seed system in Nepal. The chapter shows that 
a majority of farmers do not rely on formal seed markets but on farm-saved 
seeds and farmer-to-farmer exchange of seeds. The chapter also shows that 
within the context of social customs and practices, most farmers in Nepal do 
not possess any exclusive rights over seeds but believe in worshipping and 
sharing of seeds as commonly shared resources.  
Such dynamics of formality and informality of the seed system then lead to 
a discussion of the commons and property notions of PGRFA in Chapters 5 
to 8 of Part II of the thesis. Chapters 5 and 6 are focussed on academic 
discussions and global issues. Chapter 5 first explains the meaning and 
rationale of property rights and commons. It then discusses how commons 
scholarship has expanded to cover not only traditional commons (physical 
resources) but also “new” commons (intangible, knowledge-based 
resources). Chapter 5 also analyses how scholars have conceived the 
“enclosures” of commons in the first and second enclosure movements – the 
first dealing with the enclosure of lands and forests where plant genetic 
diversity lies, and the latter dealing with the enclosure of intangible 
knowledge-based resources through intellectual property rights. The chapter 
shows that PGRFA are a complex type of commons with two types of 
objects of regulation: tangible, physical objects as well as intangible, 
informational objects.   
Given the complex nature of PGRFA as both a commons and a property, 
Chapter 6 draws on a typology of intellectual commons of Drahos (1996, 
2006) to develop an analytical framework of four types of “PGRFA 
knowledge commons”: positive inclusive, positive exclusive, negative 
inclusive and negative exclusive. This framework explains how 
globalisation of intellectual property regulation – through the TRIPS 
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Agreement and the UPOV Convention – and the global standards on access 
and benefit sharing and farmers’ rights of the CBD and the ITPGRFA have 
led to a situation where multiple layers of positive and negative commons 
exist to regulate the use and exchange of PGRFA. In other words, the 
framework helps to show how such global regulations have moved away 
from open access-based positive inclusive commons to the different 
categories of restrictive positive exclusive, negative inclusive and negative 
exclusive commons. 
Following the discussion on global regulations, Chapters 7 and 8 focus on 
national and local regulatory trends and dynamics of commons, property 
and PGRFA in Nepal. Chapter 7 first sets a broader national context of the 
first enclosure movement, particularly highlighting the historical trends of 
enclosures of natural resources such as land and forest in Nepal. It then 
discusses the second enclosure movement focusing on the historical and 
emerging trends and contexts in relation to the regulation of PGRFA. The 
chapter shows that due to the influence from the regulatory process of 
globalisation as well as actors and networks at national and international 
levels, Nepal has been gearing towards the design and implementation of 
new regulatory principles that largely change the commons and property 
dynamics of the national regulation of PGRFA, as well as the dynamics of 
the local seed system. The chapter also discusses the regulatory trends and 
contexts in relation to regulatory capture, meta-regulation and networked 
governance, for example, when Nepal was pressured to join the UPOV 
Convention and partner with multinational seed companies like Monsanto to 
promote the use and sale of hybrid seeds. 
Chapter 8 – using the same framework of PGRFA knowledge commons –  
analyses how farmers’ local, traditional seed system is characterised by the 
elements of positive inclusive commons, that is, all human beings, regardless 
of geography, race or culture, own and use PGRFA, though only with the 
consent of the commoners. Then, the chapter analyses the contents of the 
national regulations by examining the existing legislation, including draft 
laws that govern the seed system, plant breeders’ rights, access and benefit 
sharing and farmers’ rights. This analysis shows Nepal’s regulatory 
initiatives are making a departure from the elements of positive inclusive 
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commons to a complicated system of multiple layers of positive and 
negative commons.  
Part III analyses the concepts, goals, objectives and impacts of community 
seed banks, together with an analysis of similar networks that operate in 
developed countries through seed savers’ groups. Chapters 9 to 10 of this 
part investigate how the regulatory dynamics, actors and networks of 
community seed banks relate with or are impacted by the regulations of 
formality and informality of seed systems and the commons and property 
notions of PGRFA. Chapter 9 explores the trends of organised initiatives for 
conservation, use and exchange of local, native seeds of crop varieties that 
are well-reflected in seed savers’ networks of the developed world and 
community seed banks of the developing world.  
In the developed world, with their sole focus on extending farmers’ 
networks for exchange of heirloom and open-pollinated varieties that are 
non-hybrid, non-patented and free from genetic modification, seed savers’ 
networks have emerged as important actors to counterbalance the impacts of 
the formal seed system, intellectual property rights and technologies like 
genetic engineering. In the developing world, community seed banks have 
come into existence for a variety of reasons, for example, as a post war 
recovery instrument, as a field bank of local varieties, and as an enterprise 
to produce, exchange and sell seeds of local and modern varieties of both 
informal and formal seed systems. 
Drawing on the origin, objectives and functions of community seed banks in 
Nepal, Chapter 10 builds a case of an emerging typology of community 
seed banks that interact in different ways with formal and informal seed 
systems. Within such a typology, there are self-regulatory de facto 
community seed banks that have been active for generations with customary 
practices to promote the use of farm-saved seeds and their exchange within 
local, traditional seed system. Likewise, there also exist organised 
community seed banks that came into existence first in the 1990s and then 
started to expand thereafter in several regions of the country. As organised 
community seed banks work within informal or formal or both seed 
systems, farmers not only have opportunities to protect and promote the use 
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and exchange of native and local seeds, but also face challenges from the 
emerging regulatory trends and dynamics of formality and property rights. 
Chapter 11 presents the conclusion of the thesis in relation to the formality 
and informality of the seed system, commons and property notions of 
PGRFA and community seed banks. It then discusses the desirability of a 
regulatory system that builds on the concepts of the networked model of 
regulation. The chapter argues that Nepal’s seed regulation needs to move 
beyond the idea of supporting only the formal seed system through a 
deliberately constructed linear model of seed sector development. It shows 
that it is desirable for Nepal’s seed regulation to draw upon a model of 
networked governance to address the interests of the state, private sector, 
and importantly, local, indigenous and farming communities.  
Finally, the chapter highlights the contribution the thesis has made in the 
regulatory discourse of formality, informality, commons, property, and 
community seed banks.  
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Chapter 2 
Methodology  
 
2.1 Genesis of the research idea  
The idea of conducting this research has its genesis in the outcomes of an 
international event I participated in 2011. It was the Fourth Session of the 
Governing Body of the ITPGRFA, held from 14 to 18 March in 2011 in 
Indonesia. At this session, a major issue of negotiation was the progress 
made in reviewing, and if necessary, adjusting “national measures” 
affecting farmers’ rights, including the rights to save, exchange, reuse and 
sell seeds. Contracting parties were to make such progress in accordance 
with the Resolution on Farmers’ Rights (Resolution 6/2009), adopted by the 
Third Session held in June 2006 in Tunisia. 
Before I mention what exactly motivated me to undertake this research, let 
me first briefly explain why the adoption of this Resolution was not an easy 
process. Developing countries had been calling for a resolution that would 
require the parties to review and adjust “seed regulations” as these affect 
farmers’ rights in many ways. These countries were of the view that more 
focus is often placed on the impacts of patent and plant breeders’ rights 
laws. There is much less focus on formal seed regulations that undermine 
farmers’ rights through strict provisions on variety development, quality 
control, certification and sale of seeds.  
However, as a result of lobbying by some developed countries such as 
Australia and Canada, the final Resolution on Farmers’ Rights was adopted 
by replacing “seed regulations” with “national measures”4. These countries 
put forward the argument that the Treaty only requires the parties to 
implement farmers’ rights at the national level and it is essentially a national 
concern. The negotiation on the implementation of the Resolution on 
Farmers’ Rights was an agenda item of the Fourth Session as well. It was 
pointed out that only six contracting parties had submitted their views on 
the implementation of farmers’ rights and there was rarely any progress in 
4  http://www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/R6_2009_en.pdf (last accessed 21 December 2015). 
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addressing the issue of reviewing and adjusting national measures, 
including seed regulations.       
As a non-government observer of the Fourth Session and a Rapporteur of 
the Asia and near East region, I had an opportunity to make a presentation 
in a sideline event organised by Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) of Norway. 
The presentation was part of the findings of the Report of the Global 
Consultation on Farmers’ Rights organised by FNI in Ethiopia from 23 to 
25 November 2011. An excerpt from the report that I made part of my 
presentation is as follows:    
“In most countries there are national measures in place regulating 
seed, most have seed legislation and some also have plant breeders’ 
rights, although most of the countries represented have not joined 
UPOV. National policies on biodiversity are also being developed in 
some of the countries. The participants agreed on the need for a 
review of national measures…” Andersen et al. (2011, p. 74). 
At the Fourth Session, I also had an opportunity to work closely with 
government delegates from Nepal, mainly in preparing Nepal’s official 
statements for formal negotiations among the contracting parties. During 
my informal interaction with a Nepali delegate, I inquired about Nepal’s 
preparation in relation to reviewing and adjusting seed regulations and 
intellectual property laws. He expressed the concern that no such study had 
been done by the government. He was also uncertain as to whether any 
country had in fact undertaken such a study. 
I also discussed this issue with the other Nepali participants in the Fourth 
Session who represented the non-government sector and the national gene 
bank of Nepal. I received similar feedback. My further interaction with 
some researchers of a community-based organisation in Nepal – Local 
Initiatives for Biodiversity, Research and Development (LIBIRD) – added 
to my motivation to systematically research seed regulations, intellectual 
property and biodiversity laws. In particular, their inputs helped me to link 
the research idea to ground-level practices. This led me to think about the 
experiences of community seed banks in Nepal.  
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2.2 Research design 
A number of factors influenced the research design process. First, I had to 
deal with the complexity of global and national trends in seed systems 
largely influenced by the notions of formality and informality (Chapters 3-
4). Second, vague and complex global and national regulatory landscapes of 
commons and property in relation to the use and exchange of PGRFA had to 
be considered (Chapters 5-8). Third, I also had to address the diversity of 
global and local dynamics of community seed banks (Chapters 9-10). 
Additionally, there was the problem of how best to gather data from Nepal’s 
different geographic settings and diversity of actors and networks of state, 
private, non-government and community sectors working under different 
contexts of formality, informality, commons, property and community seed 
systems.  
I decided to approach this complexity through a flexible, qualitative 
research design using a case study approach that drew on the techniques of 
in-depth, interpretive socio-legal investigation. In particular, the case study 
approach enabled me to go beyond the study of the dynamics present in a 
single setting and analyse multiple situations and phenomena faced by 
actors and networks in different geographical and context-specific settings 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Yin, 2013).  
Between 2012 and 2013, I visited Nepal two times to gather data from 
different geographical locations and a diverse group of actors and networks, 
using a variety of research methods. For primary data, I used three methods: 
preliminary observation; semi-structured interviews with key informants 
from government, private and non-government sectors; and focus group 
discussions (as well as semi-structured interviews) with farmers, managers 
and mobilisers of community seed banks. For secondary data, I used socio-
legal methods to undertake a review and analysis of documented 
information and knowledge on international, national and local regulatory 
trends and dynamics.   
The gathered data were analysed in the context of the concepts and/or 
analytical frameworks of the regulation of formality, informality, commons 
and property. The analysis of the data also benefitted from the feedback I 
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received on the presentations I made concerning the initial findings of this 
research in different international, South Asian and national meetings held 
between 2012 and 2015 in Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Norway and the 
USA. During my fieldwork in 2013, I was also invited by the Ministry of 
Agriculture to moderate a policy meeting on ITPGRFA and Nepal’s agenda. 
The discussion at this meeting helped me to refine my analysis and findings. 
2.3 Selection of Nepal as a case study  
While Nepal’s selection as a case study is rooted in the outcomes of the 
Fourth Session of the ITPGRFA, there are various reasons why the country 
fits well in this research. First, though Nepal comprises less than 0.1 percent 
of the Earth’s land mass, it ranks 31st in the world in terms of biodiversity. 
It is also rich in agricultural biodiversity owing to significant agro-
ecological variations and diverse social-cultural settings and farming 
systems in the mountain, hill and the Terai (plain land) regions (CGRFA, 
2008). However, the government’s policy has always been to focus more on 
the commercialisation of agriculture for which it relies on the import of 
plant varieties and improved seeds. There has been less policy emphasis on 
the promotion of conservation and use of native and local plant varieties. 
Importantly, the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy also identifies 
“commercialisation of agriculture” as a major reason for the loss of 
agriculture biodiversity in the country (MOFSC, 2002, p. 77).  
Second, with 83 percent of a total population of more than 28 million 
residing in rural areas, agriculture in Nepal – aside from forests and other 
natural resources – plays a significant role in supporting farmers’ 
livelihoods. These farmers comprise the so-called upper castes such as 
Brahmins and Chhetris, as well as 59 indigenous ethnic groups who 
altogether speak 22 languages and 96 dialects. A majority of Nepali farmers 
are poor, hold less than 0.5 hectares of land and depend on subsistence 
farming for livelihoods (CBS, 2011; CGRFA, 2008). The regulatory trends 
in terms of formal and informal seed systems hold significant implications 
as a majority of farmers rely on indigenous, customary practices of using 
their own farm inputs including seeds. There is, however, little academic 
research on the history, nature, actors and networks of these custom-based 
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seed systems, and in particular, the interaction between the formal and 
informal seed systems.  
Third, Nepal is a contracting party to the CBD and the ITPGRFA, and is 
obliged to implement the TRIPS Agreement as a least-developed member of 
the WTO. As Nepal is in the process of developing relevant national laws, 
these global regulatory instruments have far reaching impacts on its national 
regulation of commons and property notions of PGRFA, formality and 
informality of the seed system and community seed banks.  
Fourth, Nepal is a site of intense networked action by civil society 
organisations and farmers. It has a history of campaigns such as “No to 
UPOV” and “No to Monsanto” providing data on cases of confrontation and 
contests amongst networks made up of global, national and local actors. The 
country is also rich in examples of how networks of state and non-state 
actors can collaborate to explore and design sui generis options to protect 
the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over seeds and 
traditional knowledge. There has been little analysis of these networked 
contests and collaborations in Nepal, especially how they have shaped 
Nepal’s seed regulation, including the PGRFA regime.        
Fifth, Nepal is an important source of data on community seed banks. The 
idea of establishing a community seed bank was first operationalised in the 
1990s in Nepal. Since then, more than one hundred community seed banks 
have been established covering the country’s three ecological regions – 
mountains, hills and Terai (plain land). While some of the earlier 
community seed banks were established with support from non-government 
organisations for the purpose of ensuring the security of local seeds, some 
others were created as part of the government’s programme to ensure food 
security through the use of quality (often modern, improved) seeds. The 
effectiveness of community seed banks in Nepal has so far been considered 
positive, for example, in terms of facilitating the use and exchange of seeds 
among farmers. However, the typology, nature and impacts of the 
community seed banks have not been studied using the lens of formality and 
informality of the seed system and commons and property notions of 
PGRFA.  
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2.4 Research methods  
The thesis relies on a review and analysis of both academic and ‘grey’ 
literature. Reviewing the ‘grey’ literature was important in relation to 
gaining insights into the experiences of seed savers’ networks, community 
seed banks, as well as the regulatory issues facing Nepal. Together with the 
‘grey’ literature, the review of the academic literature helped in developing 
ideas about the concepts, theories and analytical frameworks relevant to the 
regulation of formality, informality, commons and property.  
For fieldwork data, a variety of research methods were applied during the 
two visits to Nepal, involving a total of 118 participants (Table 2.1). The 
first visit took place in 2012 between 16 and 30 December for the purpose 
of identifying the issues that various networks saw as being the important 
ones to address. Focus group discussion, and then one-to-one interaction 
with key informants from government, non-government and private sectors, 
were employed to gain insights into the concerns of these networks. I also 
got insights into the issues of community seed banks by interacting with 
farmers involved in the management of such banks in different districts of 
Nepal. During this visit, I also got important feedback on the presentation I 
made on community seed banks in a South Asian context at a Regional 
Consultation on Trade, Climate Change and Food Security5. 
The second visit took place in 2013 between 24 July and 8 October. In this 
extended fieldwork trip, data were gathered from different actors and 
networks in different geographic locations. I undertook semi-structured 
interviews with key informants from government, private and non-
government sectors of Lalitpur, Kathmandu and Bhaktapur districts. I also 
organised a focus group discussion with six mobilisers of community seed 
banks in the Pokhara district as these mobilisers were directly linked with 
the 16 community seed banks operating in the different districts of the 
country. Finally, I conducted semi-structured interviews with the managers 
of three community seed banks in Lalitpur, Bara and Sindhupalchok 
districts and later arranged for three focus group discussions with farmers 
from each of these banks.  
5  http://www.sawtee.org/presentations/SessionTwo20Dec2012.pdf (last accessed November 2015). 
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Table 2.1: Two phases of fieldwork 
Preliminary observation and mapping of the extent of fieldwork in 2012 
Research methods Key dates and districts No. of 
participants 
Focus group discussion  18 December in Kathmandu 18 
One-to-one personal interaction 
with key informants 
Between 20 and 39 
December in Lalitpur, 
Kathmandu and Bhaktapur 
11 
Main fieldwork in 2013 
Focus group discussion with 
mobilisers of community seed 
banks 
23 August 2013, Pokhara  6 
Interviews with key informants 
from government, non-
government and private sectors 
Between 25 July and 8 
October in Lalitpur, 
Kathmandu and Bhaktapur  
20 
Interviews with three managers 
of the community seed banks in 
Dalchoki, Kachorwa and 
Thumpakhar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between 4 September and 5 
October in Lalitpur, Bara 
and Sindhupalchok  
3 
Focus group discussion with 
farmers of the Thumpakhar 
Community Seed Bank 
17 
Focus group discussion with 
farmers of the Kachorwa 
Community Seed Bank 
15 
Focus group discussion with 
farmers of the Dalchoki 
Community Seed Bank 
11 
Interviews with local people6 of 
Thumpakhar, Kachorwa and 
Dalchoki villages 
17 
Total no. of participants 118 
 
2.4.1 Document review and analysis  
An important part of my socio-legal method was to review the international 
laws that were the subject of policy contestation and implementation in 
Nepal.  The TRIPS Agreement, the UPOV Convention, the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA were reviewed as per the scholarly discussion of their scope, 
nature and impacts on a country like Nepal. Thus far Nepal has not enacted 
any national law for the implementation of these international laws. While 
Nepal is opposed to joining the UPOV Convention, it has introduced draft 
6  These local people included a local school teacher, officers of community projects, farmers and 
their family members who provided accommodation during the stay in villages, and people 
available to talk in local tea and food shops.   
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bills7 (yet to be enacted as laws) as part of its obligations under the TRIPS 
Agreement, CBD and ITPGRFA (Chapter 8).  
These bills have been the subject of networked scrutiny and contestation 
and so have gone through a number of revisions. Obtaining the latest (and 
authentic) bills was key to understanding Nepal’s current regulatory 
framework. I had to contact a number of people in government and non-
government organisations to obtain access to the bills. Since these bills have 
not been discussed in detail and only a few studies exist in the ‘grey’ 
literature, I had to rely mostly on the interviews and meetings I participated 
in Nepal in order to gain an understanding of how people understood their 
likely operation and consequences. The overall analysis on these (and other) 
matters of the thesis also benefitted from my previous engagement in policy 
research in Nepal. I worked at a Nepal-based regional network, South Asia 
Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE) between 2001 
and 2011, focussing mostly on policy and legal aspects of biodiversity 
management, intellectual property and farmers’ rights. 
On formality and informality dynamics, there was very little information, 
mainly with regard to the growth of the formal seed system in Nepal. I then 
decided to explore the historical context and development of the formal seed 
system, by thoroughly reviewing Nepal’s periodic development plans and 
programmes the country had undertaken since the 1950s. Chapter 3 
provides the reader with some of the important historical contexts for 
Nepal’s seed system.   
I drew on the large literature surrounding informality to help analyse the 
fieldwork data that I had gathered on the local, customary dynamics of seed 
use and exchange in Nepal (Chapter 4). I also collected digital copies of all 
National Agriculture Census Reports and Nepal Living Standard Surveys of 
various periods to help with the analysis of the formal and informal 
dynamics in Nepal. For some of the Census Reports, I had to personally 
visit the Central Bureau of Statistics in Kathmandu and request copies.  
7  Throughout the thesis, these have been referred to as bills and draft bills, interchangeably. 
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On finding ways to understand the dynamics of community seed banks, I 
again had to mostly rely on the academic as well as ‘grey’ literature. Since 
2014, there has, however, been some growth in the academic writing on 
community seed banks. I use some of this writing in Chapters 9 and 10 to 
develop my arguments. To collect documented data on seed banks, I also 
used my professional networks. In 2012, when I had just started my 
research, I contacted an official of the Norway-based Development Fund in 
order to obtain the case studies of community seed banks that the Fund had 
conducted in eight countries, including Nepal. After receiving these case 
studies, I also contacted the officials of LIBIRD and Bioversity 
International for the case studies and publications they had on community 
seed banks. They sent me some of their case studies, including a book8 that 
provides insights into the global and national experiences of community 
seed banks.  
I have also created a facebook page of Community Seed Banks, in which 
454 people are members from different countries, though mostly from 
Nepal9. This has helped me to track important news and developments in 
the academic and ‘grey’ literature on community seed banks. In addition, 
my interaction with the others through this page has also helped me look for 
data for this research. I have also been a member of the facebook pages of 
different seed savers’ networks10. This has helped me observe how farmers 
in developed and developing countries share views to promote the idea of 
saving, using and exchanging native and local (heirloom) varieties. 
2.4.2 Preliminary observation and mapping of the extent of the 
main fieldwork  
I went to Nepal for a preliminary observation and mapping of the extent of 
fieldwork on 16-30 December 2012. I organised a focus group discussion in 
Kathmandu inviting the key actors from the government, non-government 
and private sectors. Some farmers from the community seed banks of 
8  Shrestha, P., Vernooy, R., & Chaudhary, P. (2013).  
9  https://www.facebook.com/groups/291333294360492/ (last accessed 12 January 2016).  
10  https://www.facebook.com/groups/waseedexchange/; 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/chilliseedsavers/; 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/PakistanSeedSaversAndExchange/ (last accessed 24 
December 2016). 
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different districts were also the participants in this discussion. My previous 
office, SAWTEE, helped me organise this meeting on its premises.  
I moderated the discussion and also made a presentation on the typology of 
community seed banks I had developed out of the review of case studies of 
community seed banks. While I received important feedback on the 
typology, the discussion provided me with important inputs for the main 
fieldwork I was intending to do in mid-2013. An important insight I gained 
from this discussion was the diversity in the structure and objectives of 
community seed banks in Nepal. I realised that I needed to choose my set of 
community seed banks for further investigation based on their linkages with 
formal and informal seed systems. While the ones created by the 
government seemed more aligned with the formal seed system, the ones 
created initially by some non-government organisations were working 
towards strengthening the informal seed system.  
This focus group discussion, followed by one-to-one personal interaction 
with key actors, helped to confirm that interviews and focus group 
discussions would be appropriate tools for this case study. Overall, this visit 
provided me with a fair idea about the methods to apply during the main 
fieldwork, and who to contact for interviews and focus group discussions. It 
also helped me to estimate a possible timeframe that would be required for 
the semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions in different 
locations of Nepal.  
2.4.3 Interviews and focus group discussions during the main 
fieldwork 
In the second visit between July and October 2013, I conducted the main 
fieldwork through interviews and focus group discussions in different 
geographic locations. Initially, I conducted 20 semi-structured interviews – 
8 officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Forest and Seed 
Quality Control Centre; 3 from the Nepal Agriculture Research Council 
(includes the national gene bank); 6 from non-government organisations; 
and 3 from the private seed business sector. The number of private seed 
traders is small compared to others, but I was at least able to interview a 
trader who was a key person in the largest network of private seed entities – 
Association of Seed Entrepreneurs’ Association of Nepal.  
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The interview sampling was purposive. Interviewees were identified based 
on their expertise on issues of formality, informality, commons, property 
and community seed banks. Appointments for interviews were made by 
myself and in some cases through the help of a local researcher. He also 
helped me in conducting interviews with key informants, including the 
managers of the community seed banks in different geographical locations. 
Interviews were conducted generally over 50-100 minutes.  
In the case of gathering data on community seed banks I used semi-
structured interviews and focus group discussions with mobilisers, 
managers and farmers of community seed banks, following the steps shown 
in Figure 2.1.  
Figure 2.1: Map of Nepal showing the presence of community seed 
banks in several districts and steps followed to gather data  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Step 1: A focus group discussion 
with mobilisers of 16 seed banks  
Step 2: Interviews with officials of the 
Ministry of Agriculture which created five 
seed banks with a plan to establish more 
Step 4: Site visits to three seed banks for 
interviews and focus group discussions with 
farmers, covering low land to high land  
Step 3: Interview with an official 
of Oxfam Nepal which created 90 
seed banks in just two districts 
Map description: Red locations are the districts where community seed banks have 
been created in Nepal. Yellow arrow shows the Bara district where LIBIRD and the 
Nepal Agriculture Research Council have established the Kachorwa Community 
Seed Bank; Blue arrow shows the Lalitpur district where USC Canada Nepal has 
established the Dalchoki Community Seed Bank; and Red arrow shows the 
Sindhupalchok district where the government has supported the establishment of the 
Thumpakhar Community Seed Bank.  
Source of the map: Shrestha et al. (2013). 
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These interviews led to insights into the experiences of the different banks 
operating in different locations. In the case of interviews with the 
mobilisers, managers and farmers, interviews were generally conducted 
over two hours, as they needed more time to open up and then discuss 
issues. As shown in the figure, first, I conducted a focus group discussion 
with six mobilisers of the banks. ‘Mobilisers’ means the actors involved in 
the creation and operation of the banks. These mobilisers represented the 
non-government sector and were directly linked with the creation and 
management of 16 community seed banks that mostly focus on the 
conservation, use and exchange of native and local varieties among local 
farmers. This focus group discussion was conducted in the Pokhara district, 
where six researchers of USC Canada and LIBIRD – major mobilisers of 
community seed banks in Nepal – participated for a whole day discussion 
on the different dynamics of community seed banks, including their origin, 
objectives and impacts. This discussion was critical to providing important 
information about seed bank movements across South Asia and in other 
countries, including seed savers’ networks in Australia and Canada.   
Second, I interviewed officials from the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
Ministry has created a different model of community seed banks in different 
districts. Third, I interviewed an official from Oxfam Nepal which has, in 
line with the objectives of the government, created 90 community seed 
banks in Nepal. Finally, I interviewed the managers of three different 
community seed banks. ‘Managers’ mean the chief farmers who manage the 
operation of the bank in coordination with member farmers. These 
managers then supported me in visiting their sites of work and organising 
three focus group discussions with 11, 15 and 17 local farmers from the 
Lalitpur, Bara and Sindhupalchok districts, respectively. These focus group 
discussions helped in triangulating the information and data gathered from 
the initial interviews with the mobilisers and managers of the community 
seed banks. These focus group discussions were conducted for about four 
hours on the premises of the banks.  
For site visits, the Lalitpur district, which is a hill region, was chosen 
because the Dalchoki Community Seed Bank of the district was the first-
ever example of an organised community seed bank in Nepal. It was 
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established by USC Canada, which supports the creation of community seed 
banks across many countries through its Seeds of Survival Programme. The 
Bara district, which is a fertile region of the Terai (plain land), was chosen 
because the Kachorwa Community Seed Bank of the district is considered 
an organised model bank for its contribution to the conservation, use and 
exchange of native and local varieties. This bank was established with 
support from LIBIRD, the Nepal Agriculture Research Council and 
Bioversity International. The Sindhupalchok district, which is mountainous 
and rich in biodiversity, was chosen because of the focus of the 
Thumpakhar Community Seed Bank on modern, improved varieties of the 
formal seed system. Its operation is supported by the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  
Having described the methodology of the research, let us now turn to the 
examination of the regulatory trends and dynamics of formality and 
informality of the seed system, commons and property notions of PGRFA 
and community seed banks in the substantive Chapters 3-10. The next 
chapter discusses the trends and dynamics of formality and informality, and 
the evolution of the formal seed system Nepal. 
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Chapter 3 
Trends and dynamics of formality and 
informality: The emergence of formal 
seed system in Nepal 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The development discourse on formality and informality is not new. 
Scholars have been debating the concepts and features of formality and 
informality for a long time and in different disciplines. This chapter briefly 
provides a broader context of the development discourse on formality and 
informality, highlighting that informality, though often treated as a 
neglected (or illegal) sector, remains important for development discourse, 
process and planning. This background will help to provide a better 
understanding of the role of the informal seed sector in Nepal. 
The chapter then presents an analysis of the global trends and dynamics of 
formality and informality in the seed system including in developing 
countries. It briefly explores how the regulation of the seed system through 
formal means and laws got its space and role in separating the profession of 
farming from seed production, gradually re-conceptualising the oldest 
farmers’ seed system as an informal system in the present world of 
globalisation.  
The chapter then provides a historical analysis of how global trends of the 
formality of the seed system affected Nepal’s seed sector from the 1950s. 
As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 13) argue, “globalization of regulation 
never occurs on the basis of a single mechanism, no matter how powerful.” 
This chapter shows that dense webs of internal and external influences have 
played a pivotal role in creating and expanding the formal seed system in 
Nepal. As we will see, not only the government, but also the donor 
agencies, international agriculture research centres and the private sector 
have been part of such a regulatory process of globalisation.   
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3.2 Broader context of formality and informality  
The development discourse on formality and informality has a history of 
more than half a century (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007). In the 1940s, Julius 
Herman Boeke, a Dutch anthropologist, identified a developing economy as 
a “dual economy”, which, as he views, comprises an urban market economy 
with a capitalist nature and a rural subsistence economy with static 
agriculture system of production (Boeke, 1943, 1953).  
As the rebirth of the development economics in the early post-World War II 
period coincided with the revival of development theories focusing on the 
workings of the market and the role of the state (Ranis, 2004), a number of 
economists too have explored the formal and informal nature and 
characteristics of the dual economy. For example, in the 1950s, the Nobel 
laureate Arthur W. Lewis – in his theory of unlimited supply of labour from 
agriculture to industry jobs – discussed labour market dualism, in which one 
sector is capitalist, modern, industrial or urban (formal) and the other is 
subsistence, traditional, agricultural or rural (informal) (Lewis, 1954).  
Similarly, in the 1970s, two development economists – John R. Harris and 
Michael P. Todaro – conceptualised the dual economy into a simple 
equilibrium model that consists of an urban and a rural sector (Harris & 
Todaro, 1970). Then, Keith Hart, professor of economic anthropology, 
made an important contribution to the discourse of formality and 
informality (Hart, 1973, 1985). In fact, Hart is also considered the first 
person to bring the term “informal sector” into research and policy focus 
from a Third World context (Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2006). He described 
the informal sector as an urban labour force that works outside the formal 
labour market (Hart, 1973).  
In addition to Hart, the initiatives of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) are also considered to have played a pivotal role in understanding the 
dichotomy between formal and informal sectors (Bangasser, 2000; 
Gerxhani, 2004; Guha-Khasnobis et al., 2007). The ILO has, in particular, 
contributed to build further the concept of informality, initially based on the 
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report of the ILO mission to Kenya11 and later through negotiations for and 
resolutions on the need to recognise the role and contribution of the 
informal sector.  
Since the concept of informality has come into the research and policy 
focus, there is a growing interest to explain the informal sector as well as 
analyse the dichotomy between formality and informality. Over time, 
analyses of the nature of and trends in formality and informality have not 
remained confined to an examination of economic dualism or employment 
and unemployment trends in labour markets. The study of the presence, 
nature, size and type of the informal sector is also visible in other fields 
such as criminology, finance, law, political science, public policy, 
sociology, statistics and trade. Studies on informality are not, however, 
uniform and have used a variety of contexts and criteria of informality. This 
is also a reason behind divergent views about how to define, measure, 
classify, and respond to the informal sector (Hussmanns, 2004).  
In addition, the literature on informality is not consistent in using the term 
itself and has explained it with a plethora of appellations including hidden, 
grey, shadow, clandestine, underground, illegal, irregular, unorganised, 
unofficial, unobserved, unreported, unrecorded, unmeasured, untaxed, non-
structured, petty production, subterranean, cash economy, second, parallel, 
and black market (Feige, 1990; Sindzingre, 2006). While such appellations 
may give a negative meaning to what the informal economy or sector is, 
there are two main reasons for informality to remain important in 
development discourse, process and planning.  
First, though there were assumptions that it would disappear in the course of 
economic development (Porta & Shleifer, 2014), the informal sector is 
increasingly becoming normal. It has emerged in new contexts and guises, 
and is prevalent in many unexpected places, not only in developing but also 
in developed countries. Second, support for  the informal sector has been 
11  The report was on employment, incomes and equality in Kenya. In the report, “the 'informal 
sector' consists of things 'done in a certain way'-a way characterized by ease of entry into the 
activity concerned, reliance on indigenous resources, family ownership, smallness of scale, labour 
intensiveness and 'adapted technology', skills acquired outside the formal school system and 
unregulated and competitive markets” (Leys, 1973, p. 425).   
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growing with the recognition that it contributes to promote growth and 
reduce poverty (Chen, 2005).  
For example, the ILO has argued, recognising the informal economy is a 
critical aspect of growth and development processes though it remains 
outside the social protection and tax system. According to a 2002 ILO 
resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy, the term 
informal economy refers to:  
“all economic activities by workers and economic units that are – in law 
or in practice – not covered or insufficiently covered by formal 
arrangements. Their activities are not included in the law, which means 
that they are operating outside the formal reach of the law; or they are 
not covered in practice, which means that – although they are operating 
within the formal reach of the law, the law is not applied or not 
enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, 
burdensome, or imposes excessive costs”12.  
Since formality is about the formal reach of the law, according to North 
(1992), it is ensured through codified and written rules, directives and 
contracts that are outlined, for example, in constitutions, articles of the law, 
company directives, working contracts, etc. In contrast, as North (1992) 
mentions, informal institutions operate through (often unexpressed) cultural 
norms, taboos and values, conventions, customs and practices that are 
reproduced by all members of the society (Cited from, Etzold et al., 2009).  
3.3 Formality and informality dynamics in seed system 
According to Bourdieu (1998), informal rules have emerged in accordance 
with routines, customs or traditions over many years and such rules 
manifest themselves in a specific habitus (Cited from, Etzold et al., 2009). 
In the case of agriculture too, traditional practices to secure and store seeds 
are not a new phenomenon, but have evolved out of local, customary rules 
that farmers all over the world followed over the past several millennia.  
Roughly 10,000 years ago, together with the emergence of agriculture, 
farmers not only started to domesticate wild plants and animals that today 
12  http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--
relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_218128.pdf (last accessed 7 November 2015). 
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feed the world, but also to use, retain and exchange seeds among themselves 
for future cultivation and for specific genetic features such as faster growth, 
taste and adaptive traits. The global plant genetic diversity that exists today 
is, therefore, an outcome of continuous efforts of domestication, 
conservation and use by farmers (Harlan, 1975). As farmers developed 
thousands of crop varieties in hundreds of species (Cleveland et al., 2000), 
and continue to do so under on-farm conditions, they are considered the 
conservers, guardians, custodians and innovators of a vast number of crop 
varieties (Andersen, 2005, 2008; Bala Ravi, 2004; Posey & Dutfield, 1996).  
However, since the late 19th century and mainly after the early 20th century, 
farmers’ traditional practices of domestication, conservation and use of crop 
varieties started to face significant impacts from a number of technological 
and policy developments in international agriculture (Kloppenburg, 2005). 
Such developments can be better explained by an analysis of the shift in the 
regulation of the seed sector, that is, from a formally unregulated traditional, 
indigenous system of production, saving, use, exchange and sale of seeds 
under the informal seed system to a modern, regulated system of 
production, use, sale and marketing of seeds under the formal seed system.    
Mainly after the early 20th century, based on Darwin’s theory of evolution 
through selection and the genetic mechanisms of evolution developed by 
Mendel and others, a new breeding and development sector emerged to 
apply genetics to develop varieties of crops for commercial seed production 
(Allard, 1999; Cleveland et al., 2000). Initially with the entry in North 
America and Europe, this new breeding and development sector – 
consisting of a highly sophisticated workforce of modern, scientific and 
professional breeders – made the profession of farming separate from seed 
production. Gradually in the decades after World War II, this sector started 
to come up with modern varieties of crops (such as high-yielding varieties, 
hybrids and genetically modified seeds) and inputs (such as chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides) (Borowiak, 2004; Kloppenburg, 1988; Tansey & 
Rajotte, 2008).  
These developments had a strong influence on the focus of most agriculture 
research and development programmes in many countries, including in 
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Africa and Asia, as they were convinced and assured of the benefits of new 
technologies in increasing food production and productivity (Louwaars et 
al., 2013). One may recall here an often-cited statement made by President 
Harry Truman of the US in his inaugural address on 20 January 1949:    
“…we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of 
our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the 
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas…More than half the 
people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their 
food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is 
primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to 
them and to more prosperous areas.” (Truman, 1999, p. 4). 
While Banerjee (2003, p. 149) criticises this statement for setting “the stage 
for the new imperialism”,  there are grounds to believe that in the decades 
after the 1940s, the transfer of technologies from the developed world and 
international agriculture research centres to the developing world became a 
major thrust to advance agriculture development and ensure food security. 
For example, supported by advanced techniques of plant breeding, a 
technology for dramatic increase in yields came to the forefront of 
agriculture research in the form of the Green Revolution. Though the 
research for this technology started in Mexico in the 1940s, the Green 
Revolution was promoted, for example in South and East Asia, since the 
1960s (Pinstrup-Andersen & Watson II, 2011).  
At the start, the Green Revolution, with accompanying technology such as 
chemical fertilisers and pesticides, focussed on the establishment and 
development of the public sector so that high-yielding varieties were 
transferred to farmers for cultivation. The same notion also motivated the 
countries adopting this technology to establish and strengthen centralised 
seed production units as public institutions or state enterprises (Cromwell et 
al., 1992; Louwaars et al., 2013).  
However, since the mid-1980s and 1990s, due to the economic trends of 
structural adjustment and liberalisation – which were also influenced by the 
commercialisation of agriculture, the gene revolution, stronger intellectual 
property rights protections, and more open international markets – the seed 
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production units were transformed into private seed enterprises (Cooper et 
al., 2006; Louwaars & de Boef, 2012; Raney & Pingali, 2005).  
Gradually, the neo-liberal structural adjustment, growth and development 
policies of the 1990s not only strengthened the role of the private sector in 
agriculture research and dissemination, but also led to such private sector-
supportive seed policies and laws that focus more on market-oriented 
formal seed systems (Louwaars et al., 2013). As modern plant breeding – 
supported by modern chemistry, biology, genetics and also information 
technology – advanced (Suslow et al., 2002), the private sector expanded to 
use the global collections of PGRFA and started to encroach upon the 
biodiversity commons, for instance, by two means.  
As Shiva (1993) explains, the first such means were technologies like 
terminator genes and hybridisation. Both of these do not allow the plants to 
reproduce seeds13, thereby preventing farmers from using the traditional 
technique of saving seeds for future production. The second means were 
intellectual property rights such as patents and plant breeders’ rights. Both 
of these rights establish or support legal monopolies (exclusive rights for the 
owners) over production, reproduction, marketing and use of seeds (Also 
see, Hubicki & Sherman, 2005). These genetic and legal technologies have 
helped to shape a global seed market in which the share of a few 
multinational seed companies increased from 21.1 percent in 1994 to 53.9 
percent in 2009, creating the situation of a growing corporate control over 
seeds of the formal seed system (Adhikari, 2009b; Fuglie & Toole, 2014). 
Due to these developments, today’s seed system – mainly in developing and 
least-developed countries – is composed of not just farmers who operate 
through farmer-to-farmer seed networks for exchange and use of seeds. 
There are also other organisations and institutions involved in different 
stages of selection, production, multiplication, processing, storage, 
13  Terminator genes are the products of terminator technology, also called Genetic Use Restriction 
Technologies. With this technology, genetic modification of plants is done to make them produce 
sterile seeds (Ohlgart, 2002). Likewise, hybrid seeds, also known as F1 seeds, are the products of 
a plant variety developed through a specific, controlled cross of two parent plants. Since F1 plants 
do not usually produce uniform offspring, the formal seed actors benefit from regular seed sales 
by restricting farmers to save seeds for the next season (Also see, Borowiak, 2004).  
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distribution and marketing of seeds. To put it in terms identified by many 
scholars, there exist formal and informal seed systems (Almekinders et al., 
1994; Aw-Hassan et al., 2008; Etwire et al., 2013; Lomnitz, 1988; 
Louwaars & de Boef, 2012; Louwaars et al., 2013; Pandey et al., 2011; 
Sthapit, 2012; Thijssen et al., 2008).  
While formal actors and agencies are typically focussed on sophisticated 
breeding, development and diffusion of high-yielding varieties under formal 
conditions of certification, standardisation and sale, rural farmers in many 
developing countries still largely depend on local varieties as these have 
abilities to live and reproduce in their in situ and informal conditions of 
conservation, selection, saving and exchange (Cleveland et al., 2000).  
3.3.1 Formal seed system  
The formal seed system is a deliberately constructed regulatory system for 
delivering certified seeds of verified varieties to farmers (Almekinders et 
al., 1994). The formal seed system is also referred to as: a) organised seed 
system; b) conventional seed system; c) commercial seed system; and d) 
regulated seed system14. This type of seed system is guided by seed policies 
and laws, and characterised by a deliberately constructed and bounded 
system involving breeding, production, multiplication and marketing of 
certified seeds of verified varieties, which are tested through a standard 
quality control mechanism to usually ensure that seeds are uniform, stable 
and distinct (Almekinders et al., 1994; Sperling et al., 2013; Tripp, 2002). In 
the case of seeds that are protected by intellectual property rights such as 
patent and plant breeders’ rights, the patent or the plant variety protection 
laws apply, requiring the seeds to also be new, that is, fulfilling the criteria 
of “novelty”15.  
Generally, there are certain steps followed in a formal seed system to 
deliver final products, that is, high-yielding varieties or improved seeds to 
farmers, and a major emphasis is given on increasing the seed replacement 
rate. This rate is calculated based on the percentage of area sown out of total 
14  http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/ 022/am646e.pdf (last accessed 18 December 2015). 
15  Patents require the seed to fulfill the three criteria of novelty, inventiveness and industrial use; 
and plant breeders’ rights the four criteria of novelty, distinctness, uniformity and stability. 
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area of crop planted in the season by using the seeds of the formal seed 
system, and not the farm-saved seeds of the informal seed system.  
Access to a plant genetic resource – for example either from the gene banks 
or breeders’ working collections and farmers’ fields – is the first step for 
variety research and development in the formal seed system. The next step 
is then the development of improved or new varieties through conventional 
or modern breeding by plant breeders of public or private institutions.  
Seeds are then produced and multiplied at different stages of the production 
of seeds of different class, from nucleus to breeder to foundation to certified 
to improved seeds, for maintaining genetic purity and meeting other 
technical requirements, including distinctness, uniformity and stability 
(discussed further in the next chapter – see Figure 4.3). In the entire process 
of production and multiplication of different class of seeds, not only 
government and private actors, but seed producing groups of farmers also 
engage, mainly to produce and multiply improved seeds. Finally, seeds of 
improved or new varieties are marketed to farmers, who are the consumers 
and buyers in the formal seed system, generally under the regulation of seed 
and plant variety protection laws. Based on the concept of Louwaars et al. 
(2013), Figure 3.1 shows a general trend of the steps taken in a formal seed 
system to deliver improved seeds to farmers.  
Figure 3.1: General steps for delivering varieties of the formal seed 
system 
 
The seeds of crop varieties developed in the formal seed system are 
disseminated or sold often by non-local institutions such as government 
entities, national research and extension programmes, seed companies, 
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international organisations and non-government organisations (Jarvis et al., 
2000; Maredia & Howard, 1997). One important aspect of the formal seed 
system is that formal seed markets operate based upon seed policies and 
laws, which involve formal approval of seeds promoted and approved 
through official channels and marketing of such seeds through retailers 
(Lipper et al., 2010; Tripp, 2002).  
According to Lipper et al. (2010), in formal seed markets, property rights 
are explicit, quality is assured, and farmers are guaranteed the identity of the 
seeds they are purchasing. However, there are two important considerations 
in this regard. First, the formal seed system, as a market-oriented approach, 
often focuses on the varieties of economically viable crops that have good 
recurrent seed demands. For example, it builds on a system of promoting 
the use of varieties of vegetables, hybrids and some cross-pollinated crops 
such as maize. To a lesser extent, this seed system concentrates on some 
self-pollinated crops such as wheat and barley or some vegetative 
propagated crops, mainly potato16.  
Second, the growth of the formal seed system tends to influence the 
informal seed system by requiring farmers to purchase the seeds of high-
yielding, or improved and new varieties. This way, the formal seed system 
either leads to the introduction of high-yielding varieties causing the 
replacement and gradually the loss of local landraces and traditional 
knowledge; or creates such an environment under which farmers find it 
difficult to exercise their rights to use, save and exchange seeds, for 
example, due to strict provisions of private sector-supportive seed laws and 
the introduction of seeds through technologies like hybridisation (Shiva, 
1997, 2015).  
3.3.2 Informal seed system  
Indigenous varieties – also known as traditional varieties, local varieties, 
landraces, heirloom varieties, folk varieties and farmers’ varieties – have 
evolved through both natural and human selection. In this process, since the 
start of agriculture, farmers have not only conserved and developed 
thousands of varieties but have also developed, inherited and invested a rich 
16  http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/ 022/am646e.pdf (last accessed 18 December 2015). 
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array of traditional knowledge important for food security, climate 
adaptation and conservation of local genetic diversity (Posey & Dutfield, 
1996).  
For instance, farmers have been maintaining the seeds of native as well as 
locally adapted crop varieties gathered from different places and sources 
through traditional arrangements of use, conservation, exchange, collection 
and selection. These traditional arrangements also form the basis of the 
traditional rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over seeds 
and traditional knowledge and are even recognised in international 
agreements and national laws of a number of countries (Andersen, 2005).  
However, such arrangements and rights – though having originated within 
local, customary norms long before the emergence of the formal seed 
system – are often seen as being part of the so-called informal seed system. 
Under the local seed system, farmers routinely save seeds from one harvest 
to the next or obtain seeds through social networks based on exchange with, 
or gifts from, relatives and neighbours, or through bartering with other 
farmers or purchasing from local markets (Lewis & Mulvany, 1997; 
Louwaars et al., 2013). Based on the framework of farmers’ seed system 
discussed by Louwaars et al. (2013), Figure 3.2 shows the general steps of 
seed use and exchange within the informal seed system. 
Figure 3.2: General steps of the informal seed system  
 
 
 
As the figure shows, under the so-called informal seed system – as opposed 
to the sophisticated scientific processes of variety development, breeding, 
multiplication, and marketing of seeds under the formal seed system – 
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farmers do not follow a linear sequence. They generally follow the 
traditional mechanisms of seed selection, production and diffusion. Farmers 
of the informal seed system do not, however, necessarily follow all the three 
steps mentioned in the figure. In some cases, local farmers may only opt to 
go for seed selection to production to again seed selection, typically through 
the use of farm-saved seeds at the household level. Note that around 70 
percent to 90 percent of staple crop seed demands of farmers, in particular 
in developing and least-developed countries, are met through farm-saved 
seeds and their exchange within the informal seed system (Almekinders et 
al., 1994; Lewis & Mulvany, 1997; Louwaars & de Boef, 2012).  
As the figure shows, another important aspect of the informal seed system is 
its linkage with the formal seed system. For instance, in the informal seed 
system, seed diffusion not only results in the creation and expansion of 
farmer-to-farmer seed exchange networks, but also establishes linkages with 
the formal seed system in two ways – either providing germplasms to the 
formal seed system, or bringing in the seeds of the formal seed system for 
food production, and gradually as in a general case of the informal seed 
system, for saving and exchange of seeds among farmers (Jones et al., 2001; 
Louwaars et al., 2013).  
This way, the informal seed system is complex and dynamic, and seed 
selection, production and diffusion processes of this system are influenced 
by a range of socio-cultural, religious, economic and environmental factors 
(Almekinders et al., 1994). Though there is not necessarily a distinction 
between seed and grain, the informal seed system has a very strong linkage 
with the maintenance of local genetic diversity, and importantly, with food 
security and livelihood enhancement of farmers. Mostly, this seed system is 
considered important for those farmers who depend on subsistence farming 
and live in remote, marginal, unirrigated areas with limited landholding 
(Almekinders, 2000; Cromwell et al., 1993; Etwire et al., 2013). However, 
seed policies and laws often focus on pushing local farmers to participate in 
a profit-oriented formal seed system through a unilaterally focussed linear 
model of seed sector development. Such a model has, however, largely 
failed in market terms in the developing world where a majority of farmers, 
for example in Asia and Africa, still rely significantly on local, customary 
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practices of seed use and exchange than on formal seed markets (Douglas, 
1980; Louwaars et al., 2013; Sperling et al., 2004).  
3.4 The emergence of the formal seed system in Nepal  
As in many other countries of Africa, Asia and other regions, Nepal’s seed 
sector is also divided into formal and informal seed systems. The 
government’s “National Seed Vision 2013-2025: Seed Sector Development 
Strategy” (hereafter Seed Vision) recognises the presence of formal and 
informal seed systems in the country as it states:  
“The informal seed system is characterized by farmers producing and 
preserving their own seeds for subsequent planting. Often, they exchange 
this small amount of seeds with other farmers as gift, and for both 
monetary and non monetary value. Most traditional and local landraces 
are product of such selection and maintenance process. In addition, these 
landraces are important genetic resources for modern plant breeding. The 
formal seed systems are characterised by a vertically organised 
production and distribution of tested and released/registered varieties by 
public and private organisations using agreed quality control mechanism. 
It comprises different phases of seed cycle: Breeder, Foundation, 
Certified and Improved Seeds” (SQCC, 2013, p. 5). 
The long-term Seed Vision is, however, only focussed on creating a 
supportive policy environment for the formal seed system. There is no 
section dealing exclusively with the informal seed system or farmers’ seed 
system. Notwithstanding the recognition by the Seed Vision that “there are 
limited number of farmer preferred improved varieties developed, released 
and maintained” through the formal seed system (SQCC, 2013, p. 28), the 
whole focus of this national policy document is on expanding the outreach 
of the formal seed system.  
According to the Seed Vision, the formal seed system contributes less than 
10 percent of farmers’ requirements of cereal seeds. The same figure is, 
however, around 66 percent in the case of vegetable seeds, mostly due to the 
widespread availability and use of hybrid seeds of vegetables as these do 
not regenerate and need to be replaced for the next plantation. In order to 
expand the outreach of the formal seed system, the Seed Vision thus aims to 
significantly increase the seed replacement rate of formally certified and 
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registered improved seeds of cereal and vegetable crops to 25 percent and 
100 percent, respectively (Table 3.1).  
 Table 3.1: Seed replacement rates of cereal and vegetable crops  
 Status in 2009 Projection by 2025 
Cereal crops (rice, 
wheat and maize)  
> 9% 25% 
Vegetable crops 66% 100% 
Source: SQCC (2013) 
 
Such a formal seed system-supportive vision of the government is not, 
however, a recently conceptualised vision, but is grounded in support and 
webs of influences made by different external agencies and initiatives taken 
by the government over the period of several decades. Such support and 
influences from external agencies and initiatives taken by the government 
can be explained by a historical overview of the regulatory interventions 
made under development planning.  
3.5 Historical overview of regulatory initiatives under 
development planning 
Nepal’s initiative towards creating a formal seed system can be traced back 
to the 1920s, though formal seed production and distribution by the public 
sector started only after Nepal pursued development planning in the 1950s. 
As a major institutional step of the government in promoting agriculture 
development, Krishi Adda (Agriculture Office) was formed in 1921. Then 
in 1925, this office was converted into Agriculture Department, and an 
agriculture demonstration farm was established by the Department in 
Kathmandu, the capital city. In 1947, in order to promote agriculture 
research and experimentation on exotic crop varieties, an agriculture farm 
was established in Parwanipur of the Terai region, and another one in 
Kakani of the hill region17.        
The country was not open to the outside world until the end of 1940s and 
was being ruled by the Shahs (kings), though the political power was 
effectively in the hands of the Rana family. After the collapse of the 104-
17  ftp://ftp.fao.org/OSD/CPF/Country%20NMTPF/Nepal/AgExtServDelSysNepal.pdf (last accessed 
20 December 2015). 
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year long Rana oligarchy in 1951, the country witnessed the first 
parliamentary democracy with an alliance with monarchy of the then Shah 
king (Srivastava, 2008). This led to some initiatives to open up the country 
and obtain bilateral aid for development activities from several developed 
countries and the United Nations agencies (Metz, 1995).  
With the support from the US, more experimental farms were established, 
and different plants of fruits were imported for experimentation in 
government farms. Also, a US-designed community development approach 
was imported from India, and the first development assistance received 
from the US in 1952 was used for agricultural development, including for 
the creation of the Agriculture Extension Service in 1953 (Pyakuryal & 
Suvedi, 2000).  
In the following sub-sections, I explore how Nepal has been making a 
number of regulatory interventions in its development plan periods to 
strengthen the formal seed system. As we will see, irrespective of the 
changes in the political regimes since the 1950s, there are three key trends 
which reveal that the growth of the formal seed system in Nepal is not 
distinct from the general global trends of the rise and expansion of the 
formal seed system in other countries (Figure 3.3). 
Figure 3.3: Key trends of Nepal’s formal seed system 
 
 
 
• Mainly since the 1950s 
and 1960s
Right from the begining of development planning, Nepal 
started to focus on the import of technologies such as 
improved varieties from other countries and international 
agriculture research centres like CGIAR (mostly IRRI and 
CIMMYT).
• Mainly since the 1970s 
and 1980s
External agencies have played a key role in supporting the 
government to create public institutions, develop 
infrastructure, and importantly, bring into force the seed 
laws and policies for supporting the growth of the formal 
seed system.
• Mainly after the mid-
1980s
Nepal started to implement a number of measures to 
liberalise the seed sector and involve the private sector in 
seed business. The private sector is, however, mostly 
focussed on the import of improved seeds and their 
registration for sale and marketing in the country.
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3.5.1 From the First to the Seventh Plan (1956 to 1984): The 
emergence of the public sector-led formal seed system 
A few years after the demise of the Rana regime, Nepal’s First Five-Year 
Development Plan (1956-61) was introduced and implemented with much 
enthusiasm by the first democratic government. After the implementation of 
this Plan, the government seemed committed to promote formal seed 
production and distribution by making available more efficient agricultural 
crops through selection, cross breeding and introduction from other 
countries; disseminating information about new crops; and educating 
farmers about the advantages of growing improved crops18.  
A School of Agriculture was created in 1957 to train agriculture extension 
workers such as junior technical assistants. Through this Plan, the 
government also supported the establishment of demonstration farms, and 
importantly, a central breeding station linked with research stations in other 
zones for trial plantings, plant selection, and breeding of varieties. It also 
established five agriculture extension centres, which expanded to nine in the 
Second Three-Year Development Plan (1962-65).  
Since the early 1960s, new varieties of cereal crops, mainly rice, wheat and 
maize, were gradually introduced in different government farms and 
stations, and made available to farmers through extension services. For 
instance, the first high-yielding variety of wheat called Larma 52, brought 
from Columbia, was introduced in 1960 for mid hills. As a trickle-down 
approach, the government initially mobilised village development workers 
to distribute improved agricultural inputs to the farmers, and junior 
technical assistants to disseminate information on improved agricultural 
practices. It was assumed that after a few innovative farmers benefitted 
from the adoption of improved agricultural innovations, their fellow farmers 
would be motivated for the same (Pyakuryal & Suvedi, 2000).  
In 1960, political parties were banned and power was centralised by the 
royal palace of the Shahs under the Panchayat Regime, which lasted until 
the end of 1989. Notwithstanding this shift in the political regime, the 
government’s seed sector development strategy did not change, but 
18  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/FirrstPlan_Eng1.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
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expanded to focus more on the promotion of the formal seed system through 
the public sector. In the Second Three-Year Development Plan (1962-65), 
which was also the first monarchy-led Plan, major emphasis was given on 
the provisioning of agriculture extension, and 11 agronomy farms were 
established to produce seeds for distribution to farmers19. Also, a central 
seed testing laboratory under the Agronomy Division of the Department of 
Agriculture20 was established in 1962 for providing seed testing services to 
agriculture farms for ensuring quality seed production and distribution. The 
laboratory obtained a designated membership of the International Seed 
Testing Laboratory in 1964 and continued to carry out field inspection and 
seed certification activities.   
The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1965-70) aimed at “introducing 
modern techniques to replace the existing primitive practices” by focussing 
on expanding agricultural output through “the adoption of new and 
improved agricultural techniques”21. An Agricultural Supply Corporation 
was also established in 1965 to promote the use of fertilisers, insecticides, 
agricultural implements, and importantly, improved seeds. The strategy was 
to mobilise the Corporation for producing, collecting, procuring and 
distributing improved seeds; testing for purity of seeds; protecting seeds 
from insects; and grading the seeds.  
By the end of this Plan, out of 1,845,000 hectares of the country’s cultivated 
land, improved seeds were being used in 102,630 hectares of land. For the 
distribution of improved seeds, the Third Plan aimed to establish additional 
agronomy farms, and emphasised the production of nucleus seeds in 
government farms and their distribution among the registered seed 
producers, who would grow seeds under the guidance of technical advisors 
provided by the government.  
The Third Plan led to another major development linked to the then global 
trends of technology transfer and Green Revolution for agriculture 
development and food security. Together with other countries, CGIAR 
19  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/Second_Nep.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
20  After the demise of the Rana regime in 1951, the new government had terminated the Agriculture 
Council and Agriculture Development Committee, and formed the Department of Agriculture. 
21  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/Thirs_ENG.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
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centres like the IRRI and the CIMMYT – as important global actors in the 
transfer of technologies – started to collaborate with the government 
through different projects that introduced high-yielding, improved varieties 
from outside. As a result, a number of improved varieties of rice were 
released. The parental lines of these varieties were brought from IRRI, 
Taiwan and India. Under this Plan, not only was a “Grow More Wheat” 
campaign designed, but in 1965, three improved varieties of maize, the 
parental lines of which were brought from India, were released. This was 
followed by the release of an improved variety of wheat called Lerma Rojo 
64 in 1966. The parental lines of this variety were brought from CIMMYT.  
In the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan (1970-75), an intensive 
Agriculture Development Programme, which focussed on the use of 
chemical fertilisers and improved seeds, was designed for implementation 
in select 28 districts of the Terai and the hill regions. The Plan also 
emphasised the production of foundation seeds and multiplication of such 
seeds at government farms to make them available to registered seed 
growers22. The Agriculture Supply Corporation would then purchase the 
multiplied seeds from such growers and sell the certified seeds to farmers.  
In 1974, the establishment of the Agriculture Inputs Corporation23 further 
strengthened the formal seed system by enabling it to procure and market 
seeds at a subsidized rate through its own distribution networks across the 
country. While Nepal was already receiving fertilisers as aid from countries 
like Germany, Canada, Japan and Finland, the government enabled the 
Agriculture Inputs Corporation to also import and distribute fertilisers under 
a government subsidy scheme for the hills and the Terai. The corporation 
was largely supported by external agencies such as USAID and the FAO, 
and organised seed production and distribution continued to increase after 
22  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/fourth_eng.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
23  In 1972, the Agriculture Supply Corporation was merged with the Food Management Committee 
for a new institutional set up called Agriculture Marketing Corporation. This Corporation dealt 
with both agricultural inputs and food grains. In 1974, the government, however, decided to split 
the Agriculture Marketing Corporation into two corporations. As a result, the Nepal Food 
Corporation came into being for the marketing of agricultural produce, and the Agriculture Inputs 
Corporation for agricultural inputs, including seeds and fertilisers. 
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the FAO supported the establishment of a high capacity seed drying, 
processing and bagging plant for the corporation in the Hetauda district24.  
During the Fourth Plan, four improved rice varieties, the parental lines of 
which were brought from IRRI, were released. Three improved varieties of 
wheat, introduced from CIMMYT and India, were also released. In the case 
of maize, Rampur Composite and Sarlahi Seto were released by bringing 
the parental lines from Thailand and the Philippines, respectively.  
In the Fifth Five-Year Development Plan (1975-80), the government 
introduced programmes that aimed at establishing seed laboratories in 
different regions and certifying 10,000 metric tons of seeds by 198025. A 
number of programmes were also implemented to mobilise government 
farms for producing breeder seeds and expand extension services to 
promote further production of foundation seeds by innovative farmers. In 
1975, production of vegetable seeds, and in 1977, production of cereal seeds 
started on a contract basis at the farmers’ level. In 1977, the Tuki26 
(kerosene lamp) programme was also introduced with a highly subsidised 
scheme for the use of improved inputs (Pyakuryal & Suvedi, 2000).  
During the Fifth Plan, three rice varieties, brought from IRRI, India and Sri 
Lanka, were released. Similarly, Janaki Makei, an improved maize variety 
from CIMMYT, and UP 261, an improved variety of wheat from India, 
were released for the Terai region in 1978.  
The Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (1980-85) focussed on the 
fulfilment of people’s basic needs, and continued to place an important 
emphasis on increasing agriculture production through improved seeds and 
chemical fertilisers. It set the target of making available 25,725 metric 
tonnes of improved seeds and 152,852 metric tonnes of chemical fertilisers 
for increased production of rice, wheat and maize27. The Plan focussed on 
24  http://www.moad.gov.np/downloadfile/combibed_1374486353_1423039234.pdf (last accessed 12 
March 2015). 
25  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/fifth_eng.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
26  A Tuki referred to an enlightened farmer who was supplied with improved inputs in order to 
practice in his/her own farmland so that he/she would also motivate other fellow farmers to follow 
the same. 
27  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/sixth_eng.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
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the delivery of “guaranteed and certified” seeds through agricultural farms 
and centers, and their marketing by the Agriculture Inputs Corporation.  
With support from USAID, a Seed Production and Input Storage Project 
was initiated in 1980, which was implemented for production and 
improvement of cereal seeds in the hills. Then, with the assistance of the 
same project, the first National Seed Seminar was organised in 1983. This 
seminar recommended the involvement of the private sector in seed 
business, and policy and legislative reforms for the same (MOA, 1983). 
USAID, together with FAO and GTZ, also supported the establishment of 
seed processing and storage facilities at five regional centres of the 
Agriculture Inputs Corporation in the Terai region and 20 mini seed houses 
in the mid hills (MOAD, 2013a).  
In 1981, a rice variety from India, and in 1982, three rice varieties from 
IRRI and Bangladesh were released. In the case of maize, in 1982, Arun 2 
of CIMMYT, and in 1984, Makalu 2, a locally originated variety, were 
released. For wheat, three improved varieties were released, of which one 
was introduced from Mexico and two others from India.  
So far, we saw that since the 1950s, Nepal remained highly committed to 
introduce improved varieties for increased food production by bringing 
policies and programmes that support the public sector-led formal seed 
system. As we saw, with the involvement of the external agencies in the 
early years of the 1980s, there have, however, been some developments that 
convinced the government to open the door for the private sector to come 
into the seed business. In the following sub-section, I explore how the 
Seventh to Twelfth Development Plans, under the influence of the global 
wave of globalisation, support the process of liberalisation and then the 
involvement of the private sector in the formal seed system.  
3.5.2 From the Seventh to the Twelfth Plan (1985 to 2013): The 
rise of the private sector as a major formal seed actor   
The decade of the 1980s witnessed the initiation of the processes of 
globalisation, liberalisation and privatisation throughout the world. For 
developing countries, structural adjustment programmes were prescribed as 
a major set of regulatory reforms in the overall development sector, 
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including agriculture. Nepal was not an exception. Since the mid-1980s, 
Nepal gradually embarked on the path of liberalisation and globalisation. Its 
open and liberal economic measures were designed under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
due to pressures for economic reforms from the Bretton Woods Institutions 
(Khanal et al., 2005).  
One important feature of the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan (1985-
1990) was that the government gradually shifted from the state-led 
development strategy and started to call for private sector participation for 
the economic good of the country28. Hence, while the public sector was a 
major actor in supporting the growth of the formal seed sector until the 
1980s, a number of significant changes took place thereafter. Economic and 
development policies were revised or introduced to strengthen the role of 
the private sector. In 1988, with technical support from external agencies 
such as GTZ and USAID, the Seed Act came into being to regulate seed 
production and marketing in the country, and promote private sector 
participation in the seed business. In 1989, Seed Entrepreneurs Association 
of Nepal came to the forefront as the first national association of seed 
entrepreneurs engaged in the sale as well as import of improved (including 
hybrid) seeds.  
Then, following the people’s movement of 1990, multi-party democracy 
was restored with a minimal power to monarchy, that is, constitutional 
monarchy. Such a major political shift and some institutional reforms made 
thereafter did not make any change to the government’s approach towards 
the seed sector. The formal seed system continued to receive policy and 
institutional support for promoting the use of improved seeds and fertilisers 
through the public as well as the private sector.  
In 1990, the second National Seed Seminar was organised to discuss 
strategies to promote the formal seed system. Since the private sector in 
Nepal was only operating as seed traders and not as agents of variety 
development and breeding, the Nepal Agricultural Research Council was 
established in 1991 as an autonomous public sector organisation to conduct 
28  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/seventh_eng.pdf (last accessed 12 March 2015). 
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agricultural research in the country and as the main agency to supply 
breeder and foundation seeds29 (to be discussed in the next chapter).   
During this Plan’s period, 12 rice varieties were released, most of which 
were introduced from IRRI, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and India. In the case of 
wheat, reliance on external agencies and other countries continued as four 
maize varieties were released by bringing the parental lines from CIMMYT 
and India. One important development in variety release and registration 
was the start of registration of improved seeds of a range of imported 
vegetable crops since 1990.  
In the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan (1992-97), which was the first 
plan formulated after the restoration of democracy, the newly formed 
government pursued the approach of leading “development through the 
market-oriented, open and liberalised economy”30. Following the 
implementation of Nepal’s Structural Adjustment Programme and 
consequent liberalisation initiatives undertaken during this Plan’s period, 
privatisation of public enterprises and the involvement of the private sector 
in economic and agriculture activities featured in the government’s policies.  
Such policies led to reforms in agriculture research and extension services. 
The Plan undertook the strategy of gradually involving the private sector in 
the production, import and sale of improved seeds, emphasising that efforts 
would be made to enable the private sector to fully undertake these 
functions by the end of the Eighth Plan. Specifically, the Plan aimed at 
increasing the area of paddy fields covered by improved seeds from 55 
percent to 75 percent, the area of wheat fields from 80 percent to 100 
percent, and the area of maize fields from 40 percent to 60 percent. In the 
case of millet and barley too, it set the target of using 60 and 56 metric tons 
of improved seeds, respectively, by the end of the Plan period, which was 
20 metric tons and 10 metric tons, respectively, in the first year of the Plan.  
In the Ninth Plan (1997-2002), the government aimed to develop the 
agriculture sector through the implementation of the Agriculture Perspective 
Plan, which was an ambitious 20-year plan implemented since 1997 to 
29  http://narc.gov.np/narc/index.php (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
30  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/eighth_eng.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
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direct Nepal’s agriculture into a commercial track of production and 
productivity31. Both of these plans had the strategy of making Green 
Revolution-based improved technology the basis of speedy economic 
development.  
These plans thus focussed more on the availability of chemical fertilisers 
and agriculture loans, by committing to support private, public and non-
government sectors for the supply of such inputs under a market-oriented 
mechanism, for example, by removing subsidies on the supply of chemical 
fertilisers. The Plan encouraged imports of hybrids, but called for the 
tracking of imports, as it stated: 
“Some private traders sometimes import hybrid crop seeds from the 
neighbouring country. Such information should be recorded by the 
Nepal Agriculture Research Council and be ready to solve the problems 
of hybrid seed availability. It should also collect information related to 
hybrid seeds from the international agency and disseminate such 
information to extension workers and farmers.”  
In 1999, a National Seed Policy was introduced to create an enabling policy 
environment for public and private sectors to develop crop varieties, 
multiply different classes of seeds, and market and trade improved seeds. 
Also, in the same year, subsidies on chemical fertilisers were completely 
abolished32, except for transportation to make fertilisers available in 26 
remote districts. In 2001, Nepal also introduced the National Fertiliser 
Policy to encourage the private sector for making chemical fertilisers 
available for increased agriculture production and productivity.  
The Tenth Plan (2002-2007) emphasised the role of the government as 
being “that of catalytic, facilitator, and regulator to strengthen the liberal 
and open market-oriented economic activities”, and aimed to activate the 
private sector more in agriculture33. Some important reforms were 
undertaken during this Plan’s period to strengthen the formal seed system. 
In 2002, a National Seed Quality Control Centre came into being for quality 
31  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/ninth_eng_2.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
32  In 1997, a decision was made to allow the private sector to import and market chemical fertilisers, 
and to gradually reduce government subsidies on them. 
33  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/10th_eng.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
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control of improved seeds. In the same year, under the Company Act of 
1997, the Agriculture Inputs Corporation was split into two different 
entities, namely Agriculture Inputs Company Limited and National Seed 
Company Limited, to handle fertilisers and seeds separately. 
In 2005, the then king took over the political power, which frustrated the 
political parties, including the Maoists34. Yet, the government’s thrust to 
strengthen the formal seed system continued as in the past and a number of 
rice varieties were released by importing the parental lines from other 
countries. There was another important development in the case of maize 
varieties. The first hybrid maize variety called Gaurav was introduced from 
CIMMYT and released for dissemination among farmers. Then, in 2006, 
Shitala from Mexico and Deuti from Zimbabwe were released as improved 
maize varieties. In the case of wheat, in 2004, a locally originated variety 
called Gautam, and in 2007, WK 1204, introduced from Mexico, were 
released. 
The people’s movement of 2006 led to the complete collapse of monarchy 
from Nepal. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Maoists and 
the new democratic government was signed and negotiations under a new 
Constituent Assembly started for a new Constitution aiming to introduce 
federalism in Nepal. Following this, not only the Interim Constitution of 
Nepal, 2007 was introduced35, which recognised food sovereignty as a basic 
human right, but in the same year, Nepal also ratified the ILO 169, 
recognising the need to protect the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples. 
These developments had a direct impact on development planning too.  
For the first-time ever in the history of development planning, the Eleventh 
Plan (2007/08-2009/10) included a separate section on “food security” 
aiming to establish the right to food in Nepal. The Plan had an objective to 
increase national self-reliance in basic food products and a mission to bring 
into force a Food Sovereignty Act36. Such a vision could be a reason for the 
34  The Maoists had started an armed conflict in the country in 1996, with severe implications for 
rural livelihoods and agriculture across all development regions. 
35  http://www.dor.gov.np/documents/Interim.Constitution.Bilingual.UNDP.pdf (last accessed 15 
March 2015). 
36  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/11tyip_eng.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
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Plan’s introduction of a Targeted District Priority Production Programme so 
that each district of the country becomes self-sufficient in one or more than 
one type of crop seeds.    
Yet, the government did not seem to have put a different vision as far as the 
formal seed system was concerned. For example, in another separate section 
on agriculture, as in the previous plans, the Eleventh Plan also set the 
priority to produce breeders and foundation seeds and finally supply 
improved seeds to farmers, and to facilitate the accreditation of the Central 
Seed Testing Laboratory with the International Seed Testing Organisation.  
By also mobilising local government bodies, it aimed at making the 
monitoring and regulatory activities more effective to ensure “the sale and 
distribution of seeds of known quality”. For the purpose of facilitating the 
supply of quality seeds and chemical inputs, the Plan called for the 
establishment of community and private agriculture resource centres by 
emphasising the participation of cooperatives, and their strengthening with 
technical support from government farms.  
Notably, during this Plan’s period, the registration of crop varieties by the 
Seed Quality Control Centre witnessed a significant growth through the 
approval of imported hybrid varieties of cereals as well as vegetables. In 
2010 alone, 3 hybrid rice varieties, 4 hybrid maize varieties, and more than 
150 hybrid varieties of vegetables were registered. In the case of vegetables 
too, 39 hybrids of cauliflower, 32 hybrids of cucumber, 27 hybrids of 
cabbage, 23 hybrids of tomato, 16 hybrids of bitter gourd, 12 hybrids of 
chilli, and 11 hybrids of brocauli were registered for sale approval in 
various locations of the country, mostly in high and mid hills and the Terai 
region.  
As in the period of other plans, a number of varieties of cereals were also 
released during the Eleventh Plan. Five rice varieties were released by 
bringing the parental lines from IRRI and Indonesia. Similarly, four 
varieties of maize and two varieties of wheat were released, mostly relying 
on imported parental lines from other countries.  
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The Twelfth Plan (2010/11-2012/13) integrated agriculture and food 
security into one section, and focussed on the strengthening of public and 
private farms and centres for the production of source and certified seeds, as 
well as improved seeds37. The Plan also focussed on developing the 
standards of seeds for export. In order to increase agriculture production and 
productivity, the government also planned for the establishment of 
community seed banks; promotion of District Seed Self-sufficiency 
Programme and Maize Mission Programme; and the supply of chemical 
fertilisers at a reasonable price (I will discuss the case of such community 
seed banks in Chapter 10).  
The plan to establish and support such community-based institutions 
suggests that the government has a clear target to make available and 
expand the use of formal seeds at the community level. Under this Plan’s 
period, while the registration of hybrid varieties of some vegetable crops 
continued, as a major development between 2011 and 2012, the government 
approved the registration of 14 hybrid varieties of rice and 31 hybrid 
varieties of maize.  
3.6 Conclusion  
Due to formal rules, there is often a neglect of the significance and 
contribution of informality to development. Despite this neglect, 
informality, however, remains visible and a major sector for development 
including seed sector development. Globally, regulation of the formality of 
the seed system is largely rooted in the emergence of the public sector-led 
breeding sector that separated the profession of farming from seed 
production, mainly after the early 20th century.  
Over the past few decades, formality of the seed system is being regulated 
and promoted largely by private sector-supportive seed and intellectual 
property laws that focus on a linear model of seed sector development. Such 
a linear model involves a deliberately constructed regulatory system that 
promotes the release, registration and marketing of certified seeds of 
verified varieties. 
37  http://www.npc.gov.np/images/download/TYP_2012.pdf (last accessed 15 March 2015). 
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In developing countries, the transfer of technologies through CGIAR 
centres and movements such as the Green Revolution in the 1960s played a 
major role in creating public institutions to promote the formal seed system. 
Later on, under the influence of neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s, 
these countries have witnessed a greater involvement of the private sector to 
expand the use of high-yielding varieties of the formal seed system.  
On the other hand, the so-called informality of the seed system has its roots 
in the origin of agriculture, that is, long before the formality of the seed 
system appeared on the global agriculture scene. The rules that have 
emerged in accordance with social customs, values and norms of many 
generations of practices of domestication, selection, use and exchange of 
seeds are important dynamics of the traditional seed system.  
Thus, the traditional seed system, though termed in modern times as being 
informal, holds significance for a majority of farmers in developing 
countries. Through the saving and exchange of seeds of local varieties, a 
majority of farmers have not only been contributing to conservation of local 
genetic diversity but also building a seed system that is supportive of local 
needs and preferences, and resilient to dynamic climatic and local 
conditions.  
Nepal’s case of the emergence and growth of the formal seed system is not 
distinct from the global trends of the formality of the seed system. 
Irrespective of the change in governments, since the start of development 
planning in the 1950s, Nepal has focussed more on the import and use of 
technologies from other countries or international agriculture research 
centres. As we have seen from our presentation of the various plans, 
successive governments of all the political regimes, be they under monarchy 
or a democratic system, have strengthened the formal seed system, initially 
through the public sector, and later on together with the participation of the 
private sector.  
In our historical analysis of development plans, we found that CGIAR 
centres like IRRI and CIMMYT partnered with the government to introduce 
a number of improved varieties of rice, wheat and maize since the 1960s. 
Nepal also introduced several other improved varieties from other countries, 
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but hardly paid any attention towards promoting the use of native varieties 
of farmers’ seed system. We also saw that mainly since the 1980s, external 
organisations like USAID and GTZ, as major global actors, were key to 
support seed production programmes and develop related infrastructure for 
formal seed sector. In 1983, the USAID also supported the organisation of 
the first National Seed Seminar, which recommended the enactment of a 
Seed Act and the expansion of the use of improved seeds of the formal seed 
system through private sector participation. The Seed Act finally came into 
being in 1988 with major technical support from the GTZ.  
Moreover, as I highlighted, as part of the externally-guided structural 
reforms of the agriculture sector, the introduction of the National Fertiliser 
Policy, National Seed Policy and Seed Regulation in the 1990s further 
enabled the formal seed actors to emerge as major players in Nepal’s seed 
system. These trends do not merely coincide with the global trends of the 
formality of seed system, but also relate to the outcomes of the regulatory 
process of globalisation where international trends and influences have 
played a major role in shaping the national seed sector development 
strategies across many developing countries.  
Against the backdrop of such a historical context and the growth of the 
formal seed system in Nepal, the next chapter provides an analysis of the 
regulatory features and impacts of the formal seed system. The chapter also 
provides an analysis of Nepal’s local, customary dynamics of farmers’ seed 
system.  
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Chapter 4 
Regulatory features and impacts of 
formal and informal seed systems  
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that Nepal has been following the general 
global trend to promote the formality of the seed system for seed sector 
development. While external agencies have supported Nepal to move 
towards a linear regulatory system for seed sector development, a number of 
domestic actors from public and private sectors too have contributed to the 
growth of the formal seed system in the country.  
This chapter presents an analysis of how public and private actors, together 
with non-government organisations and farmers’ groups, operate within the 
formal seed system in Nepal. As farmers in Nepal mostly rely on local 
exchanges and outlets for the use of native and local varieties, the focus of 
the formal seed system has often been on making farmers consumers 
(buyers) of the new, improved varieties.  
The chapter discusses the features and impacts of the formal seed system in 
relation to regulatory institutions and formal actors; variety release and 
registration trends; and measures of quality control, multiplication and 
marketing of improved seeds. After an analysis of the features and impacts 
of the formal seed system, the chapter presents an analysis of the dynamics 
of the local seed system in Nepal, also discussing how formal and informal 
seed systems interact.  
4.2 Major regulatory institutions and formal actors 
The introduction of the Seed Act in 1988 and the National Seed Policy and 
Seed Regulation in the 1990s shapes Nepal’s regulatory framework on 
variety development, quality control, and multiplication and marketing of 
seeds under the formal seed system. Within such a regulatory framework, 
different formal actors operate in Nepal to promote the use of improved 
seeds and chemical fertilisers. 
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At the top level of the regulatory agency is the Ministry of Agricultural 
Development. The Ministry holds the authority to coordinate and supervise 
the plans and programmes in the seed sector. The Ministry also oversees the 
plans and programmes of the Department of Agriculture, which implements 
developmental and extension programmes in the seed sector through 
District Agriculture Development Offices in all the 75 districts of the 
country.  
The National Seed Board, formed under the Seed Act 1988, also works 
under the Ministry. The Board has three sub-committees: the Variety 
Approval, Release and Registration Sub-committee; the Quality Standards 
Determination and Management Sub-committee; and the Planning 
Formulation and Monitoring Sub-committee. Seed Quality Control Centre 
acts as the secretariat of the National Seed Board with three units: the 
Central Seed Testing Laboratory, the Seed Certification Unit and the 
Seed/Variety Registration Unit.  
The Seed Act contains provisions for quality control, registration and 
certification of a variety of crop seeds, including those of cereals and 
vegetables. It requires mandatory permits for the sale and distribution of 
seeds, prohibiting any sale and distribution if seeds are not registered, 
released, certified, notified or listed as per the Act (Sections 11 and 13).  
There are various actors engaged in variety development, seed 
multiplication and marketing of seeds. The major ones from the government 
sector are Nepal Agriculture Research Council, Department of Agriculture, 
National Seed Company Limited and Agriculture Inputs Company Limited. 
While the Nepal Agriculture Research Council promotes variety 
development through research and breeding, the other government actors 
promote the use of improved seeds through production and sale in the 
country.  
Until July 2011, 1,476 private seed traders had obtained licences to market 
seeds, and 829 seed traders had completed training to produce and maintain 
seeds. Similarly, more than 2,000 agrovets and local seed traders operate in 
Nepal, mostly to market improved seeds and chemical fertilisers. These 
actors, some of whom are also the members of the Seed Entrepreneurs’ 
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Association, promote the marketing of seeds of open-pollinated as well as 
hybrid varieties. A representative of the Association represents the private 
sector in all the sub-committees of the Seed Board, while there is no 
representation of any farmer. A representative of a relevant non-government 
organisation, however, remains a member of the Variety Approval, Release 
and Registration Sub-committee. This is because non-government 
organisations have also started to play a vital role in variety development 
through participatory plant breeding programmes.  
Besides public and private actors, a number of agriculture (seed) 
cooperatives and community seed banks also produce and promote the use 
of improved seeds of the formal seed system. Different developmental 
programmes of the government such as District Seed Self-sufficiency 
Programme and Community-based Seed Production Programme too are 
being implemented for the dissemination of improved seeds of the formal 
seed system, mainly through the mobilisation of seed producers and growers 
at the community level.  
4.3 Variety release and registration trends 
The Variety Approval, Release and Registration Sub-committee facilitates 
the release and registration of plant varieties by making recommendations to 
the National Seed Board for variety approval. For any variety to be released 
through breeding, it has to be distinct, uniform and stable. As a public sector 
organisation, variety development and maintenance is managed by the 
Nepal Agriculture Research Council as the main agency to develop and 
release varieties through different commodity research programmes.  
So far, the private sector has a minimal role and contribution in variety 
research, breeding and development. Realising this, the National Seed 
Policy of 1999 calls for making arrangements to encourage and involve the 
private sector, including non-government organisations, in variety 
development and release, but so far only a few varieties have been released 
from actors other than the government.  
Interestingly, as we will discuss a bit later, this has been possible because of 
the collaborative role played by the Nepal Agriculture Research Council, 
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non-government organisations and farmers’ groups to develop and breed 
varieties through participatory variety selection and breeding programmes. 
However, there is a greater role of the private sector in the registration of 
the varieties for production, sale and marketing of imported improved seeds. 
In variety registration, there are three important aspects.  
First, improved seeds of imported varieties can be registered for sale and 
production in the domestic seed market. As long as the formal seeds are 
open-pollinated and not hybrids, farmers can also save and exchange such 
seeds, though there is no provision for such allowance in the law. It is 
because Nepal’s Seed Act and Regulations provide for “ownership rights” 
of breeders, but do not specify the nature and scope of such rights. These 
are left vague. In effect it means there is no intellectual property protection 
through breeders’ rights in the existing seed laws, and breeders can only 
obtain ownership certificate of the released varieties without being able to 
exercise monopoly-type rights over released plant varieties.  
Second, the Seed Regulation of 2013 bans the registration of seeds with 
terminator genes, but allows for genetically modified seeds on the basis of a 
biosafety report. Notably, there is no official record of the use or production 
or sale of such seeds within the country.  
Third, traditional and local varieties can also be registered under the seed 
law, which is a new provision incorporated in the Seed Act in 2008 and the 
Seed Regulation in 2013. This amendment is intended to establish the rights 
of farmers over traditional and local varieties, but the seed law does not 
specify the nature and scope of such rights. While implementing this 
provision, until 2013, the Seed Quality Control Centre had only registered 
two local varieties of broad-leafed mustard called Dunde Rayo and 
Gujmuje. However, there was no clarity on the nature and scope of 
ownership rights that the locals of the Dalchoki village of the Lalitpur 
district had obtained out of such registration.  
From 1960, when the first improved variety was released, to 2010, Nepal 
introduced 55 varieties of rice, 31 varieties of wheat, 23 varieties of maize, 
6 varieties of barley and 3 varieties of finger millet as improved varieties of 
cereals. In the case of crops other than cereal and commercial, it introduced 
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49 varieties of vegetables, 34 varieties of grain legumes, and 17 varieties of 
oilseed. While none of these varieties are genetically modified seeds, an 
analysis of the data of the variety release and registration shows that 
Nepal’s variety research and development system relied more on varieties 
introduced from outside for parental lines than on local landraces.  
Of the total 118 varieties of cereals introduced until 2010, only 41 varieties 
were introduced using a local landrace as a parental line, and the rest used 
only the parental lines of the varieties introduced from outside. In the case 
of rice, out of 55 improved varieties, only 21 varieties used local variety as 
a parental line, whereas 19 varieties had their parental lines from IRRI and 
25 others from countries such as Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, India, 
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Taiwan.  
Similarly, out of 31 varieties of wheat, while the parental lines of 6 varieties 
were provided by CIMMYT, the parental lines of 16 other varieties were 
introduced from countries such as India, Mexico and Colombia. In the case 
of improved varieties of maize, CIMMYT provided the parental lines of 7 
varieties, and 8 other varieties had their parental lines from countries such 
as India, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand and Zimbabwe (Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1: Released/registered varieties of cereal crops by source of 
origin (1960 to 2010) 
Source: Based on the data of MOAD (2013b) 
The trend is similar in the case of the varieties of barley and finger millet, 
though only a few of their varieties were released, as compared to those of 
rice, wheat and maize. In the case of the varieties of vegetable, grain legume 
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and oilseed crops too, Nepal relied more on varieties introduced from 
outside than on local landraces (Figure 4.2). 
Figure 4.2: Released/registered varieties of crops other than cereals by 
source of origin (1960 to 2010) 
 
Source: Based on the data of MOAD (2013b) 
4.4 Quality control and multiplication of seeds 
Seed Quality Control Centre – as the secretariat of the National Seed Board 
and based on the recommendations of the Quality Standards Determination 
and Management Sub-committee – is empowered to require breeders and 
seed producers to follow seed certification standards in each stage of variety 
release, including multiplication of seeds. In order to maintain the quality of 
seeds, different classes of seeds – from nucleus to breeder to foundation to 
certified to improved seeds – are developed, maintained and multiplied for 
use and dissemination or sale.  
Since there is no engagement of the private sector in variety research, until 
the production of breeder seeds, Nepal Agriculture Research Council 
produces and maintains seeds through its research stations and commodity 
research programmes. Then the Council produces foundation seeds under 
the supervision of breeders and other technical experts.  
At this stage, the Department of Agriculture as well as private actors are 
also involved in the production of foundation seeds. Then, with more actors 
such as government agencies, the private sector, local seed producers and 
non-government organisations, foundation seeds are used to produce 
certified seeds. The entire process of producing certified seeds is supervised 
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by technical experts, central and regional seed testing laboratories and the 
Seed Certification Unit of the Seed Quality Control Centre.  
Finally, improved seeds are produced from certified seeds and sold with a 
label indicating yield potential and suitability for specific regions. Improved 
seeds are made available through the government’s extension programmes 
or seed traders and other actors, including local seed producers and non-
government organisations. Figure 4.3 shows the engagement of different 
public, private and non-government actors and farmers in the production 
and multiplication of each class of seeds. 
Figure 4.3: Seed class, stages of seed multiplication and producing 
actors   
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4.5 Marketing of improved seeds, including hybrids 
The Seed Act of 1988 prohibits the sale and marketing of seeds not 
registered or notified under the law, except for the purposes of agriculture 
research. If anyone is found to have been engaged in the sale and marketing 
of seeds that have not been certified, registered or notified, crop inspectors 
have the right to seize such seeds. In addition, improved seeds cannot be 
sold without packaging and in regions other than recommended ones, and 
must be labelled with information as determined by the law.  
Marketing and sale of seeds could either be of seeds developed and released 
in Nepal, or of seeds registered or notified, for example, through the import 
from other countries under the seed law. The private sector or other actors 
such as seed producing groups can also opt to use truthful labelling or 
quality-declared seed system to market and sell seeds to farmers. Under 
these options, the suppliers of the seeds, however, remain responsible for 
quality as these are not certified by the authorised agency.  
There are government agencies like the National Seed Company and other 
actors – foreign seed companies, importers, agrovets, local seed traders, 
non-government organisations, seed producers’ groups, cooperatives, 
community seed banks, etc. – for promoting the supply, marketing and sale 
of improved seeds, including hybrids and chemical fertilisers. While some 
traders have already been engaged in importing and selling hybrids since the 
late 1980s, the national research and breeding programme, in collaboration 
with CIMMYT, too has started to develop hybrids of maize. For example, in 
2003, the National Maize Research Programme introduced a maize variety 
called Gaurav as the first released hybrid variety and recommended for use 
in the Terai and mid hills. Since then, different other hybrid varieties have 
also been released.  
The increasing trend of using hybrid seeds is also visible from the 
registration of hybrid seeds in Nepal. For example, if we assess the above-
mentioned variety release and registration data from 1960 to 2010 by 
including the registration data of hybrids and some non-hybrid varieties 
between 2011 and 2012, some other interesting observations can be made. 
First, the data for Nepal’s reliance on varieties of foreign origin would 
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significantly increase, as most of the varieties introduced since 2010 were 
coming from outside. Second, as shown in Figure 4.4, the government 
created a more favourable environment for the private sector to import 
hybrids for production and sale to farmers.    
Figure 4.4: Released/registered varieties by type (1960 to 2012) 
 
Source: Based on the data of MOAD (2013b), Variety Release and Registration Handbooks of SQCC 
and Nepal Agriculture Research Council38  
 
For example, in just two years between 2010 and 2012, the government 
registered 17 hybrid varieties of rice, 35 hybrid varieties of maize, and 224 
hybrid varieties of different vegetable crops. In the figure, the denotified 
varieties are those that were recommended between 1960 and 2012 but 
denotified later due to their inappropriate technical responses in production 
and yield owing to, for example, poor adaptive capacity or disease. Until 
2012, the government had denotified 12, 13 and 7 varieties of rice, wheat 
and maize, respectively.   
4.6 Features of informality in Nepal’s seed system  
As we discussed, due to the government’s continued focus on 
commercialising agriculture and introducing high-yielding varieties for 
increased agriculture production and productivity, hundreds of varieties 
were introduced for use by farmers, either through the release of improved 
varieties by the public sector, or through the registration and notification of 
38  http://www.narc.gov.np/publicaton/pdf/varieties_released/Reco-Var.Eng%20updated.pdf (last 
accessed 15 March 2015). 
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improved varieties imported by the private sector. However, as the National 
Seed Vision (2012-2025) reveals, the seed replacement rate of improved 
seeds of rice, wheat and maize is only 9 percent, 7 percent and 9 percent, 
respectively (MOAD, 2013a).  
It means farmers in Nepal mostly use farm-saved seeds of native and local 
varieties rather than rely on formal markets for improved seeds. In the case 
of vegetables, the seed replacement rate is significantly high with 66 
percent, mostly because the formal seed system has been able to popularise 
the use of hundreds of hybrid varieties that cannot be regenerated by 
farmers for the next season. In order to complement this data, we draw 
Figure 4.5 from three Nepal Living Standard Surveys of 1995/96, 2003/04 
and 2010/11. These surveys show that even in the case of major food crops, 
only a limited number of farmers use improved seeds, though there is a 
gradual increase in such use (CBS 2011).  
Figure 4.5: Percentage of households using improved seeds of major 
crops  
Source: Based on the data of various Nepal Living Standard Surveys (CBS, 1996, 2004, 2011) 
The data from these surveys correspond to the data of Agriculture Census 
reports of Nepal. As we see in Figure 4.6, the trend of using local seeds of 
Nepal’s four major food crops is significantly high across the farming 
households of the country, though the use of improved and hybrid seeds of 
these crops is also rising along with the growth of the formal seed system. 
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Figure 4.6: Use of local, improved and hybrid seeds by farming households 
 
Source: Based on the data of the Agriculture Census Reports of various decades (CBS, 1972, 1985, 
1993, 2003, 2013). 
Such trends require us to understand the driving elements and features of 
informality in Nepal’s seed system. As we discuss in the following three 
sub-sections, the driving elements and features of informality in Nepal’s 
seed system are constructed within or embedded in the traditionality of 
Nepali agriculture system; local, customary dynamics of seed use and 
exchange; and interaction between formal and informal seed systems. 
4.6.1 Traditionality of agriculture in Nepal  
Nepal is rich in agriculture biodiversity owing to significant agro-ecological 
variations, and diverse socio-cultural settings and farming systems in the 
mountain, hills and the Terai (plain land). Though it comprises less than 0.1 
percent of the earth’s land mass, the country ranks 31st in the world in terms 
of biodiversity. Of more than 6,000 vascular plant species found in its 
territory, about 550 species and sub-species have food value and 200 are 
cultivated species. Similarly, more than 400 species of agro-horticulture 
crops, more than 100 varieties of 15 major fruit species, 200 varieties of 50 
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vegetable species, and about 10 varieties of potato are available in this 
country (MOFSC, 2002).  
In addition, at least four species of wild rice, two wild relatives and several 
types of weedy rice contribute to genetic diversity in rice, which is largely 
consumed as a main source of food in Nepal. While wild relatives of wheat 
are also available in the hill and mountain regions, diversity in maize in 
these regions is attributed to the rich specific adaptation of the crops 
continuously maintained by farmers. In varieties grown by local farmers, 
variations in grain colour, husk cover, maturity and adaptive trait to 
intercropping are typical and important for the maintenance of local 
agriculture biodiversity (CGRFA, 2008). 
In the case of cropping pattern, three features are important. First, cropping 
pattern does not merely depend on the altitudes of the Terai, hills and 
mountains, and temperature like sub-tropical warm, warm temperate and 
cool temperate, but also on land type such as rainfed, partially irrigated, 
irrigated, rainfed slope and irrigated lowland. For field crops, maize-based 
cropping system is predominant in upland areas of hills and valleys, and 
rice-based cropping system is prevalent in the low land areas, that is, in the 
Terai. Pulses, oilseeds, wheat, millets, barley and buckwheat are important 
crops in both cropping systems  (Shrestha & Wulff, 2007).  
Second, cereal crops dominate the cropping pattern. Rice, maize and wheat 
are the major cereals, though underutilized crops such as millet and 
sorghum are the major food items in the hills and buckwheat in the 
mountain. The share of cereal crops in agricultural gross domestic product 
(GDP) is 37 percent and in the national GDP 13 percent (MOAD 2013b). At 
the national level, according to Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2010/11, 
the proportion of agriculture households cultivating main paddy was 72 
percent, wheat 57 percent, summer maize 64 percent, winter potato 53 
percent, summer vegetables 69 percent, and winter vegetables 72 percent 
(Figure 4.7).  
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Figure 4.7: Percentage of agriculture households growing major crops  
  
Source: Based on the data of various Nepal Living Standard Surveys (CBS, 1996, 2004, 2011). Note: 
Data for winter vegetables were not available for 1995/96.  
Third, despite the dominance of cereal crops in cropping patterns, mixed 
farming system is an important feature of Nepal’s agriculture. It combines 
all the enterprises of the farming system, from the production of cereals, 
vegetables, oilseeds, fruits and flowers to beekeeping, sericulture, fishery, 
poultry and livestock (Shrestha, 1998). Farmers, for example in the Pokhara 
valley, grow four major grain crops:  rice, millet, maize and wheat, as well 
as a wide range of vegetables, chilli, oilseed, fruit, and lentil species at over 
150 different plant species in one village in a typical year (Schroeder, 
1985). According to Schroeder (1985), this is not merely a major strength of 
indigenous agriculture but the high number of cultigens grown in a single 
small community also reduces farmers’ vulnerability to food insecurity in 
case a crop fails.  
Another important feature is that the agriculture sector stands as the major 
economic sector though it had a mere annual average growth rate of 2.9 
percent in 2013, and  its share in GDP has rapidly declined from 67 percent 
in 1968 to 34 percent in 2013  (MOF, 2015) (Figure 4.8). Agriculture is still 
a means of livelihood, rather than business for a large majority of farmers. 
Around 76 percent of households of the country depend on agriculture for 
livelihoods. Of these, 74 percent are agricultural households39 with land and 
39  According to the Nepal Living Standard Surveys, an agricultural holding is an economic unit of 
agricultural production under single management comprising all livestock and poultry kept, and 
all land used, wholly or partly, for agricultural production purposes, without regard to title, legal 
form, or size. Agricultural holdings are grouped into two categories: land holdings and holdings 
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around 2 percent without land. In terms of the size of land too, there is 
limited scope for commercialisation as about 53 percent of agriculture 
households operate less than 0.5 hectare of land and only 4 percent of 
households operate 2 hectares and more land (CBS, 2011).  
Figure 4.8: Share of agriculture and non-agriculture in GDP (1968-
2013) 
Source: Based on the Economic Surveys of MOF (2015) 
Moreover, about 52 percent of farmers own only the most basic 
equipment—a plough or improved type of plough (bikase halo). The use of 
yoked oxen, simple hand-made tools of iron and wood, and human labour is 
a common practice for ploughing, terracing, levelling and other field 
preparations. A significant number of farmers also lack irrigation facilities 
as only 53 percent of the cultivated area is irrigated, and year-round 
irrigated area is significantly low, implying significant dependency on the 
monsoon’s timing and sufficiency for agriculture production and food 
security (CBS, 2011). 
All these factors and features of Nepali agriculture suggest that a majority 
of farmers largely rely on subsistence agriculture with their own farm inputs 
such as seeds, manure and human and animal labour. Large-scale 
commercial agriculture is difficult and beyond their economic capacity. 
with no land. Holdings with land are those cultivating at least 0.013 hectare (1,458 square feet or 
8 dhur) in the case of the Terai and at least 0.0127 hectare (1,369 square feet or 4 ana) in the case 
of the hills and the mountains during an agricultural year. Holdings with no land, on the other 
hand, are those with two or more cattle (or the equivalent of other livestock and poultry birds) and 
operating less than 0.013 hectare of land for agricultural purposes.  
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Such traditionality of agriculture is, therefore, largely maintained through 
local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange. 
4.6.2 Local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange 
Anikal ma Biu Jogaunu, Hulhal ma Jiu Jogaunu (Save seeds in famine and 
lives in riots) is a common Nepali proverb. However, what is interesting is, 
a majority of Nepali farmers do not save seeds merely in times of famine. 
For generations they have been relying on farm-saved seeds of plant 
varieties of their local needs and their regular exchange through farmer-to-
farmer seed exchange networks. For many centuries, such networks have 
been in operation in Nepal within customary norms and self-regulatory 
practices of seed use and exchange. During the focus group discussions with 
farmers in three villages of Bara, Lalitpur and Sindhupalchowk districts, all 
farmers reported that they had  saved and exchanged seeds under local, 
customary norms and at individual, household and community levels (Table 
4.1).  
Table 4.1: Traditional practices of seed use and exchange identified in 
three focus group discussions with farmers 
 Fieldwork sites 
Kachorwa,  
Bara  
(15 farmers) 
Dalchoki,  
Lalitpur  
(11 farmers) 
Thumpakhar, 
Sindhupalchowk  
(17 farmers) 
Traditional practices   
Production through own 
farm-saved seeds 
15 11 17 
Exchange with neighbours, 
relatives and friends  
15 11 17 
Given to visitors (strangers) 7 8 13 
Borrowed/purchased from 
local traders, cooperatives 
and community seed banks 
(including improved seeds) 
15 11 17 
Source: Fieldwork data 
 
At the individual and households levels, farmers select, use and save seeds 
to sustain their livelihoods. In this case, their preference is to select, use and 
save seeds that adapt to local environments and meet their socio-economic 
needs. They often recognise such seeds as being native or locally adapted 
seeds derived from formal as well as informal channels. Most of the farmers 
have little (in fact hardly any) information about seed certification and 
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registration processes though seed cooperatives and community seed banks 
operate to deliver improved seeds in local areas. In the words of a farmer of 
a focus group discussion in Dalchoki:  
“We plant the seeds mostly relying on our traditional knowledge and 
communication with fellow farmers. We have no idea about seed 
certification and registration processes. We want to secure our food and 
are always looking for use and exchange of seeds that perform in our 
local conditions meeting our needs (FGD#5).” 
Though there is a gradual increase in the trend of using improved seeds, 
including hybrids mostly of maize and vegetables, farmers prefer to save 
and use native and local seeds of cereals and vegetables for a variety of 
reasons. Such seeds are less likely to witness crop failure due to well-known 
and locally tested and adapted qualities, and generally do not require costly 
external inputs such as chemical fertilisers. Importantly, farmers also prefer 
to use native seeds as these are easily available at the local level through 
regular exchange among farmers and/or borrowing/purchase from the 
locally known provider or supplier (usually a farmer and sometimes also a 
local seed trader, a seed cooperative or a community seed bank).  
Farmers also save and use seeds of local varieties for religious purposes, 
and for better taste and medicinal values, though they admit that many of 
their local varieties have disappeared over time. For example, with an 
increasing trend of using improved seeds (mostly of rice in Kachorwa, 
maize and vegetables in Thumpakhar and vegetables in Dalchoki), local 
farmers express concern over loss or shortage of seeds of their native and 
local varieties. Notably, in cases of the shortage or absence of local seeds, 
farmers not only rely on farm-saved seeds but also manage to collect seeds 
in required quantities by engaging in farmer-to-farmer seed exchange 
networks based on social relations and contacts.  
Farmers first interact to share and obtain information and knowledge about 
their seeds, either through a contact between two individual farmers or 
between two or more households. These farmers are mostly from the same 
ward or village and could either be neighbours, or relatives and friends. The 
contact with farmers at the individual and household level enables them to 
obtain information about the use of seeds, assess the requirement of seeds 
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for planting, and finally, access the required amount of seeds and 
information provided by other farmers or households. In cases when the 
varieties are already known to the farmers seeking access to seeds, they 
simply use their networks to obtain the required quality of seeds.  
At the community level, individual farmers or the households as a whole 
interact in a larger group, for example, in their ward or village, and 
cooperate to make seeds available for farmers in need through self-help or 
other groups, including non-government organisations. Such groups vary in 
form and size, and perform dynamic roles of collective action on 
agricultural (seed cooperatives, community seed banks); resource 
management (irrigation and forest user groups); religious/tribal (Guthi, 
Perma, Chath); conservation (seed/diversity fairs); and overall 
developmental (seed cooperatives, micro-credit, Aama Samuha- women 
groups) activities.  
These findings from the focus group discussions suggest that farmers do not 
rely on one or two networks and factors, but use a variety of means and 
organisations to access, use and exchange seeds of their preferences and 
needs. At all of these levels of dynamic networks, farmers exchange farm-
saved seeds in numerous ways. First, they provide farm-saved seeds to other 
farmers without any condition, which is generally a trend in the case of their 
relatives, neighbours and friends. Second, they provide seeds as gifts to 
farmer-visitors or when they establish family, cultural and friendly relations 
with farmers of other areas.  
Third, farmers exchange seeds of different varieties based on each other’s 
requirements or barter seeds with other items. Fourth, they also provide 
seeds based on a commitment by the recipient farmers to return the same or 
other agreed amount of seeds (generally, one and half of or double the 
amount received), for instance, in the case of borrowing of seeds from 
community seed banks.  
Fifth, farmers also purchase seeds in order to meet their requirements. The 
sale of seeds is not normally a trend at individual and household levels 
within a small group of farmers of a particular area. The sale of seeds is 
usually a practice at the community level, either informally in temporary, 
74 
 
small local markets (such as Haat Bazar/Hatiya), or formally through the 
outlets of local seed traders (such as Biu Pasal), seed cooperatives and 
community seed banks.  
In order to meet seed requirements, farmer-to-farmer seed exchange 
networks are not confined to providing or exchanging seeds within a ward 
or a village. Local farmers also network with farmers outside their ward or 
village, and exchange or purchase seeds in the wards and villages of other 
districts or regions. In some cases, farmers also purchase seeds in India or 
exchange seeds with farmers in India and other countries when they travel 
there on personal missions, or for attending training, workshops and 
seed/diversity fairs.  
In such circumstances, as an example, there are cases when marriage plays a 
role in seed exchange, particularly in regions like the Bara district that share 
an open, porous border with the neighbouring country India. After marriage, 
women farmers from India bring their popular crop varieties either as gifts 
or for experimentation in the field of their husbands. The same is the trend 
when a Nepali woman farmer is married to an Indian farmer.  
Farmers consider seeds as the gift of the creator. Worshipping of seeds 
before planting (and of crops after harvesting), and during religious 
ceremonies, is a culture common among farmers of all castes. Farmers 
believe that giving seeds, sharing knowledge and offering food to guests 
(including foreigners) bring fortunes and create goodwill – they cite a 
proverb common in Nepali culture Atithi Debo Vaba (Guests are God). For 
them, seeds and traditional knowledge are their cultural heritage, and their 
sharing for use and exchange by others is the basis of their agriculture and a 
critical way to promote in situ conservation of crop genetic diversity.   
As part of their culture, they also provide seeds to visitors, including 
government and non-government organisations, researchers, academic 
institutions and international missions. To such visitors, they either provide 
seeds as gifts or as seed samples for research or conservation purposes. 
Farmers do not create demands for prior informed consent and benefit 
sharing when visitors, including international missions and government 
authorities, come up with projects in local areas to collect their germplasms.  
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In such cases, two issues are important to note. First, farmers are not 
necessarily involved in these germplasm collection projects, or consulted in 
the project development and implementation process. Second, when such 
projects are implemented by informing them and if they are asked to 
cooperate with their knowledge about germplasms, they kindly agree. They 
do not follow any formal processes or documents to provide their 
germplasms or share traditional knowledge. 
The presence of such local, customary norms of seed use and exchange in 
different parts of Nepal has also been discussed in some previous studies. 
For example, some studies indicate or discuss the inability of the formal 
seed system to meet farmers’ requirements of seeds and the contribution of 
local seed systems to expand farmers’ choices of use and exchange of seeds 
based on local needs and preferences (Cromwell et al., 1993; Joshi et al., 
2012; Sapkota et al., 2013).  
Some other studies conducted in different regions find that farmers derive 
60-90 percent of their seeds through saving, 10-40 percent from informal or 
local sources, and 2 percent from public and private companies (Shrestha & 
Wulff, 2007). Similarly, a study conducted in three districts covering all the 
ecological regions of the country (Jumla in the mountain region, Kaski in 
the hill region and Bara in the Terai region) also shows a similar pattern. 
According to this study:  
“The main sources of seed were farmer’s own saved seed (67-91%), 
seed from neighbours and relatives. Exchange of germplasm was the 
main basis of fulfilment from other sources. All farmers obtained seed 
from their own village, while farmers introduced materials occasionally 
from outside village.” (Baniya et al., 2005, p. 1)        
Shrestha (1998) and Joshi (2000) identify the importance of farmers’ seed 
system in utilising and managing landraces with information and traditional 
knowledge about production environment, as well as users’ needs and 
preferences. Shrestha (1998) asserts that in Nepal, traditional seed systems 
are key to form the basis of conservation and use of agriculture biodiversity 
and traditional knowledge, and provide security to farmers against risks and 
uncertainties. According to him: 
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“traditional seed supply systems are dynamic and continuous processes 
comprised of varietal selection, variety adaptation, seed selection, 
processing, storage, and exchange by farmers. Through these processes, 
genetic variations in crop varieties have evolved continuously, 
contributing to the maintenance of on-farm crop diversity.” (Shrestha, 
1998, p. 145) 
Similarly, a study of the local seed system of rice farming communities in 
mid hill, low hill and Terai plains finds that as a common social practice, 
farmer-to-farmer seed exchange has been “a reliable and trustworthy 
mechanism for local farmers to access seed and information”, though 
farmers in the Terai region are gradually becoming more inclined to 
purchase seeds due to exposure to seed markets (Poudel et al., 2015, p. 9). 
According to this study: 
“…informal seed supply system in the community plays important role 
to fulfill the seed requirement and also improves the conservation of the 
crop genetic resources on farm. Farmers acquire seed using variety of 
networks of social relations and different types of seed transactions. 
They seek seeds to replace poor quality seeds, to grow better cultivars 
they saw in another farmer’s field, to test new cultivars, to look for 
suitable cultivars to replace the existing one for specific land parcel, and 
to fight disease or pest infestation. The majority of seed flow occurs 
within a community as gifts, exchange and bartering within the context 
of social custom.” (Poudel et al., 2015, p. 9). 
Since farmers have also opted to use new cultivars when they have access to 
the formal seed system, some other studies also identify that the same 
farmers engage with formal as well as informal seed systems. For example, 
farmers of the Kaski and Bara districts not only rely on informal networks 
to access seeds, but also use formal sources to replace the old seeds with the 
new seeds of the formal seed system (Jarvis et al., 2000; Rana et al., 2011). 
Hence, while making an attempt to understand the dichotomy between 
formal and informal seed systems, it is important to discuss how these two 
seed systems interact with each other.  
4.6.3 Interaction between formal and informal seed systems 
During the fieldwork in Kachorwa, Thumpakhar and Dalchoki villages of 
Bara, Lalitpur and Sindhupalchok districts, respectively, it was found that 
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both seed systems do not necessarily work in isolation or in conflict. In fact, 
both seed systems interact in a complex manner, creating choices to farmers 
for locally preferred varieties but making it difficult to pin down to what 
extent formal seed system is formal and to what extent informal seed system 
is informal.  
For example, farmers adopt and localise improved seeds if they find them 
appropriate to address their local needs and preferences. In such 
circumstances, farmers either replace the seeds of new varieties through 
purchase in every season, or adopt and localise the open-pollinated, non-
hybrid seeds within their local seed system for regular use, reuse and 
exchange within informal conditions. This way, informal or local or 
farmers’ seed system not only conserves and uses native varieties, but also 
localises varieties of the formal seed system. Table 4.2 provides a list of 
improved seeds of different crops farmers were using in the three fieldwork 
villages of Sindhupalchok, Bara and Lalitpur districts.  
Table 4.2: Improved seeds in use in Sindhupalchok, Bara and Lalitpur  
Villages  Paddy Maize Wheat Potato Vegetables 
Kacharwa BG 1442,  
Sona Mansuli 
(Bhadaiya), 
Kacharwa 4, 
Sabitri, Ram,  
Katarni,  
Sarjug 52 
V92, 900 M 
Kargil 
Aditya,  
NL 292, 
NL 973,  
Lok 1, 
UP 262,  
Gautam 
Rajendra 1, 
Shiva 40, 
Lal Gulab, 
Sinduri, 
Kapuri 
Lauka 5, 
Cauli 3-4, 
Simi 4, 
Kerau 5 
Thumpakhar Makawanpure 1, 
Khumal 4, 
Khumal 8, 
Khumal 10, 
Khumal 11, 
Khumal 13, 
Tainun 242 
Rampur, 
Makawanpure 3, 
Makawanpure 4, 
Makawanpure 5, 
Makawanpure 6, 
Deuti, Posilo,  
Arun 1, Arun 2 
WK 1204, 
Pasang 
Lhamu, 
Gaurab 
Rojita, 
Kuprijyoti, 
Kuprisindure, 
Cardinal,  
MS 42 
Cauli 5-7, 
Simi 5 
Dalchoki Not any Manakamana 3  Not any Only local Cauli 3, 
Tomato 3, 
Bandaa 3 
Source: Fieldwork data  
 
Note that it is not the case that only the farmers’ seed system obtains and 
uses the locally adapted seeds of the formal seed system. The informal seed 
system also provides materials for breeding and crop improvement to the 
formal seed system. At the national level, the interaction between formal 
and informal seed systems can be understood from the use of the parental 
lines of local landraces to breed and release improved plant varieties, 
though the country’s major focus was mostly on varieties derived from 
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other countries and CGIAR centres. As mentioned above, altogether 41 
varieties of cereals, 34 varieties of vegetables, 26 varieties of legumes and 
16 varieties of oilseed were introduced as improved seeds by using a local 
landrace as one of the parental lines.  
Similarly, since the introduction of programmes such as participatory 
variety selection and participatory plant breeding in the 1990s, there has 
been a growing realisation that farmers and breeders can and should work 
together to develop local varieties. The Nepal Agriculture Research Council 
and some non-government organisations, together with farmer groups and 
community seed banks, have played a crucial role in implementing 
participatory variety selection and participatory plant breeding programmes, 
focussing on local varieties that are suitable for marginal climatic regions 
and possess value for conservation and food security.  
In these participatory crop improvement programmes, farmers contribute 
their traditional knowledge for identifying traits and provide a multi-farmer, 
multi-locational testing system to improve the crop through selection and 
breeding in different climatic conditions, and technical experts and breeders 
contribute their formal scientific knowledge to breed and enhance varieties 
identified through participatory methods. Such participatory variety 
selection and breeding programmes40 have already led to the development 
and release of locally enhanced rice varieties such as Sunaulo Sugandha for 
rainfed areas rather than irrigated rice growing areas of the Terai and inner 
valleys, and Barkhe 3004 as a drought-tolerant variety for the Terai and 
inner Terai. A number of other rice varieties being bred through such 
programmes too are in the pipeline for release such as Mansara, Biramphul, 
Kachorwa and Lumle 2. Such programmes are also in the process of 
enhancing the local landraces of maize for converting them into improved 
varieties (Chhetri et al., 2012).  
However, notwithstanding the two-way interaction between formal and 
informal seed systems, it is important to highlight that the formal seed 
system has the potential to lead to genetic erosion of the existing native and 
local varieties, and gradually drive out the traditionality or the so-called 
40  http://www.researchintouse.com/nrk/RIUinfo/PF/PSP13.htm (last accessed 23 March 2015).  
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informality of the seed system through a variety of influences. For example, 
local, customary practices of seed use and exchange are being negatively 
affected by the introduction of seeds of hybrid varieties which do not breed 
true in the next season, thereby reducing the incentive for farmers to save 
and exchange seeds. Hybrid varieties have the potential to change the 
customary habits of farmers.  
Note that with the allowance under the seed laws, we already discussed the 
proliferation of hundreds of hybrids of cereals and vegetables in Nepal. 
According to some estimates, 80 percent of maize production in the Terai 
and 10 percent in the mid hills, and around 75 percent of the production of 
tomatoes, cauliflower and many other vegetables are being managed 
through the use of hybrid seeds in Nepal (Cited from, Adhikari, 2014). This 
also explains why Nepal has a higher replacement rate of improved seeds in 
vegetables (66 percent), as compared to cereals (less than 10 percent) 
(SQCC, 2013). 
Similarly, not only hybrid seeds, but seed laws themselves can also restrict 
farmers’ freedom and customary rights to save, exchange, reuse and sell 
seeds of crop varieties. In a strict sense, the existing seed laws of Nepal do 
not allow farmers to exchange and sell seeds of native and local varieties as 
these are not registered or notified varieties, and are also not generally sold 
with packaging and labelling as per the law. Farmers have the option to use 
truthful labelling or self-declared quality scheme to promote exchange and 
sale, but these schemes are meant to serve commercial purposes. Note that 
the transactions of seeds under the local seed system are, however, mostly 
done as a social custom or a socio-cultural practice to help farmers in times 
of shortages or needs of seeds.  
In this regard, the amendment made to the Seed Act and the Seed 
Regulation for incorporating a provision of the registration of traditional 
varieties can be interpreted as having two possible implications. First, 
farmers may establish their ownership rights over local and traditional 
varieties through registration under the seed laws. Second, the registration 
of local and traditional varieties under the law will make them as formal as 
any other released or registered varieties.  
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However, since the Seed Act and the Seed Regulation are silent about the 
nature and scope of the ownership rights over traditional varieties, it is not 
clear whether the owners of such varieties become “exclusive” owners as in 
an intellectual property system. It is also not clear how such registration 
would impact farmers as a whole (other than owners) and what would be the 
conditions and requirements if any other third party, including scientists and 
breeders from the public sector, want to access the registered traditional 
varieties for research and breeding purposes in the formal seed system.  
4.7 Conclusion  
Nepal’s formal seed system is a classic example of a linear regulatory 
system of seed sector development. In terms of variety development through 
breeding, the Nepal Agriculture Research Council, as a major public sector 
agency, develops plant varieties for release under the Seed Act. The 
Council’s sole engagement in the maintenance of nucleus and breeder seeds 
and the private sector’s participation in the later stages of variety 
development (that is, in the production of foundation, certified and 
improved seeds) indicate that the public sector is still a major actor of the 
formal seed system. Seed cooperatives and community seed banks, together 
with seed producers’ groups, also participate in this process but mostly 
under the supervision of, or in coordination with, public and private actors.  
However, private actors are fully active in the introduction of imported 
improved seeds, mostly those of the hybrid varieties of cereals as well as 
vegetables. As a result, the trend of the registration of hybrid varieties, 
including other improved varieties, is rising, creating a space for the formal 
seed system to gradually attract farmers towards improved seeds.       
On the other hand, for generations, the traditionality in agriculture and local, 
customary dynamics of seed use and exchange among Nepali farmers have 
been supportive of livelihood enhancement and on-farm conservation of 
agricultural biodiversity. Notwithstanding the growth of the formal seed 
system over the past decades, a majority of farmers do not rely on formal 
seed markets but on farm-saved seeds and farmer-to-farmer exchange of 
seeds of their local needs and preferences. Within local or the so-called 
informal seed system, farmers benefit from saving of seeds and seed flows 
81 
 
at individual, household and community levels through farmer-to-farmer 
seed exchange networks. In particular, these practices have created an 
environment of trust, reciprocity and communication across farming 
households and communities. An example of this is the fact that within the 
context of social customs and practices, farmers do not possess any 
exclusive rights but believe in worshipping seeds and sharing of seeds and 
information.   
However, the formal and informal seed systems do not necessarily work in 
isolation in Nepal. They interact in a complex manner to support the 
creation of options for variety development and use. For example, farmers’ 
seed system has provided a number of parental lines of landraces for variety 
improvement and release in the formal seed system. Importantly, in recent 
years, programmes like participatory variety selection and breeding too 
have strengthened the interaction between formal and informal seed 
systems. Likewise, farmers’ seed system has also adopted and converted a 
number of formal varieties into local varieties through years of cultivation 
and improvement within local climatic conditions.  
Notwithstanding such flows of seeds from one system to another, one 
important aspect that we saw in the case of Nepal is the limited scope of the 
provisions for plant breeders’ rights in the existing seed laws. However, as 
we will see in Chapters 7 and 8, Nepal is moving ahead towards the 
development and implementation of new national laws and policies 
compatible with the TRIPS Agreement, CBD and ITPGRFA. In these 
contexts, it is more likely for the formal and informal dynamics of the seed 
system to experience additional impacts once Nepal moves beyond the 
current seed laws and brings into place laws in relation to plant breeders’ 
rights, farmers’ rights, and access and benefit sharing. Before I discuss such 
issues in Chapters 7 and 8, I will explore the global trends and dynamics of 
commons and property notions of PGRFA in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 5 
Property rights, enclosure movements, 
and new commons  
 
5.1 Introduction  
In Chapters 3 and 4, we discussed the concepts as well as the regulatory 
trends and dynamics of formality and informality of the seed system, 
highlighting their relationship with and implications for local, customary 
practices of seed use and exchange in Nepal. Formality of the seed system is 
closely interlinked with the notions of property rights over seeds, and 
importantly, have implications for local, customary dynamics of seed use 
and exchange. We saw in the previous chapters that property rights over 
seeds have not, however, so far been a concern in Nepal’s seed system. This 
is because Nepal is yet to provide intellectual property protection in 
agriculture as part of its obligation under the TRIPS Agreement. In addition, 
notwithstanding the country’s ratification of the CBD and the ITPGRFA, it 
is yet to bring into force national laws that govern the aspects of access, 
benefit sharing, prior informed consent, and farmers’ rights.  
In the previous chapter, as we saw, the existing Seed Act and the Seed 
Regulation of Nepal provide for ownership rights to breeders, but these laws 
are not clear about the nature and scope of such rights. Similarly, an 
amendment to these seed laws provides legal space to register traditional 
varieties enabling farmers to claim ownership rights over such varieties. 
However, as in the case of ownership rights to breeders, the scope and 
nature of the ownership rights over traditional varieties are not clear.  
Yet, these legal provisions have a significant relationship with the commons 
and property notions of PGRFA in Nepal’s seed regulation, the remit of 
which is not confined within the existing seed laws and their implications 
we discussed in the previous chapters. As Nepal is moving ahead to 
implement the TRIPS Agreement, CBD and ITPGRFA, a broader national 
framework for the regulation of the seed system requires the country to steer 
the flow of events in relation to the regulation of the commons and property 
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notions of PGRFA as well. For these reasons, it then becomes important to 
study how Nepal has undertaken regulatory initiatives for the 
implementation of intellectual property rights as well as the rights of local, 
indigenous and farming communities over different sets of PGRFA. It also 
becomes important to examine how state, private and civil society actors 
and networks at international, national and local levels are engaged in 
policy- and law-making processes to steer the flow of events in relation to 
the regulation of commons and property notions of PGRFA.  
An inquiry into these aspects leads us to introduce Part II of this thesis in 
which the current chapter and Chapters 6-8 discuss global and national 
regulatory trends and dynamics in relation to commons and property 
notions. This chapter, together with Chapter 6, provides a theoretical basis 
to discuss Nepal’s case of commons and property notions, mainly in relation 
to the implications of the global agreements and national laws on PGRFA 
knowledge commons in Chapters 7 and 8. In particular, this chapter 
analyses the three key concepts of the regulation of PGRFA, that is, 
“commons”, “property rights” and “enclosures”. Drawing on the work of 
commons scholarship, the chapter discusses the notions of property rights 
beyond their economic rationale, including the types of commons and 
property regimes. These aspects are important for Nepal as the use and 
exchange of PGRFA in Nepal are closely associated with societal values, 
cultural norms, and common property principles.  
The chapter also provides a brief historical context of the “enclosures” 
discussed by scholars as the first and second enclosure movements. The first 
enclosure movement is said to have initially started in the 15th century with 
a series of enclosures of land and other resources in England, gradually also 
extending such enclosures in other countries through colonisation. On the 
other hand, in the post-World War II period, the second enclosure 
movement is argued to have started when the trends of privatising intangible 
resources through intellectual property rights grew as a means of 
information capitalism to relocate openly accessible intangible knowledge 
in the private domain. As we will see in Chapter 7, Nepal has not remained 
isolated from the implications of these enclosure movements, and 
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interestingly, both of these movements have implications for the use of 
PGRFA in the country.  
In addition to explaining the key concepts, another major objective of this 
chapter is to analyse how the commons discourse has expanded to deal with 
knowledge as a “new commons” and identify the complications to explain 
knowledge commons as a good. This then leads us to further analyse the 
complicated nature of PGRFA as a knowledge commons in Chapter 6. In 
sum, this chapter maps the evolution of key concepts that this thesis uses in 
the next chapter to develop an analytical framework of PGRFA knowledge 
commons which helps in the analysis of the shifts in common spaces 
available in global agreements governing PGRFA. This framework will also 
be used in Chapter 8 on Nepal’s regulation of PGRFA and Chapter 10 on 
community seed banks in Nepal. Below I first discuss the key concepts of 
property rights, commons and enclosure movements, before discussing 
knowledge as a new commons. 
5.2 Key concepts 
5.2.1 Property rights: beyond economic rationale  
Over time, property rights have emerged as the most important and 
substantially discussed category of rights incorporated in resource regimes 
(Young, 1982). The economic rationale of property rights is that they 
economise on the use of resources, reduce the transaction costs involved in 
such use, and assist in a better allocation of resources (Demsetz, 1967).  
Nevertheless, the nature, scope and objectives of property rights are not as 
simple, clear and conclusive as we may infer from their economic rationale. 
This is particularly when the meaning of property itself has always been a 
matter of philosophical analysis among economists, ecologists, lawyers, 
political scientists, etc. In the words of John Edward Cribbet, “the word 
property remains the same, but the concept is truly in transition”, and “the 
meaning of the chameleon-word like property constantly changes in time 
and space” (Cribbet, 1986, p. 1).  
From a legal perspective, property is a legally enforceable bundle of rights 
over resources which property rights holders are free to exercise without 
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interference, neither by the state nor by any private person (Cooter & Ulen, 
1988). However, the idea that property is a bundle of legally enforceable 
rights is subject to philosophical analysis (Drahos, 1996) and the content of 
such a bundle of rights relies on the nature of the object41, society and time 
(Young, 1982). Yet, property rights can be broadly understood as dealing 
with:  
“what people may and may not do with the resources they own: the 
extent to which they may possess, use, develop, improve, transform, 
consume, deplete, destroy, sell, donate, bequeath, transfer, mortgage, 
lease, loan, or exclude others from their property” (Cooter & Ulen, 1988, 
p. 74).  
In this sense, property rights delineate and convey to the right holders the 
legally sanctioned conditions for excluding others from the above-
mentioned privileges they are entitled to enjoy as the legitimate right 
holders of the resources (David, 2001). However, the understanding of 
property rights should not always be limited to the rights of full ownership 
and the sole authority to use, develop and dispose of a resource, or to 
exclude all others by privatising the resources (Meinzen-Dick & Di 
Gregorio, 2004).  
Bromley (1989) highlights the need to consider a number of parameters 
important for society. The core of the property is beyond the physical 
objects, and involves the rights, the expectations, the duties and the 
obligations that exist in a society before property can exist (Bromley, 1989; 
Larson & Bromley, 1990). It is due to such reasons that, in the commons 
literature, property is often described as referring to certain rights and duties 
drawn from rules and norms that authorise particular actions regarding the 
access to and use of common-pool resources in a society. Individuals, for 
instance, the commoners of a resource, can take such particular actions in 
relation to other individuals (Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom & Schlager, 1996).   
Another important aspect of property rights is the need to understand that 
these rights are not only about private property. In addition to private 
41  Since the nature of the object of property affects the rights and obligations, there could be more 
than one bundle of rights on one and the same resource (Björkman & Hansson, 2006). 
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property, there are other domains of property rights such as common and 
public property, which we will discuss shortly in relation to common-pool 
resources.  
Over the past few decades, intellectual property rights have also emerged as 
an important domain of property rights. In order to reward innovations, 
these rights are given over the creations of the minds, granting the creator 
exclusive rights over the use of creations, such as through copyrights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, patents, and plant breeders’ rights 
(Blakeney, 1996; Correa, 2000). In other words, unlike real property rights 
in physical property, intellectual property rights deal with intangible 
property, or are given in abstract objects as rights of exploitation in 
information and knowledge (Drahos, 1996, 1999; Matthews, 2002).  
All of these domains of property rights have implications for the 
management of natural as well as human-made resources, including the 
PGRFA knowledge commons that we will discuss in the next chapter. Since 
property rights have implications that affect society, people and the 
environment, they should be designed to promote economic productivity, 
and at the same time, achieve social goals such as justice (Björkman & 
Hansson, 2006). Thus, a careful consideration of the “efficiency” of a 
property rights system to address such a dual objective is of utmost 
importance, mainly in the context of a country like Nepal that has formal as 
well as informal dynamics involved in the regulation of its seed system.  
Likewise, intellectual property rights should not be used as a means of 
“information feudalism” which involves “a transfer of knowledge assets 
from the intellectual commons into private hands” (Drahos & Braithwaite, 
2002, p. 2). There are costs involved if intellectual property rights are used 
to lock up “knowledge at the expense of rewarding innovations”, or as 
blocking rights by depriving “follow-on innovators of access to and 
freedom to operate with information inputs” (Braithwaite, 2008, p. 111). In 
essence, intellectual property rights should not merely be based on 
economic and utilitarian value, underestimating the cultural and identity 
value attached to intangible resources (Santilli, 2012).  
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Such cultural and identity value, for example, is an integral part of the 
traditional rights of local, indigenous and farming communities which they 
exercise under traditional farming and seed systems in many countries, 
especially in developing and least-developed ones such as Nepal. These are 
the rights that enable these communities to conserve, use, exchange and 
manage a common pool of PGRFA based on their traditional knowledge, 
and local socio-cultural, economic and ecological contexts (Andersen, 2005; 
Matthews, 2011). 
5.2.2 Commons: a resource and a form of property regime  
In the commons literature, common-pool resources generally refer to 
resource systems that are collectively shared and used by multiple 
individuals. According to Ostrom (2000, p. 1), c ommon-pool resources:  
“…generate finite quantities of units and one person’s use subtracts 
from the quantity of resource units available to others. Most common-
pool resources are sufficiently large that multiple actors can 
simultaneously use the resource system and efforts to exclude potential 
beneficiaries are costly.”  
In commons discourse, common property is also an important concept. As a 
form of property regime, common property is a legal regime that is 
governed by a set of rights belonging to the commoners of the resources 
(Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, 1975; Larson & Bromley, 1990; McCay & 
Acheson, 1990; McCay & Jentoft, 1998; Ostrom, 1990). In this sense, in a 
common property regime, members of a group exercise their common 
rights, or a bundle of common rights, such as the right to enter a defined 
physical area (access right), obtain resource units (withdrawal right), and 
manage the resources (management right) (Ostrom, 2003; Ostrom & 
Schlager, 1996).  
Agrawal and Ostrom (2001) identify the following four types of property 
rights that are mostly relevant for the use of common-pool resources: 
withdrawal (which also includes the right to access), management, 
exclusion and alienation (Figure 5.1).  
 
 
88 
 
Figure 5.1: Four types of property rights relevant to the use of 
common-pool resources 
 
 
These property rights are the authority to undertake authorised actions in 
relation to common-pool resources. Such rights, however, can either be de 
jure, or de facto property rights, and remain conditional on  the rules that 
have been generally “agreed-upon and enforced as prescriptions to require, 
forbid, or permit specific actions for more than a single individual” 
(Schlager & Ostrom, 1992, p. 250). For example, local community forest 
user groups may obtain or be given the rights of access and withdrawal to 
benefit from community forest resources. They may, however, also be 
subject to operational rules that require them to limit their access and 
withdrawal rights to only certain timber or non-timber forest products, but 
not all forest products, including genetic resources. 
This also points to an important issue that people may derive the authority 
and exercise such a bundle of property rights, either partially or fully. Those 
having the rights of access to the resource and to obtain resource units are 
the “authorised users”, and those who have these two plus the right of 
management are the “claimants”. Similarly, “proprietors” hold all the rights 
of claimants, as well as an additional right of exclusion, but not the right of 
alienation, which only “owners” possess (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Ostrom 
& Schlager, 1996; Schlager & Ostrom, 1992). In a common property 
Alienation right
The right to sell or lease all the other rights, that is, withdrawal, management and 
exclusion rights 
Exclusion right
The right to determine who will have the right of withdrawal and how that right may be 
transferred
Management right
The right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making 
improvements 
Withdrawal right
The right to enter a defined physical area or property and obtain resource units or 
products of a resource system 
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regime, individuals or a group of people often appear as “proprietors” with 
the rights of withdrawal, management and exclusion, but without having the 
right to alienate (sell or lease) these resources to others. Schlager and 
Ostrom (1992, 1996) view that these three rights are sufficient for local 
people and groups to undertake decisions for the use and management of 
common-pool resources.  In the next chapter, we will see that the property 
rights relevant to the use of physical common-pool resources may not be 
fully appropriate to explain the use rights of the PGRFA knowledge 
commons as these are largely subject to intellectual property rights for their 
real value in intangible property of PGRFA. 
5.2.3 Common-pool resources: management under different 
regimes 
It is not right to associate the management of common-pool resources only 
with common property regimes (Ostrom, 2003). Generally, common-pool 
resources are managed under four types of property regimes: open access, 
public property, private property, and common property (Edwards & Steins, 
1998; Feeny et al., 1990; Steins & Edwards, 1999).  
Figure 5.2: Four types of property regimes to manage common-pool 
resources  
 
 
Bromley (1989), arguing that open access is not a property regime at all, 
highlights the need to understand an important distinction between open-
access resources (res nullius), and common-property resources (res 
Open access
•Well-defined property rights are absent as rules regulating 
access to and allocation of benefits from the resource do not 
exist
•Allows all to use the resource 
Public/state 
property
•Access rights for the public are held in trust by the state
•All public are able to access and use the resource
Private 
property
•Tradable rights are owned by an individual, or a household, 
or a firm 
•Such rights generally limit others from accessing and using 
the resource
Common 
property
•A set of rules is implemented to govern access to, use and 
allocation of, and control over the resource
•A group of individuals, generally local people, exercise the 
property rights to use and manage the resource
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communis). According to him, open access is free-for-all, whereas common 
property means a well-defined set of institutional arrangements for the 
management of resources, including their access and use (Bromley, 1989).  
In the case of common-pool resources, as Ostrom (2000) explains, various 
actors and agencies can manage these resources under different property 
rights regimes. While local communities may manage common-pool 
resources under the common property regime, in the case of state and public 
property, either national, or depending on the political structure, even 
regional or local governments can manage common-pool resources. 
Similarly, private individuals or corporations are the ones who manage 
common-pool resources as private property.  
Another important aspect of the management of common-pool resources is 
that these resources may also be managed in overlapping and conflicting 
combinations of different property rights regimes with variation within each 
of such regimes (Feeny et al., 1990). An example of a mix of property rights 
regimes is the management of forests in Nepal that is administered based on 
the regulatory structures and principles prescribed under the Forest Act 
1993. Forests in Nepal – despite being a shared resource in principle – have 
been formally categorised and governed, for example, as national forests 
(government-managed), community forests (national forests handed over to 
the local people forming community forest user groups for development, 
conservation and utilisation for collective interest), and private forests 
(forests planted, nurtured or conserved in private lands) (Acharya, 2002; 
Graner, 1997).  
As we will see in Chapter 6, in the case of the ownership and management 
of PGRFA too, these resources may be subject to different property 
domains such as state property, community property and private property. 
In Chapter 8, I will also discuss how PGRFA has been made subject to 
ownership under different property regimes in Nepal’s CBD-compatible 
national law on access and benefit sharing.  
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5.2.4 Common-pool resources: classification in the quadrant  
of goods  
How common-pool resources are similar to or different from public, private, 
and club goods is a major focus of the commons literature. Goods are often 
classified based on two features, that is, whether or not their consumption or 
use is excludable and subtractable (rivalrous) (Cornes, 1996). For instance, 
if the consumption of a particular good is non-excludable, and at the same 
time, non-subtractable, it is a public good. Sunsets are an example of a 
public good. When we view sunsets, we cannot exclude others from the 
same viewing, and our viewing will not also subtract any part or amount of 
sunsets.  
However, the same features may not be available in the case of the use of 
local irrigation systems when these are common-pool resources. It would be 
difficult or costly to exclude any local user from access to and use of the 
irrigation systems, but certainly any additional user would mean a reduction 
in the amount of water available to others. In the commons literature, one of 
the often-cited illustrations of the two crucial characteristics of common-
pool resources (non-exclusionary and subtractability), in comparison to 
public, club and private goods, is the following:  
Table 5.1: Quadrant of different types of goods  
 Subtractability 
Low High 
Ex
cl
us
io
n 
D
iff
ic
ul
t 
Public goods 
(e.g., sunsets) 
Common-pool resources  
(e.g., irrigation systems) 
Ea
sy
 Toll or club goods  
(e.g., journal subscriptions) 
Private goods 
(e.g., personal computers) 
Source: Ostrom and Gardner (1993)  
 
Since it is difficult to exclude potential beneficiaries in the course of the use 
of common-pool resources, it is perceived that common-pool resources 
share the very characteristic of “non-excludability” with pure public goods, 
an example of which, as mentioned above, are sunsets. Whereas since one 
person’s use of common-pool resources subtracts from the resource units 
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available to the other users, the very yield of common-pool resources is 
“subtractable”. This characteristic is similar to the characteristic of pure 
private goods such as personal computers (Bromley, 1989; Ostrom & 
Gardner, 1993). Using this quadrant, I will discuss how scholars have 
identified the complications of classifying PGRFA as a good in the next 
chapter. 
5.3 Enclosures: locating the first and second movements 
The customary norms of commons, that is, the practices of common use and 
sharing of resources, have been dismantled time and again by the “enclosure 
movements”, often either through government control or the formalisation 
of private property rights. The “first enclosure movement” has been 
observed as the first intervention to implement a series of enclosures that 
started in the 15th century and continued until the 19th century in England to 
capture common resources such as shared agricultural fields, forests, and 
grazing lands42 (Boyle, 2003; Neeson, 1996; Polanyi, 1944; Travis, 2000). 
Such an enclosure movement, along with the rise of colonialism43, had its 
widespread impact on other countries too, for example, India, encouraging 
them to enclose land, forests, water, and other resources (Shiva, 1997).  
As a result, in much of the 19th and 20th centuries, centrally administered, 
top-down regulatory policies continued to regulate the control and 
management of forests and other natural resources (Agrawal et al., 2008), 
restricting local people’s ability to openly access and use the resources for 
livelihoods. In the 21st century, mainly in the post-World War II period, a 
further intensification of the enclosure process occurred along with the 
wave of globalisation, and gradually, in a neoliberal economic order, 
property rights emerged as the sine qua non of markets (Boyle, 2003), 
favouring the individuals and corporations with private property rights.  
42  See, http://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/short-history-enclosure-britain, explaining how 
the progressive enclosure of commons over several centuries deprived most of the British people 
of access to agricultural land (last accessed 12 January 2015). 
43  See, http://p2pfoundation.net/Vandana_Shiva_on_the_Contemporary_Enclosure_of_the_ 
Commons_through_IPR, explaining how the enclosure policies of England, including the policy 
of deforestation, was later replicated in the colonies in India (last accessed 12 January 2015).  
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In different times, based on their own rationale and findings, resource 
economists justified the enclosure approach on the basis of efficiency and 
incentives, biologists on the basis of avoiding open access and restricting 
overexploitation for resource conservation, and demographers on the basis 
of addressing resource degradation caused by the growing population 
(Feeny et al., 1990; Young, 1982). Particularly in the field of natural 
resource management, since the 1960s, the theory of the tragedy of the 
commons by a famous biologist and ecologist Garrett Hardin largely 
influenced policymakers to pursue further government control and private 
ownership of resources such as agriculture lands, forests and fisheries 
(Hardin, 1968).  
Since the mid-20th century intellectual property rights have become much 
more prominent tools of enclosure (Drahos & Braithwaite, 2002). Such 
rights first appeared to regulate the use of PGRFA with the reform of 
domestic laws, for example, by the US44, and later through international 
laws like the UPOV Convention in 1961 and the TRIPS Agreement in 1995 
(Matthews, 2011; Pistorius & van Wijk, 1999). Consequently, the private 
sector, in the form of giant commercial multinational seed companies, 
emerged to use new technologies (such as genetic engineering), make 
improvements to plant germplasms, and monopolise their use, production, 
reproduction, sale  and marketing in the global seed market (Mulvany, 
2005; Shiva, 1993).  
The size of the monopoly market created through intellectual property rights 
is also visible from the trends of corporate control over seeds. For example, 
by 2009, the top 10 multinational seed companies were accounting for 73 
percent of the global commercial seed market and just 3 of them were 
controlling more than 53 percent of the global commercial seed market.45  
Scholars perceive and describe such a trend as “the second enclosure 
movement”, which aims for “the enclosure of the intangible commons of 
44  The US allowed for the intellectual property protection of the varieties of vegetatively propagated 
plants since 1930, and of sexually propagated plants (that is, those reproduced through ordinary 
seeds) since the enforcement of the Plant Variety Protection Act in 1970 (Herdt, 1999). 
45  In 2009, the global commercial seed market was valued at US$27,400 million. See, 
http://www.etcgroup.org/factoids (last accessed 12 January 2015). 
94 
 
                                                 
the mind” (Boyle, 2003), and promotes the stringent forms of monopoly-
creating intellectual property rights in different fields such as biodiversity 
and agriculture (Shiva, 1997). As we will see in Chapter 7, multinational 
companies like Monsanto, together with USAID, has used a number of 
tactics to influence Nepal’s regulation of its seed system, essentially by 
making efforts to open the door for the sale and marketing of its hybrid 
seeds in the country. 
The enclosure trend is not, however, confined to the first and second 
enclosure movements as identified and discussed by scholars. There could 
be and must be many other examples of enclosures. For instance, the 
analysis of the enclosure movements should not be limited to the capture of 
openly accessible tangible natural resources such as land and forests, or the 
ratcheting up of the intellectual property rights over the use of intangible 
cultural creations such as information and knowledge. 
In an era of globalisation, and largely due to the strong influence of the 
neoliberal approach to the promotion of private sector’s interest-driven 
growth models, the enclosure movements even extend to squeezing the 
sovereign regulatory space that developing countries need to design their 
own sui generis policies for intangibles. There are scholars who – 
discussing the restriction on access to medicines vital for HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and tuberculosis created by the global intellectual property system – 
observe an international enclosure movement that: 
“…encloses the policy space of individual countries and requires them 
to adopt one-size-fits-all legal standards that ignore their local needs, 
national interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, 
and public health conditions” (Yu, 2007, p. 3). 
The same argument also holds true in the case of the influence of the 
international regulation of intellectual property on the country’s ability to 
design sui generis laws, mainly in relation to the need to protect the rights 
of local, indigenous and farming communities over PGRFA (Correa, 2015; 
Hoekman, 2005). While such cases are more like incidents of regulatory 
capture, we will also see in Chapter 7, how Nepal was able to prevent such 
capture during its accession negotiations for WTO membership due to the 
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mobilisation of civil society actors as third-party gatekeepers. The case of 
Nepal also shows how the use of networked governance enabled the country 
to design its regulation in support of the rights of local, indigenous and 
farming communities.  
5.4 Commons scholarship: from traditional to new 
commons 
Four decades have passed since Garrett Hardin put forward his theory of the 
tragedy of the commons in Science in 1968. He developed his idea of the 
tragedy, using a metaphor to describe how individual and collective 
rationality46 functions in a situation of open access to a highly predictable, 
finite supply of a resource unit. He imagined a case where a group of people 
using a commons are locked into an inevitable process, which gradually 
leads to the overexploitation, and eventually, a tragic situation of the 
destruction of the very resource on which they depend (Hardin, 1968, p. 
1244).  
In a similar way, an influential work of economist Mancur Olson too 
discusses the idea of the “incentives” for collective action, the absence of 
which, according to him, leads to the free-riding problem in groups and 
organisations. He argues that “rational self-interested individuals will not 
act to achieve their common or group interests” in the absence of some form 
of external coercion or certain incentives (Olson, 1965, p. 2).  
As an interesting development in the commons scholarship, Elinor Ostrom, 
a Nobel laureate and a globally recognised expert on commons, criticises 
the conventional theory of the “simple” common-pool resources being 
heavily focussed on “open-access resources” and not on the local or 
indigenous collective action dynamics of a number of “managed commons” 
(Ostrom, 1990). She argues that the capacity of local people and groups to 
interact and change institutions for the effective management of common-
pool resources is successfully and empirically visible in many cases, in 
46  In economics, the theory of rational choice is the general theory of how people make choices. The 
logic of this theory begins with an assumption that individuals have preferences and choices to 
select the most preferred one so as to maximise utility (where the utility function identifies higher 
preferences with large numbers). See, Cooter & Ulen (1988) for a legal overview of this theory; 
and Green et al. (1994) for a critical analysis in political science.  
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developed as well as developing countries (Ostrom, 2000; Ostrom & Hess, 
2007).  
Since the 1980s, a number of other commons analysts, based on historical 
and empirical analyses, including a growing volume of socio-
anthropological evidence, have also argued why it is not always right to 
assume that local people or institutions are incapable of self-governing their 
resources. Such scholars have laid an important emphasis on the efforts of 
local communities to initiate and sustain collective action, the building 
blocks of which, according to Ostrom (1998), are “trust, reciprocity and 
communication” (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001; Feeny et al., 1990; Freeman et 
al., 1990; Keohane & Ostrom, 1994; Larson & Bromley, 1990; Ostrom, 
1990; Ostrom et al., 1999; Ostrom & Gardner, 1993; Varughese & Ostrom, 
2001).  
Interestingly, the significance of the commons scholarship in various 
aspects of resource management is not limited to how a substantial number 
of experimental studies of common-pool resources have challenged the 
generalisability of the conventional theory of the commons (Varughese & 
Ostrom, 2001). The commons discourse has led to the formation of the 
International Association for the Study of the Commons47, and a large 
number of international, interdisciplinary studies have shown an interest in 
using the findings of the commons research as major theoretical frameworks 
to understand the dynamics of the management of not just the natural 
resources (Van Laerhoven & Ostrom, 2007).  
An example of this is an incremental focus being given to locating and 
analysing human-made resources, mainly since the mid-1990s. Based on an 
analysis of the research undertaken by many scholars around natural as well 
as human-made resources, Hess (2008) categorises the commons into 
traditional and non-traditional commons sectors. He describes that a number 
of “new commons” have been identified and debated by scholars in many 
47  The Association was founded in 1989 to bring “together multi-disciplinary researchers, 
practitioners and policymakers for the purpose of improving governance and management, 
advancing understanding, and creating sustainable solutions for commons, common-pool 
resources, or any other form of shared resource”. See, http://www.iasc-commons.org/about (last 
accessed 22 January 2015). 
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new areas. Such new commons include cultural creations like the 
knowledge commons (Hess, 2008). The issues discussed around the 
knowledge commons range from university libraries as a commons (Forrest 
& Halbert, 2009) to digital advancements and information technology 
(Evans, 2005), and copyright and creative commons (Goss, 2007) to the 
intellectual property protection of the bio commons such as PGRFA (Gulati, 
2001; Srinivas, 2006). The knowledge commons is also referred to as 
intellectual commons (Drahos 1996), information commons (Cunningham, 
2014), technology commons, and learning commons (Forrest & Halbert, 
2009).  
5.5 Knowledge: a new, cultural commons 
Scholars have extensively discussed the meaning of knowledge; information 
and data as a source of knowledge; and the acquisition of knowledge 
through a personal as well as a social process (Bellinger et al., 2004; 
Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Polanyi, 2012; Tuomi, 1999). Davenport and 
Prusak (1998, p.5) define knowledge as:   
“…a fluid mix of framed experiences, values, contextual information, and 
expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating 
new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the minds 
of knowers. In organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in 
documents and repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, 
practices, and norms.”  
This is why knowledge is also referred to as “all intelligible ideas, 
information, and data in whatever form in which it is expressed or obtained” 
(Ostrom & Hess, 2007, p. 7). However, since knowledge is cumulative and 
abstract, an understanding of knowledge or a knowledge-creation system is 
complex too. Hence, the extension of the commons discourse from tangible 
resources such as pastures to also cover the new commons such as 
intangible cultural creations like knowledge makes the commons 
scholarship broadly inclusive, but at the same time, complex.  
Some scholars have already discussed the complexity and interdisciplinary 
nature of the knowledge commons. Therefore, there is a concern whether a 
typical set of design principles developed for the analysis of collective 
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action required to manage natural resources may fit well in the analysis of 
the knowledge commons. The knowledge commons is an intangible 
resource that characterises the vast number of players with multiple 
conflicting interests, and is not a small, homogenous resource with clear 
boundaries (Ostrom & Hess, 2007).  
The realm of the knowledge commons covers the analysis of the 
behaviours, decisions, rights and rules people make in relation to their 
shared knowledge resource, including the common sharing of “ideas, 
inventions, discoveries, symbols, images, expressive works (verbal, visual, 
musical, theatrical), or in short any potentially valuable human 
product…that has an existence separable from a unique physical 
embodiment…” (Cooper, 2006, p. 105). However, the complexity in the 
analysis of the knowledge commons should not ruin the noble purpose it 
intends to achieve.  
As Cooper (2006, p. 105) observes, “…improved access to knowledge, 
information and communications is critical in building this society. The 
transformation requires a shift in the balance between the private incentive 
for production and the public value of circulation, in favour of the latter”. 
Before discussing further the rationale behind the concept of the knowledge 
commons and its relevance with the international regulation of PGRFA in 
the next chapter, below I briefly explain different views on the classification 
of knowledge as a good (including as a commons).    
5.5.1 Knowledge as a public good  
The intangible form of knowledge is often considered a classic example of a 
public good, mostly by economists48. One person’s use of knowledge – such 
as in the form of ideas, thoughts, and wisdom  – neither excludes others 
from using the same, nor diminishes its availability for others to use (Cooter 
& Ulen, 1988), for example, the use of Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the 
commons.  
48  Economists generally identify three characteristics. The first one is non-rival possession, which is 
done through the “perfect expansibility” of ideas. The second is the low marginal cost of 
reproduction and distribution, implying that it is more difficult to exclude others from gaining 
access to ideas. The third one is the substantial fixed costs of original production (David, 2001).    
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Joseph E. Stiglitz, one of the most influential economists and Nobel 
laureate, views that knowledge has both of the two critical properties of a 
public good: non-rivalrous consumption and non-excludability. In fact, he 
views knowledge not merely as a public good, but as “a global public 
good”, and argues that the international community has a “collective 
responsibility for the creation and dissemination of one global public good -
- knowledge for development” (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 308).  
5.5.2 Knowledge as a private good  
The advent of new technologies and the emergence of intellectual property 
rights have made a fundamental change in how knowledge is being treated 
in the real world. Through the use of intellectual property rights, knowledge 
is being converted from a non-rivalrous, non-exclusionary public good into 
an excludable private good. In the process of promoting a legal 
commodification of knowledge, patent laws play a major role in extracting 
exorbitant costs in exchange for access to knowledge and other 
technologies, including genetic information contained in PGRFA.  
James Boyle calls such a trend “the second enclosure movement”, and Steve 
Weber and Jennifer Bussell “the imperialism of property rights” (Boyle, 
2003; Weber & Bussell, 2005). Likewise, Evans (2005) explains the 
defensive and offensive sides of the second enclosure movement as:  
“There are…two halves to the second enclosure movement. The defensive 
side focuses on intensifying the enforcement of politically protected 
monopoly rights to exclude others from using information that has been 
defined as private property. The offensive side of the agenda involves 
taking information that has been considered part of nature, or the common 
cultural and informational heritage of humankind, and transforming it into 
private property” (Evans, 2005, pp. 86-87). 
5.5.3 Knowledge in the tragedy of the anti-commons  
The excessive proliferation and application of overlapping intellectual 
property rights over knowledge is often referred as the tragedy of the anti-
commons (Aoki, 1998; Kloppenburg, 2014; Louwaars, 2006; Santilli, 2012; 
Srinivas, 2006).  In a typical situation of the tragedy of the anti-commons, 
too many owners of a resource utilise the right to exclude others, giving rise 
to under-exploitation of the resource. This is in contrast to a typical situation 
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of the tragedy of the commons, where a group of people use a resource, but 
cannot exclude others, giving rise to overuse and finally the destruction of 
the resource. The case of Golden Rice, a genetically engineered transgenic 
Asian rice – containing a precursor of vitamin A called synthesised beta-
carotene – is an example of a variety that has been developed using 70 
different patented technologies (Hope, 2009).   
In 1998, Michael Heller had put forward the idea of the tragedy of the anti-
commons, as opposed to Hardin’s theory of the tragedy of the commons. In 
his article “The tragedy of the anti-commons: property in transition from 
Marx and markets”, he offers an example of many storefronts in Moscow to 
build his argument that a property or a resource is prone to underutilisation 
when there are too many owners who hold and exercise the right of 
exclusion (Heller, 1998). In the same year, Heller had also co-authored 
another article with Rebecca Eisenberg titled “Can Patents Deter 
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research”.  The article 
identifies “an unintended and paradoxical consequence of biomedical 
privatization” in which “a proliferation of intellectual property rights 
upstream may be stifling life-saving innovations further downstream in the 
course of research and product development” (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998, p. 
698). 
5.5.4 Knowledge as a commons  
Knowledge has many forms. It could be academic, non-academic, scientific, 
non-scientific, modern, traditional, indigenous, tribal, local, and specific to a 
particular field or area, for example, farming and biotechnology. When such 
knowledge is privatised, it restricts their access and sharing due to the 
exclusive rights created by the intellectual property system. On the other 
side, when such knowledge is in the public domain, it basically means that it 
is subject to open access and use, and has no effective protection against 
misappropriation (Santilli, 2012); and “what it contains is not defined and 
legal “rights” to its use are not delineated” (David, 2001, p. 16). It is in 
between these circumstances that the importance of the knowledge 
commons is often highlighted and defended, though the concept that 
knowledge is a new commons, as Ostrom and Hess (2007) view, is still in 
its early infancy.  
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The knowledge commons is a more important concept than public domain 
and has a meaningful purpose in the governance of knowledge dominated 
by intellectual property rights. According to Drahos (2006, p. 101), public 
domain is “information and activity that is not restricted by a species of 
intellectual property law” and thus, merely “a residual category”, whereas 
the knowledge commons “leads directly to questions of moral and political 
philosophy concerning the kinds of associations and rights we want for the 
governance of knowledge”.  
Here, the moral and political philosophy is attached to the notion that 
knowledge has been a shared resource throughout history and the sharing of 
knowledge should not be subject to intellectual property rights, but be 
promoted for the collective good of society, people and the environment. 
The governance of knowledge, as Drahos (2006) argues, should not be 
based on monopoly rights in the form of intellectual property rights, as these 
types of restrictive rights are an especially bad idea for the knowledge 
commons.  
Many scholars and institutions are working around some innovative, 
alternative approaches to address the impacts of intellectual property rights 
and the situation of the tragedy of the anti-commons. Examples of some 
efforts in this area are: open-source softwares, open source biology, the 
copyleft movement and the creative commons movement (Hope, 2009; 
Santilli, 2012). The focus of these approaches is  to address the threats from 
withdrawal, commodification and privatisation of knowledge that used to be 
accessible for all as a shared resource (Ostrom & Hess, 2007). According to 
Hope (2008, p.20), “open source principles of technology development, 
licensing, and commercial exploitation offer at least a partial solution to the 
innovation lock-down caused by extensive private control over scientific 
and technological information within a highly concentrated industry 
structure”.  
5.6 Conclusion 
The enclosures of commons have remained a major issue in discussions 
around property rights and resource regimes. The commons scholarship, in 
particular, has focussed more on the need to distinguish between open-
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access resources and resources that are “managed commons”. The strengths 
of the commons discourse relates to its identification of the self-governing 
capacity and collective action of local people and groups to manage a 
number of physical common-pool resources.  
The commons literature shows that the management of common-pool 
resources is not only possible by government control or private property 
rights, but also by local people. In fact, local management is probably the 
oldest form of commons management. In this respect, the ability of the 
commons scholarship to identify different property rights regimes, and the 
types of property rights applicable to common-pool resources, is also 
important in the discourse around resource management.  
One of the major developments in the commons scholarship is its increased 
focus on not just natural resources, but also on human-made resources, 
mostly since the mid-1990s. As we discussed, there are “new commons”, 
such as the knowledge commons, which are diverse, and at the same time, 
complex in their nature as these resources are not homogenous and do not 
have a clear geographical area. Articulating the concept of the knowledge 
commons helps to address the threats from privatisation, commodification 
and withdrawal of information and knowledge that should be accessible for 
the collective good of society, people and the environment.  
However, there are questions if an intangible, cultural commons like the 
knowledge commons may be analysed with the same or similar institutional 
frameworks designed for the analysis of natural resource-based commons. 
These aspects will be explored in detail in the next chapter on international 
regulation of PGRFA. 
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Chapter 6 
International regulation of PGRFA 
knowledge commons  
 
6.1 Introduction   
In the previous chapter, I discussed the notions of commons and property, 
the first and second enclosure movements, and the extension of commons 
scholarship from traditional to new commons like knowledge commons. I 
also discussed the limitations of the commons scholarship to provide a 
framework for the study of the complex features of the knowledge 
commons. The knowledge commons is an intangible resource that 
characterises the vast number of players with multiple conflicting interests, 
and is not a small, homogenous resource with clear boundaries. In this 
chapter, I situate and analyse PGRFA as a component of the knowledge 
commons, hereinafter referred to as “PGRFA knowledge commons”.  
PGRFA are an important component of agriculture biodiversity. These 
resources – other than forest plants and ornamentals –  include all those 
plant species that provide food, medicine, fodder for domestic animals, 
fiber, clothing, shelter, energy, and other uses (Hammer et al., 2003). As a 
basis for the world’s food security and agriculture, PGRFA are also the raw 
materials for breeding and development of crop varieties. From ancient 
times only farmers were domesticating wild plants and improving varieties 
of local needs by selection and breeding within the informal, local seed 
system. In the present time, formal actors too access PGRFA for improving 
varieties or developing new ones within the formal seed system through 
modern techniques of breeding such as genetic engineering (Lawson, 2009). 
In the debates around PGRFA knowledge commons, the effects of 
intellectual property restrictions on access to and use of PGRFA are a major 
concern. However, note that as the concept of the knowledge commons as a 
whole, the concept of PGRFA knowledge commons too is not simple to 
understand and explain.  
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This chapter first discusses the ambiguity in the understanding of the 
property dynamics of PGRFA. Some scholars put these resources 
somewhere between a pure natural resource (traditional) commons and a 
knowledge (new) commons as PGRFA possess tangible (physical) as well 
as intangible (informational) property. Some others classify these resources 
based on the quadrant of goods. It is not, however, always clear which type 
of PGRFA are public goods and which others are private, or club or 
common goods.  
The chapter then analyses the complexities that PGRFA face as a 
knowledge commons. There is complexity in characterising the commons 
and property notions of PGRFA. This is evident from how international 
regulation of these resources through the UPOV, TRIPS, CBD and 
ITPGRFA has led to the introduction of a multiple domain of property 
rights that affect their use and exchange. The conceptual complexity of the 
PGRFA knowledge commons is also evident from how these resources face 
a typically different social dilemma as their overuse and not underuse 
ensures the maintenance of their diversity and sustainable use.       
Against the backdrop of the limitations of the commons scholarship to 
provide a framework for the study of the complex features of the PGRFA 
knowledge commons, this chapter seeks to make an important theoretical 
contribution. In order to develop an analytical framework to better 
understand PGRFA knowledge commons, the chapter discusses the 
conceptual scheme of a typology of four types of commons developed by 
Drahos (1996) as positive inclusive, positive exclusive, negative inclusive 
and negative exclusive commons. It then builds on the analysis of Drahos’ 
typology by Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren (2008) in locating the shifting 
status of PGRFA vis-à-vis the relevant international undertaking, 
resolutions and agreements.  
Through the conceptualisation of the PGRFA knowledge commons 
framework, the chapter seeks to explain the regulatory influences of 
different international agreements that govern and regulate PGRFA through 
multiple property rights domains. The chapter is, however, limited to the 
discussion of the regulatory influences of the UPOV Convention, CBD, 
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TRIPS and ITPGRFA. As we will see in Chapter 7, these international 
agreements have led to network confrontations in Nepal through actors and 
networks at international, national and local levels. Since the CBD, TRIPS 
and ITPGRFA are the agreements that Nepal is obliged to implement 
through national laws and/or measures, this chapter also provides a 
theoretical basis to analyse Nepal’s regulation of the PGRFA knowledge 
commons in Chapter 8. We will see that Nepal is moving ahead to introduce 
multiple property domains to regulate the different subsets of PGRFA, or 
PGRFA knowledge commons. For now, we start the discussion with an 
analysis of the complexities of PGRFA knowledge commons. 
6.2 The complexities of PGRFA knowledge commons  
6.2.1 Tangible and intangible property of PGRFA 
PGRFA possess two types of objects: tangible, physical objects, as well as 
intangible, informational objects. The tangible, physical objects of these 
resources are plant materials containing functional units of heredity such as 
cells, tissues, plant parts, and sexual and vegetative seeds. The intangible, 
informational objects of these resources are enclosed in a physical object, 
that is, the deoxyribonucleic acid molecule (DNA). However, these two 
objects do not fully define and complete the meaning, nature and 
significance of PGRFA.  
The tangible, physical objects, as well as the intangible, informational 
objects of PGRFA are also embedded with important knowledge about their 
agricultural, economic, social, cultural and ecological use and value. Such 
information and knowledge are mostly the outcomes of the efforts made by 
various actors in different networked systems of variety selection, use, 
research and breeding. Mainly farmers and breeders have made valuable 
efforts to continuously use and develop plant varieties to adapt to or address 
the needs of food security, agriculture development, climate change and 
poverty, either through the use of traditional knowledge or modern 
technologies or both.  
Due to these tangible and intangible aspects, PGRFA fall into the category 
of physical property, and at the same time, intangible property. This then 
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brings us to an important question of the linkage or the relationship of 
PGRFA with property rights. According to Correa (1995), while addressing 
the issue of property rights, there is a need to establish the distinction 
between rights over physical property and intangible property of PGRFA. 
He maintains that PGRFA, as physical property, can be the object of private 
or public property rights, for example, when these resources are situated in 
private or public lands, just like the tangible common-pool resources studied 
by the commons scholars. According to him, when the same PGRFA are 
removed from specific lands and transported outside, these resources may 
become subject to a different property regime, for instance, in cases of shifts 
outside the land of origin or to another country. However, he also makes it 
clear that due to the information contained in these resources, PGRFA hold 
their real value as an intangible property, and thus, a different property 
regime governing the knowledge component of PGRFA becomes important 
(Correa, 1995).  
As plant genetic resources are situated somewhere between and not exactly 
as a natural resource (tangible) commons and cultural (intangible) 
commons, according to Halewood (2013), the institutional frameworks 
developed to analyse natural resource commons and cultural commons are 
not suitable for the analysis of complex commons like PGRFA. More than 
the property rights of withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation 
discussed by the commons scholars in the case of physical common-pool 
resources, the analysis of the PGRFA knowledge commons requires a 
careful consideration of the property rights relevant for the regulation of 
intangible property of PGRFA.  
According to Correa (2013), it is where the legal problems are complex, as 
states continue to come into conflict around the legal status of PGRFA. 
Such a conflict is visible in the way the international regulation has evolved 
over last six decades to govern and regulate the use of plant genetic 
resources (including PGRFA) with different property rights domains.   
6.2.2 International agreements to govern plant genetic resources 
Before PGRFA became the subject of global governance and property 
rights, they were largely globally shared and accessible resources. Some 
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scholars perceive this situation as PGRFA being a “global commons”, in the 
use of which non-members theoretically do not exist (Roa-Rodríguez & 
Van Dooren, 2008; Safrin, 2004). Similarly, some perceive that PGRFA 
were part of a “common heritage of humankind” (Andersen, 2005; Corson 
& MacDonald, 2012).  
Notwithstanding these understandings, since the mid-20th century, the 
global governance of PGRFA has come a long way to introduce and include 
in its remit a number of regulations for the access, use, exchange, collection, 
production, reproduction, sale and marketing of PGRFA. As a result, 
PGRFA are no longer entirely a global commons, or a common heritage of 
humankind, but subject to different domains of property rights. In the words 
of Raustiala and Victor (2004):  
“…states have created property rights in these resources in a Demsetzian 
process: as new technologies and ideas have made PGR far more 
valuable, actors have mobilized and clashed over the creation of 
property rights that allow the appropriation of that value” (Raustiala & 
Victor, 2004, p. 277). 
An understanding of the property rights domains created by the 
international regulation of PGRFA is well understood with the analysis of 
the provisions of the UPOV Convention of 1961, 1978 and 1991; the CBD 
of 1992; the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement of 1995; and the ITPGRFA of 2001 
(Matthews, 2011). The UPOV Conventions and the TRIPS Agreement of 
the WTO have been designed for the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights, covering, among others, exclusive-type of patent and plant breeders’ 
rights over plant varieties (Correa, 2000, 2015).   
On the other hand, the CBD establishes sovereign rights of states over all 
genetic resources – including PGRFA but not human genetic resources – 
that are located within their territories. The Convention calls upon the states 
to exercise sovereign rights but take measures to facilitate access to genetic 
resources for other contracting parties through a bilateral system of access 
and benefit sharing. The CBD also calls for the protection of the rights of 
local and indigenous people over their genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge through national laws (Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Swanson, 
2013).  
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Similarly, the ITPGRFA creates a global pool of 64 crops for facilitated 
access through a multilateral system so that obstacles of access to plant 
germplasms are addressed at a global level by the contracting parties. The 
Treaty also provides a legal basis to nationally protect farmers’ rights to 
PGRFA and traditional knowledge through national laws and/or measures.  
These agreements clearly show the shift of PGRFA from the state of an 
unregulated system of access, domestication, cultivation, exchange and 
collection within farmers’ seed system to a situation of a complicated global 
system governed by a number of property rights domains. Such a shift in the 
international regulation of PGRFA means that the countries participating in 
these global agreements have to devise compatible domestic regulations to 
recognise, as allowed and where necessary, state sovereignty, the rights of 
local and indigenous people, farmers’ rights, and intellectual property 
rights. The upshot of this is that between the PGRFA-providing countries in 
the South and the PGRFA-receiving countries in the North, the international 
conflict was and continues to be mainly around the issue of 
commercialisation of PGRFA through intellectual property rights (Adhikari, 
2009a; Brush, 2013; Posey & Dutfield, 1996; Tansey & Rajotte, 2008).  
As we will discuss a bit later, the issue of intellectual property rights is 
central to the discourse on the PGRFA knowledge commons and have 
implications for access to and use of PGRFA at global, national and local 
levels. In particular, the property rights implications could be a major source 
of restrictions for local and indigenous communities who rely on traditional 
seed systems to access, use and exchange PGRFA for seed and food 
security. Such restrictions are not a good idea also because PGRFA are 
resources that face a typically different social dilemma, and their 
conservation and sustainable use are best ensured through continuous use 
and exchange.  
6.2.3 PGRFA facing a typically different social dilemma  
PGRFA do not face a typical danger of overexploitation and resource 
degradation, as the commons scholars discuss in the case of physical 
common-pool resources (Halewood, 2013). Unlike natural resources, as 
Drahos (2006) mentions, “repletion through use rather than depletion is 
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what characterises the intellectual commons”. In this sense, in the case of 
the PGRFA knowledge commons, the collective action problem in the 
conservation and use of PGRFA does not come from the free and 
unrestricted use of the resource by a group of farmers, but appears due to 
conditions that force or motivate farmers to underuse or avoid the use and 
exchange of PGRFA.  
An example of this is the loss of traditional varieties of PGRFA from local 
areas due to a policy that promotes an increased use of modern high-
yielding varieties or that restricts reproduction and reuse of seeds through 
seed laws. We will see in Chapters 9 and 10, such loss of traditional 
varieties has led some civil society and community actors to establish 
community seed banks and promote the use and exchange of local varieties 
in different countries, including Nepal.  
Halewood (2013) explains the different type of social dilemma that PGRFA 
face as following: 
“The principle social dilemma facing PGRFA is quite different: in the 
absence of human intervention through selection and breeding, the existing 
diversity of crop species (and diversity within those species) would never 
have evolved. The corollary is also true: in the absence of continued use 
(or storage in ex situ collections) much of the existing inter- and intra-
specific diversity would cease to exist…underuse of PGRFA – not overuse 
– is the biggest threat to their evolution, conservation and availability for 
use by others.”  
Hence, in building a case for the PGRFA knowledge commons, it is to be 
well understood that PGRFA evolve, develop and expand with human 
intervention and further use in diverse and complex socio-economic and 
environmental settings. Understandably, today’s diversity of PGRFA –  
which is important in feeding the global population and sustaining 
agriculture all over the world – is not merely a product of nature. Such a 
diversity is also the result of millennia of efforts that farmers and breeders 
have made by using their knowledge and other resources to understand and 
benefit from PGRFA, complex ecosystems, and societal and environmental 
needs (Halewood et al., 2013).  
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6.2.4 PGRFA as different goods in the “goods quadrant”  
The intangible knowledge contained in PGRFA has a complex nature. As 
some scholars argue, there is ambiguity in what type of resources PGRFA 
are, and which particular classification of goods suits PGRFA. Some 
scholars view PGRFA to be a public good, whereas some others find them 
having the features of a private good (Brown & Swierzbinski, 1988; Fisher, 
1988; Sedjo, 1992).  
In particular, Sedjo (1992) makes the distinction that PGRFA contain the 
characteristics of both private and public goods. On the one hand, 
phenotypes – that is, individual plants – are subject to rivalry in 
consumption as in the case of private goods, on the other, their genotypes – 
that is, the information embodied in the genetic constitutions of plant 
species – are non-rivalrous in consumption, as in the case of public goods49.  
Similarly, Herdt (1999) makes an attempt to classify the PGRFA, but in the 
form of seeds. According to him, when PGRFA are in use as reproducible 
open-pollinated seeds, they are like a public good for two reasons: first, 
farmers cannot be prevented from using them (non-excludable), and second, 
their use by one farmer does not compete with their use by another (non-
rival). However, if they are hybrid seeds, they are nothing but private goods 
(Herdt, 1999). Hybrid seeds cannot be reproduced as open-pollinated seeds. 
The same holds true in the case of seeds developed using terminator 
technologies.  
For some other scholars, PGRFA do not only fall within the classification of 
public or private goods. Halewood (2013) argues that different subsets of 
PGRFA can be described as public goods, private goods, club goods or 
common-pool resources. According to him, only a subset of PGRFA that is 
near extinction and the samples of which are difficult to produce should 
qualify as common-pool resources. The other subsets of PGRFA, as shown 
in Table 6.1, are either public, or club or private goods.  
 
49  Sedjo (1992) also views that both phenotypes and genotypes can possess exclusivity by excluding 
consumption from some individuals, while allowing for others.   
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Table 6.1: Classification of PGRFA as different kinds of goods 
 Subtractability 
Low High 
Ex
cl
us
io
n 
D
iff
ic
ul
t 
 
Public goods 
• Ex situ collections in 
CGIAR and many 
European countries 
(global public goods) 
• Collections in national 
gene banks (national 
public goods) 
• In situ PGRFA on lands 
managed and controlled 
by national government 
(in the absence of farmer 
management) 
• Plant breeders’ right-
protected PGRFA (for 
purposes of research, 
breeding, private, non-
commercial use) 
 
Common-pool resources  
• PGRFA embedded in threatened situ 
populations and unique samples/units 
in threatened ex situ collections 
 
Ea
sy
 
 
Toll or club goods  
• Patent pools 
• PGRFA subject to 
facilitated access in 
research consortia 
• PGRFA subject to 
humanitarian use licenses 
 
Private goods 
• PGRFA that are subject to strong 
national access and benefit sharing 
laws including potentially ex situ and 
in situ PGRFA held by provincial 
government, private universities, 
companies, civil society 
organisations, and farmers, and in the 
wild (except those on public lands) 
• Patent-protected PGRFA 
• Plant breeders’ right-protected 
PGRFA (for commercial 
exploitation)  
• Hybrid parental lines, hybrid seed 
(that are not shared publicly) 
Source:  Halewood (2013).  
 
However, note that the classification of PGRFA in the classic goods 
quadrant does not clarify the property rights dynamics set under 
international and national regulatory tools. This classification provides a 
conceptual understanding of the characteristics and nature of PGRFA in 
relation to the quadrant of goods, but may not be a comprehensive 
framework to understand the PGRFA knowledge commons. Moreover, the 
above classification overlaps and is ambiguous too.  
For instance, to say that collections in national gene banks are public goods 
might not be desired by some local communities if their PGRFA are 
accessed and stored in national gene banks for the purpose of conservation 
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and safety duplicates. As we will discuss in Chapter 10, for example, some 
community seed banks did not initially express their consent to provide their 
germplasms to the national gene bank of Nepal. Instead, these community 
seed banks asked for a formal request and demanded the protection of their 
rights over their seeds and traditional knowledge.  
Against the backdrop of these issues and the limitations of the commons 
scholarship to provide frameworks for the study of the PGRFA knowledge 
commons, in the following section, I develop an analytical framework that 
explains the property rights dynamics of regulations that create and affect 
the PGRFA knowledge commons.  
6.3 Four types of PGRFA knowledge commons 
Drahos, in his book “A philosophy of intellectual property” (1996) and in a 
subsequent article “A defence of the intellectual commons” (2006), has 
made a philosophical analysis of the commons leading him to derive four 
types of commons. These commons flow logically from assumptions of 
exclusiveness, inclusiveness, positive and negative community. They 
represent visions of commons that are logically available.  
According to him, in a negative commons, no one owns the resources, but 
anyone may appropriate them for personal use. In contrast to that, in a 
positive commons, resources are jointly owned and their use by any person 
depends on the consent of all other commoners. For him, inclusiveness 
means a universal access to the resources by all human beings, irrespective 
of geography, race or culture50; and exclusiveness means the confinement of 
the use of resources by a group of people, excluding others from accessing 
and using the same resources. His philosophical analysis of the commons 
then forms a typology of four types of commons: positive inclusive, positive 
exclusive, negative inclusive and negative exclusive.  
50  According to Drahos (2006), an ideal situation of the positive inclusive commons may be difficult 
to be seen in the case of tangible resources. However, for certain types of knowledge, such as the 
rules of arithmetic, all have use rights, and thus, a situation of the positive inclusive commons 
exists.   
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Figure 6.1 explains their meaning and type with an elaboration in the 
context of access to and use of PGRFA, which I call the typology of the 
PGRFA knowledge commons.  
Figure 6.1: Typology of the PGRFA knowledge commons 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In using these categories to develop a framework for the analysis of the 
PGRFA knowledge commons in the context of international regulation and 
Nepal, I am not claiming that these logical categories of Drahos’ typology 
of intellectual commons perfectly describe the law and systems of 
governance for PGFRA to be found in Nepal or in other regimes such as the 
TRIPS or the CBD regimes. Rather these logical categories represent a 
vision that an institution or network might have of a commons and that 
serves as an ideal to which it might work. In other words, there is no perfect 
fit between the logical categories and the world. As we will see in the next 
Positive 
commons: 
PGRFA are jointly 
owned. Their use by 
any person will 
have to be 
consented by all the 
commoners. 
Positive inclusive commons: All human beings, 
regardless of geography, race or culture, own and use 
PGRFA (though only with the consent of the 
commoners).  
Positive exclusive commons: Only a particular 
group is able to jointly own and use PGRFA. Others 
are not entitled to any use unless consent is obtained 
from that particular group. 
 Negative inclusive commons: An individual, or a 
group of users, or an institution appropriate the 
PGRFA to introduce new varieties under their 
(private) control. All are allowed to use the new 
varieties, but only with some exemptions as specified 
by the law (e.g., for only research, breeding, and 
private, non-commercial use such as in the case of 
plant breeders’ rights). With regard to the earlier 
PGRFA, there is still no ownership, and all can 
continue to appropriate. 
 Negative exclusive commons: An individual, or a 
group of users, or an institution appropriate the 
PGRFA to introduce the new varieties under their 
(private) control. Others are hardly given any 
exemptions in the law (e.g., other than commercial 
exploitation as the buyers and consumers of the 
privately-owned PGRFA such as in the case of 
patents). With regard to the earlier PGRFA, there is 
still no ownership, and all can continue to 
appropriate. 
 
 
Negative 
commons:  
No one initially 
owns the PGRFA, 
but anyone may 
appropriate them. 
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chapters, many actors and networks in Nepal contest the governance of 
PGFRA attempting to tilt the rules and regimes in the direction of their 
preferred vision of the commons. 
Previously, Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren (2008) have used Drahos’ 
typology of intellectual commons with the addition of Ostrom and 
Schlager’s categorisation of operational-level property rights that I 
discussed in the earlier chapter. Their analysis locates the shifting status of 
PGRFA vis-à-vis the four types of commons and the relevant international 
undertaking, resolutions, and agreements. The analysis that I have made 
below builds and elaborates on Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren’s discussion 
of the shifting common spaces in the international regulation of PGRFA. 
However, I have given consideration to some important aspects that this 
framework demands for the analysis of regulations affecting the use and 
exchange of PGRFA.  
Firstly, I have defined the four types of PGRFA knowledge commons as 
shown in the figure above. Additionally, in the previous analysis, it is not 
clear if the entire set of PGRFA, or only a subset, shifts from one type of 
commons to another type, when a particular regulation comes into play to 
govern the use of PGRFA. I have tried to bring more clarity to this aspect, 
showing that PGRFA – not as a whole but with their different subsets – 
become subject to different types of positive and negative commons.  
Secondly, I have not mixed Drahos’ typology of commons with Ostrom and 
Schlager’s categorisation of property rights, as Roa-Rodríguez & Van 
Dooren have done. This is mainly because these property rights, as we 
discussed in the previous chapter, are better explained in the case of the 
management of physical property or tangible resources. For example, the 
analysis of the rights of withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation 
would be better suited to the study of whether and how local people, or 
private individuals and public institutions, possess these rights over tangible 
resources, such as forest products, in a well-defined geographical area.  
In the case of PGRFA too, these property rights mainly matter while 
analysing the possession of tangible components of PGRFA (for example, 
individual plants) as physical property. However, the analysis I make below 
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focusses more on how the international regulation of PGRFA has advanced 
regulatory influences for the use and exchange of PGRFA as a knowledge 
commons. In this case, the intangible property of PGRFA does not have 
clear boundaries but is subject to property rights such as intellectual 
property rights and farmers’ rights. Thus, in this analysis, I contextualise the 
categorisation of property rights by Ostrom and Schlager only when it is 
important to understand PGRFA as physical property, for example, in the 
case of the recognition of sovereign rights of states over PGRFA in their 
territories.   
Thirdly, this analysis emphasises that the condition of consent from 
commoners – as mentioned by Drahos – is relevant for the discussion on the 
PGRFA knowledge commons. This aspect has not been clearly discussed by 
Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren, and I discuss this more in Nepal’s case of 
positive inclusive commons in Chapter 8.  
Fourthly, this analysis has not necessarily come to the same conclusions as 
those of Roa-Rodríguez & Van Dooren. This analysis builds on mostly the 
new or additional references and/or contexts, and hence, the contents of 
analysis are different to a significant extent. In addition, this analysis does 
not simply provide an overview of which international agreement governs 
what type of negative or positive commons. As we will see below, I 
examine the diversity of PGRFA and property rights dynamics in detail to 
show multiple layers of commons being governed by each international 
agreement. In Chapter 8 too, I use the same approach to analyse Nepal’s 
case of PGRFA knowledge commons. 
6.3.1 Pre-UPOV era of positive and negative commons  
A common understanding among a number of scholars is that before the 
20th century, as there were no legal instruments like intellectual property to 
restrict the access and use of intangible resources, PGRFA were largely a 
global commons or a common heritage of humankind (Aoki & Luvai, 2007; 
Le Buanec, 2005; Thomas, 2005). As Raustiala and Victor (2004, p. 281) 
put it, until that time “while a particular specimen of a plant could be 
owned, genetic resources per se were not owned by individuals or states”.  
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An analysis from the lens of the above-mentioned framework of PGRFA 
knowledge commons shows that PGRFA as a global commons or a 
common heritage – which is based on the principle of open access and not 
common property – is more like an ideal situation of PGRFA as a positive 
inclusive commons. However, one must note that even before the 
globalisation of intellectual property regulation started to proliferate in 
many countries, there were different visions of the commons, both positive 
and negative. These different visions of the commons were then central to 
the governance and regulation of PGRFA among different networks of 
farmers, breeders, scientists, etc.  
For example, between 1850 and 1950, also referred to as “the era of plant 
exploration and introduction”, open access to freely51 accessible genetic 
resources had enabled the famous plant collectors (like Frank Meyer and 
Nikolai Vavilov) and mostly the powerful states in the North52 to pool and 
preserve PGRFA in botanical gardens and ex situ collection centres (Cohen 
et al., 1991, p. 867; Fowler & Hodgkin, 2004). In a way, through such ex 
situ collection missions,53 PGRFA were being treated more like a negative 
commons. Such missions enabled a number of states, mostly developed 
ones, to collect the resources from different countries and “appropriate” 
without any need to obtain the consent from the providers (commoners) of 
the resources or share the benefits accrued out of such appropriation.  
On the other hand, since the time of earliest crop domestications, local, 
indigenous and farming communities have treated PGRFA under their use 
and management more like a common property, and as per our typology, a 
positive commons. Generally, such communities jointly own the PGRFA 
for use and exchange among themselves with customary norms and 
51  The only cost being the expenses of collection (Kloppenburg, 2005). 
52   According to Crosby (1972), long before such as an era, the so-called “Columbian exchange” 
contributed to the collections of plant germplasms (such as of maize, wheat, olives, onions, 
radishes and many others) between Europe and Americas. European powers then created 
worldwide networks of botanical gardens to fulfil the economic needs associated with the 
agriculture development of colonial possessions (Kloppenburg, 2005).  
53  Since the era of plant exploration and introduction to the recent time, about 7.4 million accessions 
have been made globally. The ex situ collections have widened to such an extent that there are 
more than 1,750 individual genebanks worldwide, with the largest collections made by CGIAR 
(FAO, 2010). 
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practices of obtaining consent for access and use from all the commoners of 
the resources. For example, in Australia, indigenous communities use 
PGRFA more like a positive exclusive commons, as only these communities 
jointly own and use the resources based on their customary principles of 
common property (Drahos & Frankel, 2012). As we will see in Chapter 8, 
the case of Nepal is a bit different, as farmers in Nepal are widely involved 
in using and exchanging PGRFA more like a global commons or a positive 
inclusive commons. We will discuss that Nepali farmers have not only 
exchanged seeds among themselves, but have also provided seeds to other 
actors, irrespective of geography, race and culture, which is an important 
element of positive inclusive commons.  
An important connection of such different visions of the positive and 
negative commons is with the advent and expansion of the second enclosure 
movement of intellectual property rights that we discussed in the earlier 
chapter. In the following sections, we will discuss how the international 
regulation of PGRFA – through international agreements and resolutions in 
different forums – has emerged with different property domains to affect the 
use and exchange of PGRFA.  
However, in this analysis, as mentioned above, PGRFA as a whole are not 
part of any specific type of PGRFA knowledge commons, but with their 
different subsets, are subject to regulation as commons of positive, negative, 
inclusive or exclusive nature. For example, we will see that intellectual 
property rights have emerged to govern a subset of PGRFA with exclusive 
private rights, treating PGRFA outside the intellectual property system as 
negative commons, that is, openly accessible for appropriation and 
conversion into private property without any obligation to obtain consent 
from the commoners of the initial varieties (resources).  
Yet, note that intellectual property-protected varieties too become negative 
commons once they become public domain varieties after the expiry of 
intellectual property after certain years, for example, after 20 years in the 
case of patents. However, until the period of protection, these rights impact 
significantly on the typology of PGRFA knowledge commons, first by 
restricting common spaces available for use and exchange of PGRFA 
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protected as a private property, and second by treating PGRFA (other than 
intellectual property-protected) as a negative commons. Below I start this 
discussion with the first international agreement that came into being to 
provide plant breeders’ rights on plant varieties derived out of the 
appropriation of PGRFA.             
6.3.2 UPOV: Appropriation of PGRFA as a negative commons 
Following the proposal from the actors of the plant breeding industry, that 
is, European plant breeders in the 1950s, the UPOV Convention came into 
being in 1961 and has been revised since then in 1978 and 1991. The first 
version of the convention – UPOV 1961 – established a system54 that 
provided a monopoly-type of protection for the fruits of all forms of plant 
improvement, including “discoveries”, for example, through the protection 
granted on selections made within natural (pre-existing) variation.  
However, the Convention did not impose any obligation to seek consent 
from or share the benefits with the commoners, treating all the PGRFA as a 
negative commons, that is, owned by no one but open for appropriation. 
And in the course of appropriation, if plant breeding led to the introduction 
of varieties that were new, distinct, uniform and stable, the Convention 
provided protection on such varieties through plant breeders’ rights.  
Then, only the plant breeders (often the seed companies) enjoyed the rights 
to produce and market such varieties for commercial benefits. Such rights, 
in fact, have widened along with the subsequent revisions of the 
Convention, first in 1978 and then in 1991.  
The latest version of the UPOV Convention, referred to as UPOV 1991, 
extends the protection to “production, conditioning, offering for sale, 
selling, exporting, importing, or stocking for above purposes of propagating 
materials of the variety.” This essentially means that the users (farmers) of 
the UPOV-protected new varieties can only buy the seeds of such varieties 
for the purpose of producing food, while all are able to use the substantial 
54   See http://www.upov.int/edocs/infdocs/en/0_c_extr_19_2_rev.pdf (last accessed 24 
November 2015). 
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subset of PGRFA that are outside the UPOV protection as negative 
commons.   
Table 6.2: Salient features of UPOV  
Provisions UPOV 1978 UPOV 1991 
Protection 
coverage 
Plant varieties of 
nationally defined 
species and genera 
Plant varieties of all genera and species 
Protection 
type 
Producing for 
purposes of 
commercial 
marketing, offering 
for sale and marketing 
of propagating 
material of the variety.  
Producing, conditioning, offering for 
sale, selling or other marketing, 
exporting, importing, stocking for 
above purposes of propagating 
materials of the variety. If harvested 
materials are obtained through the 
unauthorised use of propagating 
material, certain acts are prohibited if 
the breeder has had no reasonable 
opportunity to exercise his right in 
relation to the propagating material. 
Breeders’ 
exemption 
Yes, breeders are free 
to use a protected 
variety to develop a 
new variety. However, 
repeated use of the 
protected variety for 
the commercial 
production of another 
variety is not 
exempted. 
Yes. However, in addition to the 1978 
version, essentially derived varieties 
and varieties which are not 
distinguishable from the protected 
variety are not included in the 
breeders’ exemption. 
Farmers’ 
“privilege” 
Yes, farmers are 
implicitly free to use 
their harvested 
material for any 
purpose, also when it 
stems from a protected 
variety 
National governments are entitled to 
decide whether farmers shall be 
allowed –within reasonable limits and 
safeguarding the legitimate interests of 
the rights holder – to reuse the harvest 
of protected varieties on their own land 
holdings without the authorisation of 
the rights holder.   
Source: Santilli (2012). 
 
The only elements of inclusiveness in the UPOV system are the certain 
flexibilities specified by the UPOV as breeders’ exemption and farmers’ 
“privilege”. However, as shown in Table 6.2, while plant breeders’ rights 
have been strengthened in the subsequent revisions, the two important 
inclusive elements – farmers’ “privilege”, and to some extent breeders’ 
exemption – have been gradually weakened in the 1978 and then the 1991 
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versions of the UPOV Convention. Based on this analysis, it can be 
concluded that the UPOV system has narrowed down the “positive” and 
“inclusive” elements of PGRFA as a global commons.   
6.3.3 Restoration of positive inclusive commons through IUPGR 
The decades of 1960s and 1970s witnessed a growing trend of granting 
intellectual property rights on the improved varieties of PGRFA, treating 
continuously the resources outside the property rights as a negative 
commons. While such a trend benefitted the PGRFA-receiving countries in 
the North, there did not exist any fair and equitable mechanism of allocation 
of benefits to the holders and providers of PGRFA, who were mostly the 
PGRFA-providing countries and local communities in the South, that is, 
positive commoners (Footer, 2000; Mooney, 1979). In addition, mainly 
since the 1960s, due to the introduction of high-yielding modern varieties, 
the erosion of local PGRFA scaled up at an unprecedented rate, creating 
concerns for the countries in the South (Andersen, 2008). These issues 
triggered international conflict and tensions between the PGRFA-providing 
countries in the South and the PGRFA-receiving countries in the North 
(Fowler, 1994).  
Then came another development in the global governance of PGRFA that 
tried to create PGRFA as a global commons, that is, a positive inclusive 
commons in the 1980s. The FAO Conference Resolution 8/83 adopted the 
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR) in 198355. 
The Undertaking focussed on the conservation of PGRFA, and emphasised 
to promote unrestricted, wider access under “the universally accepted 
principle that plant genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and 
consequently should be available without restriction”.  
In order to monitor the implementation of the IUPGR and advise the FAO 
on its activities and programmes on PGRFA, in 1983, the FAO Conference 
Resolution 9/83 also established the FAO Commission on Plant Genetic 
Resources56. However, as we will discuss below, the negotiations under the 
55  ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/meeting/015/aj399e.pdf (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
56  http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5563e/x5563e0a.htm (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources could not sustain the idea of 
making the PGRFA a positive inclusive commons.  
6.3.4 Positive vs negative commons 
The two subsequent decisions adopted in 1989 as annexes to the IUPGR in 
the FAO Conference made a major shift in how PGRFA were being 
considered to be made available for exploration, documentation and access 
without any restriction. The first of such decisions came in the form of The 
Agreed Interpretation of the International Undertaking (Resolution 4/89)57. 
This Resolution added “common” to the initially-accepted principle stating 
that “plant genetic resources are a common heritage of mankind to be 
preserved, and to be freely available for use, for the benefit of present and 
future generations”. However, the same Resolution recognised that “Plant 
Breeders' Rights as provided for under UPOV…are not incompatible with 
the International Undertaking”.  
Such a recognition by the IUPGR strongly favoured the UPOV-led 
enclosure process by recognising the UPOV-protected subset of PGRFA to 
continue to remain as private goods. This was essentially also the interest of 
the PGRFA-receiving countries in the North as they wanted to capture the 
PGRFA within the intellectual property system for commercial sale in the 
global seed market. However, other than UPOV-protected new PGRFA, 
since rest of the PGRFA (for example those in the public domain) were still 
considered to be available for appropriation as negative commons, the 
resource-providing countries in the South expressed their reservation for 
two main reasons.  
First, there was fierce resistance from these countries as intellectual 
property protection was being extended to such new plant varieties.  These 
countries took the view that this was based on the PGRFA that they had 
made available, for example, through accessions to ex situ conservation 
programmes. Second, the countries in the South, as resource providers, 
wanted to ensure that their farmers receive full benefits from the use of 
57  http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5588e/x5588e06.htm (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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PGRFA and be supported for continuous conservation and sustainable use 
of PGRFA (Andersen, 2005; Correa, 2000).  
Thus, in order to address the equity and benefit sharing concerns of the 
resource-providing countries in the South, the second resolution was 
adopted as Resolution 5/89 on “Farmers’ Rights”58. This Resolution 
endorsed the concept of farmers’ rights. It, among other things, stated that 
“farmers, their communities, and countries in all regions” should be able to 
“participate fully in the benefits derived, at present and in the future, from 
the improved use of plant genetic resources, through plant breeding and 
other scientific methods”.  
Though the IUPGR was not legally binding, it was the first-ever 
international recognition of farmers’ rights in the international instrument. 
The subsequent negotiations on the concept of farmers’ rights led to the 
incorporation of farmers’ rights in 2001 in an international law, the 
ITPGRFA. We will discuss this issue a bit later while analysing the 
typology of PGRFA knowledge commons in the context of the ITPGRFA.   
6.3.5 From positive inclusive to positive exclusive commons  
under the CBD 
The global governance of PGRFA took a major shift from inclusiveness to 
exclusiveness in the 1990s, initially when another resolution was adopted as 
the third annex to the IUPGR in 1991. In the FAO Conference Resolution 
3/91, the principle that “plant genetic resources are a common heritage of 
humankind” was made subject to “the sovereignty of the states”59. In other 
words, promoting unrestricted, wider access to PGRFA became subject to 
the consent and approval by national governments as and when the PGRFA 
were available for access in the territories of the respective states.  
Such a consensus in the Third Resolution led to a situation when, for the 
first time in the history of the global governance of PGRFA, all the PGRFA 
available as positive inclusive commons (global commons), other than the 
intellectual property-protected PGRFA, were considered to become state-
owned positive exclusive commons. Their access and use were now 
58  http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5588e/x5588e06.htm (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
59  http://www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa/cgrfa-about/cgrfa-history/en/ (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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dependent on consent and approval from national governments, making the 
states positive exclusive commoners of the PGRFA available in their 
territories. In this case, the logic of state sovereignty derives from states’ 
possession of PGRFA in their territories as physical property. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, if viewed from the lens of the traditional commons 
discourse, states then have the rights of withdrawal, management, exclusion 
and alienation as they are the “owners” of PGRFA. However, since the 
IUPGR was not legally binding, it did not have that much impact in the 
international regulation of PGRFA.  
The situation changed with the adoption of the CBD at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. This Convention is 
the first legally binding international regulation to deal with conservation, 
sustainable use, and access and benefit sharing issues pertaining to all 
biological diversity (including PGRFA, but excluding human genetic 
resources)60. One of the major features of the CBD is its recognition and 
reaffirmation of state sovereignty. In its Preamble, contracting parties 
reaffirm that states have sovereign rights over their own biological 
resources. In its Principal in Article 3, it recognises the state sovereignty as:  
“States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the 
responsibility to ensure that activities in their jurisdiction or control do 
not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the national jurisdiction.”  
Similarly, in its Article 15 on Access to Genetic Resources, it recognises 
sovereign rights of states over their natural resources. While recognising 
this, it states that “the authority to determine access to genetic resources 
rests with the national governments and is subject to national legislation”. 
Furthermore, while facilitating access, the CBD also requires the 
contracting parties to ensure that access is granted based on “mutually 
agreed terms” to ensure that access be subject to the “prior informed 
consent” from and “benefit sharing” with the resource-providing contracting 
parties. However, according to Article 15.2 of the CBD:     
60  https://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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“Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to create conditions to facilitate 
access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses by other 
Contracting Parties and not to impose restrictions that run counter to the 
objectives of this Convention.” 
This way, the CBD contains the positive as well as exclusive elements. The 
positive elements lie in its provisions where it requires the contracting 
parties not to restrict access to genetic resources when such access is in 
support of its three objectives: conservation, sustainable use and benefit 
sharing derived from the use of genetic resources. The exclusive elements 
are built in its provisions where it allows national governments to restrict 
access to nationally-available genetic resources through the CBD-
compatible national laws on access and benefit sharing.  
As a result of which, a substantial subset of openly accessible and globally 
shared PGRFA has become subject to legally binding international 
regulation that allows national governments to develop national legislation 
to act as positive exclusive commoners. Thus, the CBD has given an 
international regulatory support and means to convert the nationally-
available genetic resources, including PGRFA, into positive exclusive 
commons, which the FAO Conference Resolution 3/91 also intended to do. 
Recognition of state sovereignty over natural and genetic resources is not 
the only feature of the CBD. The Convention also asks all contracting 
parties to: 
“Subject to national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local 
communities embodying traditional lifestyles…and promote their wider 
application with the approval and involvement of the holders of such 
knowledge.”  
This provision has two important features. The first is the obligation for the 
contracting parties to protect traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities that are relevant for the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity through national 
laws. The second is the need to promote their wider application, where the 
Convention also states “with the approval and involvement of the holders of 
such knowledge.” This way, the CBD has not only made PGRFA a state-
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owned positive exclusive commons, but also provided flexibilities to 
governments to develop national laws for creating another layer of 
community-owned positive exclusive commons. We will discuss the 
implications of these provisions for Nepal’s regulation of PGRFA in 
Chapter 8. 
For now, note that there are two important considerations in regard to such 
provisions. First, while creating such commons, the CBD has not, however, 
made any contradiction with the agreements on intellectual property rights. 
This means that the Convention, like the IUPGR, recognises the intellectual 
property rights over genetic resources. Second, while implementing the 
national laws, it is more likely that the rights of local and indigenous 
communities may be recognised by the states based on how local and 
indigenous communities possess PGRFA in their lands as physical property. 
This issue will be further clear when we discuss Nepal’s case in Chapter 8.         
The incorporation of exclusiveness into the PGRFA governance does not, 
however, stop within the text of the CBD. The exclusive elements were 
strengthened further by the Conference for the Adoption of the Agreed Text 
of the CBD, which was convened by the United Nations Environment 
Programme in May 1992. This Conference – while adopting the Resolution 
on the Interrelationship between the CBD and the Promotion of Sustainable 
Agriculture61 – made an important recognition that there was a need to seek 
solutions to outstanding matters. Such outstanding matters were in relation 
to governing access to ex situ collections not acquired in accordance with 
the CBD and addressing the question of farmers’ rights.  
Subsequent discussions at the international level led to the expiry of the 
IUPGR and the birth of a new international treaty in 2001 called the 
ITPGRFA. Before we discuss how this International Treaty influences the 
governance of PGRFA through the creation of a protected global commons, 
and the recognition to different subsets of commons, we will first analyse 
the regulatory influence of the most dominant global agreement on 
intellectual property rights, that is, the TRIPS Agreement.  
61  http://www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa/cgrfa-about/cgrfa-history/en/ (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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6.3.6 The birth of negative exclusive commons within TRIPS 
The adoption of the UPOV in 1961, as discussed earlier, treated the PGRFA 
outside the UPOV system as negative commons. The introduction of 
TRIPS62, as a multilateral agreement of the WTO in 1995, takes a step 
further by converting the inclusive elements of the UPOV into exclusive 
elements. With its two provisions, first on patent protection, and second on 
a sui generis system for the protection of plant varieties, TRIPS has critical 
influences on the governance and regulation of PGRFA. It establishes 
minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property such as 
patents (Matthews, 2002, 2011). In its provision on patentability in Article 
27.1, it calls for the patent protection of:  
“any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application”.  
This implies that technologies, such as genetic engineering, can be used to 
convert the existing PGRFA into new plant varieties. If these varieties also 
meet the other two criteria for patent – inventive step and industrial 
application – they can be patentable.  
The patents under the TRIPS Agreement and plant breeders’ rights in the 
UPOV Convention establish monopoly-type of rights for the inventors over 
the new varieties. Both of these consider PGRFA as a whole are available 
for appropriation for the advancement of innovations, and in a way promote 
the enclosure of PGRFA into private domain. Such negative elements are 
well understood since neither of these agreements deal with prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing arrangements, as in the case of the CBD.  
Nevertheless, there are some differences too, when we analyse these two 
international agreements from the viewpoint of inclusiveness and 
exclusiveness. The exemptions provided by the UPOV Convention, though 
highly restrictive in the version of 1991, allow others to benefit from the 
Convention’s inclusive elements. For example, as Santilli (2012) states, the 
UPOV Convention enables plant breeders to use the protected new varieties 
as a source of variation in research and breeding, only restricting the 
62  https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf (last accessed 24 November 2015). 
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production, reproduction and sale of the same varieties for commercial 
purposes. In addition, in the UPOV system, if a breeder, in the course of 
research and breeding, develops another new variety that is distinguishable 
from the protected variety, that breeder will have the right to produce and 
sell the new variety without any authorisation from the inventor of the 
protected variety.  
However, in the patent system, such exemptions are much more restrictive, 
implying that patents comprise exclusive elements in terms of using the 
patent-protected varieties of PGRFA. Similarly, unlike the patent rights, 
plant breeders’ rights do not cover the protection of processes of plant 
breeding such as cross-breeding and backcrossing (Santilli, 2012). 
As mentioned before, TRIPS also has a provision on the protection of plant 
varieties, which enables Members (countries) to exclude from patentability:  
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially 
biological processes for the production of plants or animals other than 
non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Members shall 
provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an 
effective sui generis system of or by any combination thereof”.  
What is clear from this provision is that WTO member countries are not 
required to only choose the patent system for the protection of plant 
varieties. They can also opt for an effective sui generis system (Matthews, 
2002). However, what is not clear in TRIPS and has remained a major 
source of conflict among member countries negotiating for the review of 
TRIPS Article 27.3(b)63 is the uniform meaning of the effective sui generis 
system (Correa, 2000, 2015; Dhar, 2002). This is sometimes interpreted as a 
system similar to the UPOV, or the UPOV itself, or a domestic law that 
provides flexibilities to recognise—in line with the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA—the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge.  
63  TRIPS Article 27.3 (b) itself mandates for the review of the Article. The review had to commence 
from 1999, that is, four years after the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. The review 
begun only since 2000 within the Council for TRIPS, but member countries continue to remain 
divided, for example, on the issue of the reconciliation between the TRIPS Agreement and the 
CBD.    
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As a result of such interpretations, on the one hand, some member countries 
have already been pressured into joining UPOV and some others are under 
pressure to do the same64. On the other hand, as alternatives to UPOV, some 
states have developed (such as India65) or are considering to develop (such 
as Nepal) their domestic law in a way that not only safeguards plant 
breeders’ rights but also the rights of local, indigenous and farming 
communities. We will discuss the case of Nepal in Chapters 7 and 8.  
To sum up, the TRIPS Agreement treats PGRFA outside the intellectual 
property system as a negative commons for appropriation without any 
obligation to obtain consent from the holders of the resources. However, 
one important aspect of intellectual property is that when countries choose 
to follow the option of joining the UPOV or extend a similar type of 
protection for plant varieties under the TRIPS Agreement through a sui 
generis option, new varieties of PGRFA become inclusive in nature as there 
could be certain exemptions for the use of protected varieties. On the other 
hand, if countries choose or are pressured to choose to introduce patent 
systems for plant varieties in accordance with TRIPS or with TRIPS-plus 
conditions, it creates, promotes and expands the use of the new varieties of 
PGRFA with exclusive, restrictive elements.   
 
 
64  The pressure to join UPOV has not come merely from negotiations with acceding countries for 
WTO membership, for example, in the case of Nepal and Cambodia which joined the global trade 
body through accession negotiations (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2004; Adhikari & Dahal, 2004). 
Mainly the powerful states in the North such as the US and the European Union have exerted such 
pressures through bilateral and regional trade negotiations and agreements, for example in the 
case of Jordan and Nicaragua by the US (Drahos, 2001), and Bangladesh, Lebanon and Malaysia 
by the European Union (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2004; Faso et al.). Such pressures are not though 
limited to joining the UPOV Convention, but even with regard to extending the patent protection 
beyond the flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement (often termed as TRIPS-plus 
conditions), for example, in the case of Bahrain, Morocco and Singapore.   
65  India enacted the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Act in 2001 to comply with 
TRIPS Article 27.3 (b). It chose to provide for plant variety protection through this domestic law, 
establishing it as the effective sui generis system. See Brahmi et al. (2004) for an analysis of the 
historical context, and the salient features of this Act.  
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6.3.7 ITPGRFA: from a protected global commons to a complex 
mix of commons at global, state and community level   
As discussed before, following the decisions made in May 1992, the 
negotiations for addressing the outstanding matters of farmers’ rights and ex 
situ collections made before the entry into force of the CBD continued in 
the FAO forum. The negotiations also focussed on the issues of access to 
and use of overall PGRFA, and harmonisation of the IUPGR mechanism 
with the CBD.  
As the CBD established a bilateral approach of access and benefit sharing 
between the contracting parties, the subsequent negotiations found 
complexities in such a system for access to and use of PGRFA. One of the 
major concerns was that the bilateral approach of access and benefit sharing 
would be overly restrictive and bureaucratic. The other concern was that the 
bilateral approach of benefit sharing did not suit the case of PGRFA, as 
these resources originate and are made up with different stages of 
domestication, adaptation and breeding at the centre of origin, as well as the 
centre of diversity (Ten Kate & Laird, 2000).  
Finally, the lengthy negotiations culminated in the adoption of the 
ITPGRFA in 2001. The Treaty makes a major influence on the global 
governance of PGRFA, as it establishes a multilateral system of access and 
benefit sharing that includes samples of PGRFA of 64 crops enlisted in 
Annex 1 of the ITPGRFA66. The multilateral system, with such a global 
pool of PGRFA important for the world’s food security and agriculture, 
aims to facilitate access to PGRFA for its contracting parties, and among 
them, share the benefits arising from the utilisation of these resources in a 
fair and equitable way.  
One of the major features of this Treaty’s mechanism is its difference with 
that of the CBD. As a legally binding international agreement, the CBD, as 
discussed above, recognises “state sovereignty” and creates state-owned 
positive exclusive commons. In harmony with the CBD, the ITPGRFA also 
recognises state sovereignty over PGRFA in national jurisdiction, including 
their authority to determine access to their PGRFA. However, as a step 
66  ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf (last accessed 30 November 2015). 
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further, it also requires all contracting parties to exercise their sovereignty 
for the purpose of making the multilateral system “effective, efficient and 
transparent”.  
In the exercise of their sovereign rights, all the contracting parties are then 
required to include in the multilateral system all Annex 1 PGRFA that are 
under the management and control of the state, and in the public domain. As 
another feature, the coverage of the multilateral system also extends to other 
PGRFA that are within the jurisdiction of natural and legal persons; and 
held as ex situ collections in international gene banks and other institutions 
(Correa, 2013b). Likewise, the Treaty also deals with PGRFA under in situ 
conditions, provides for the protection of farmers’ rights, and restricts 
intellectual property on PGRFA of Annex 1 “in the form received” 
(Andersen, 2008). 
As per the Treaty, once the materials are made part of the multilateral 
system, their access is subject to the Standard Material Transfer Agreement 
(SMTA). One of the obligations for the user of the PGRFA received 
through the SMTA is to ensure monetary benefit sharing, if the user 
commercialises the product containing the material from the same PGRFA 
(Correa, 2013a).  
In that case, the amount derived through the monetary benefit sharing goes 
to the Multilateral Benefit Sharing Fund, which is to be used primarily for 
farmers, especially in developing countries, who conserve and use PGRFA. 
However, if the user includes the improved PGRFA in the multilateral 
system, there is no obligation of monetary benefit sharing. Such an 
inclusion is itself interpreted as a non-monetary benefit sharing, since it 
allows all to access the improved PGRFA as in the case of other PGRFA of 
the multilateral system. Below I analyse how the ITPGRFA promotes 
and/or deals with different types of PGRFA knowledge commons.  
6.3.7.1 PGRFA under the management and control of the state  
According to the Treaty, subject to their national legislation, if the 
contracting parties hold Annex 1 PGRFA under their management and 
control, they must include such PGRFA in the multilateral system. Correa 
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(2013) interprets the PGRFA under the management and control of the state 
as: 
“all those materials that are property of, held by or in the possession of 
the contracting parties, or that are under other forms of control or 
management of the contracting parties, with the sole exception of those 
resources under development or subject to intellectual property rights” 
(Correa, 2013b, p. 185).  
In this sense, the PGRFA found in all types of state and public property, 
including in the national gene banks and government farm stations, have to 
be included in the multilateral system, though the interpretation of these 
relies more on the respective national laws of the contracting parties.  
According to the Treaty, the parties also need to include the PGRFA found 
in the public domain. Intellectual property laws constitute a public domain 
by not covering certain subject matters or through limitations of the duration 
of protection. The public domain information belongs to all to use (Drahos, 
2006). This means, the contracting parties have to include in the multilateral 
system those PGRFA that have never been protected by intellectual 
property, or the intellectual protection for which has expired (Correa 2013).  
The inclusion of all these PGRFA will then facilitate multilateral access to a 
global pool of Annex 1 PGRFA for all the contracting parties. This avoids 
the CBD’s bilateral approach of access and benefit sharing, but only for 
PGRFA of 64 crops included in Annex 1.  
As for its feature of establishing a multilateral system for facilitated access 
to such a global pool of PGRFA, some scholars perceive the ITPGRFA to 
have created a “protected global commons” (Halewood, 2013; Halewood et 
al., 2013; Santilli, 2012) or an attempt to restore the principle that PGRFA 
are a common heritage of humankind (Andersen, 2007). In the framework 
of PGRFA knowledge commons, the Treaty could be interpreted to have 
created or affected a number of commons, suggesting that it deals with a 
complex mix of positive and negative commons.  
The so-called protected global commons under the multilateral system could 
be seen as a global-level positive exclusive commons (for PGFRA of 64 
crops) as it represents the global accumulation of state-owned positive 
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exclusive commons. For this to happen, the contracting parties include 
materials under their management and control and in the public domain to 
facilitate access through the Treaty’s multilateral system. In this sense, the 
Treaty is characterised by the elements of positive commons for reasons of 
the consent and agreement of the contracting parties to exercise their 
sovereign rights to include Annex 1 PGRFA in the multilateral system.  
Similarly, the Treaty possesses exclusive elements, as the multilateral 
system is accessible only for the contracting parties and not for others. If all 
or almost all states join the Treaty in years to come, the Treaty’s global pool 
of Annex 1 PGRFA may also be seen as positive inclusive commons. 
However, the elements of positive inclusive commons would only apply to 
the PGRFA under Annex 1.        
From another perspective, the Treaty’s multilateral system can also be 
argued to be negative commons. In this case, the elements of negative 
commons being the absence of any condition to bilaterally obtain the prior 
informed consent from the resource-providing contracting parties, as in the 
case of the CBD. Similarly, being permitted to access and use the materials 
“in the form received” creates an element of negative commons, though 
such a flexibility should only be used “for the purpose of utilization and 
conservation for research, breeding and training for food and agriculture, 
provided that such purpose does not include chemical, pharmaceutical 
and/or other non-food/feed industrial uses”.  
Based on this, the multilateral system could also be interpreted as a 
supportive mechanism for public and private entities to access Annex 1 
PGRFA for the purposes of breeding and development of new varieties and 
finally to obtain intellectual property rights over the new varieties. In the 
Treaty, the intellectual property restriction is only on “in the form received” 
materials. This means that the recipients can make improvement to Annex 1 
PGRFA accessed from the multilateral system, and even claim intellectual 
property on the improved PGRFA.  
Furthermore, in cases of improvement to the received/accessed PGRFA, the 
recipients are also allowed to have discretion as to whether or not to make 
the improved varieties of PGRFA available to others. Due to these 
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provisions, if the multilateral system is used more by private researchers 
and breeders to obtain intellectual property rights over the accessed plant 
varieties, it is more likely that this would promote the expansion of 
intellectual property rights by enabling actors, often seed industries, to 
appropriate the global-level positive exclusive commons, that is, PGRFA in 
Annex 1. In such a context of intellectual property, it is important to 
highlight two issues.  
First, as an obligation under the SMTA, if the recipients obtain intellectual 
property on the improved PGRFA, they have to either share the benefits on 
a monetary basis, or on a non-monetary basis. If they decide to share the 
benefits on a non-monetary basis, they would be obliged to include the 
improved PGRFA in the multilateral system, which would make the global-
level positive exclusive commons more comprehensive. However, if the 
recipients decide to do the monetary benefit sharing, the improved PGRFA 
will either join the subset of PGRFA with inclusive elements (if protected 
with exemptions for others by plant breeders’ rights) or the subset of 
PGRFA with exclusive elements (if protected under strict forms of patent 
rights).  
Second, the Treaty also intends to include in the multilateral system the 
PGRFA that are, as discussed below, subject to the rights of individuals or 
legal entities.  
6.3.7.2 PGRFA within the jurisdiction of natural and legal persons  
The ITPGRFA requires all contracting parties to take appropriate measures 
to encourage natural and legal persons within their jurisdiction to include 
the PGRFA in the multilateral system if they are listed in Annex 1. This 
means that at the time of negotiations for the multilateral system, 
governments did not want to, or were not in a position to, make any 
commitment to include PGRFA that were subject to the rights of individuals 
or legal entities, that is, natural and legal persons (Halewood et al., 2013).  
This way, the ITPGRFA has recognised that in cases of PGRFA under 
certain rights of individuals or legal entities (for example, intellectual 
property rights), the contracting parties can only take appropriate measures 
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to encourage intellectual property holders to include PGRFA within their 
jurisdiction in the multilateral system. In this case, it is clearly the intention 
of the Treaty to include the Annex 1 PGRFA, which are subject to the rights 
of individuals and legal entities, such as plant breeders’ and patent rights, 
into the global pool of the multilateral system.  
Though such an inclusion is voluntary in nature, it is aimed at making the 
global-level positive exclusive commons, as we discussed initially, more 
comprehensive by including both the types of intellectual property-
protected varieties into the global pool of germplasms. In addition, this 
provision is also aimed at including the PGRFA that are or could be under 
the domains of farmers, or local and indigenous communities (I will discuss 
this shortly). The Treaty’s aim to expand the global pool does not, however, 
stop here, but also extends to include the ex situ collections of international 
gene banks and research centres.   
6.3.7.3 PGRFA held as ex situ collections by CGIAR and others 
Until the ITPGRFA came into being in 2001, what was missing from the 
regulation of the international regulation of PGRFA was the ex situ 
collections that were made prior to the entry into force of the CBD. The 
CGIAR collections received a great deal of attention as they were hosting 
substantial ex situ collections to conserve plant genetic diversity; acting as 
the principal breeders of crops that were developed for countries that lack 
breeding programmes; and were also making available their collections to 
others. Though the centres were not claiming ownership of the germplasm 
but were holding the collections in-trust for the international law, they 
became subject of discussion in which non-government organisations also 
raised questions regarding the complex nature of the centres, as well as the 
confusion regarding the ex situ collections and the rights of states and 
communities (Andersen, 2007; Fowler, 2004).  
In this regard, one of the major features of the multilateral system is the 
inclusion of the ex situ collections made by the gene banks of the agriculture 
centres of CGIAR, and other institutions who host ex situ collections of 
PGRFA. As a progress on this front, so far, CGIAR centres, and others such 
as – the Tropical Agricultural Research and Higher Education Centre 
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(CATIE), The Coconut Genetic Resources Network (COGENT) and the 
Mutant Germplasm Repository of the FAO/International Atomic Energy 
Agency Joint Division in Vienna – signed agreements with the Treaty’s 
Governing Body for such inclusion (Correa, 2013b).  
In the case of the inclusion of such ex situ collections, the Treaty, thus, 
expands to cover a “new” subset of PGRFA into the multilateral system. 
These are a “new” subset of PGRFA for two main reasons. First, the CBD 
had not dealt with the ex situ collections made before its entry into force, 
and second, such PGRFA were outside the scope of the regulation through 
state sovereignty or the rights of natural and legal persons. More or less, 
such resources were, as Halewood (2012) views, global and national public 
goods.  
6.3.7.4 PGRFA under farmers’ rights  
The International Treaty is the first legally binding international agreement 
to recognise the protection of farmers’ rights pertaining to PGRFA and 
traditional knowledge. Table 6.3 lists farmers’ rights as provided for 
protection and implementation by the Treaty in Article 9.  
Table 6.3: Farmers’ rights provisions in the ITPGRFA  
Provisions Description 
Recognition in 
Article 9.1 
The contracting parties recognise the enormous contribution 
that the local and indigenous communities and farmers of all 
regions of the world have made and will continue to make 
for the conservation and development of PGRFA.  
Implementation 
in Article 9.2 
The contracting parties agree that the responsibility for 
realising farmers’ rights rests with national governments. In 
accordance with their needs and priorities, each Contracting 
Party should, as appropriate, and subject to its national 
legislation, take measures to protect and promote farmers’ 
rights. 
Rights in 
Article 9.2 and 
9.3 
Protection of traditional knowledge relevant to PGRFA; the 
right to equitably participate in sharing benefits arising from 
the utilisation of PGRFA; the right to participate in making 
decisions, at the national level, on matters related to the 
conservation and sustainable use of PGRFA; and the right 
save, use, exchange and sell farm-saved seed/propagating 
material.  
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 Since the implementation of farmers’ rights is subject to national legislation, 
the ITPGRFA does not as such protect them internationally. Yet, it provides 
a legal option to contracting parties willing to protect farmers’ rights 
through national laws and/or measures. In such circumstances, the Treaty’s 
implementation at the national level will have influence on the typology of 
PGRFA knowledge commons as well. 
For example, when the contracting parties decide to protect traditional 
knowledge in relation to PGRFA, access and use of such traditional 
knowledge will be subject to the consent of the farmers holding the 
knowledge. In addition, their right to benefit from the use of PGRFA under 
their domain will also have to be respected. This means that a subset of 
PGRFA (when they are embedded with traditional knowledge) will fall 
under the farmers’ domain, making the farmers positive exclusive 
commoners, and at same time, giving them the authority to decide whether 
to make their varieties part of the multilateral system.  
In other words, if farmers’ rights to PGRFA and traditional knowledge are 
recognised by the national law, such varieties of PGRFA might not be the 
so-called public domain varieties. Such varieties may become farmers’ 
varieties with some form of ownership vesting in farmers at the national 
level. This is what India has done by recognising farmers’ ability to register 
local landraces as farmers’ varieties under the Plant Variety Protection and 
Farmers’ Rights Act 2001 (Bala Ravi, 2004).  
Access to and use of such farmers’ varieties then become subject to the 
consent of and benefit sharing with the farmers who registered these 
varieties. The same may also apply in the case of the varieties under 
development in “in situ conditions”, as the Treaty provides exemption to 
“material under development”. It means that the developer has the 
discretion to permit or deny access to such materials.    
In such cases, the contracting parties too can only take appropriate measures 
to nationally encourage farmers to include their varieties in the multilateral 
system, but any such initiative would be at the discretion of farmers. For 
example, others can access and use the PGRFA protected by farmers’ rights, 
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but only with the consent of the farmers. Farmers, other than the right 
holders, may however be allowed to save, use, exchange and sell seeds of 
such varieties for non-commercial purposes. 
The same logic may hold true when the so-called public domain varieties 
are protected on the basis of the rights of local and indigenous communities, 
for example, through the national legislation developed to comply with the 
CBD. Under these circumstances, certainly the community rights-protected 
PGRFA are more likely to be community-owned positive exclusive 
commons.   
To sum up, the implementation of the ITPGRFA is more likely to create 
multiple subsets of PGRFA to fall into different categories of PGRFA 
knowledge commons – from global-level positive exclusive commons to 
state-owned positive exclusive commons to community-owned positive 
exclusive commons. Since the Treaty allows for appropriation of PGRFA 
(though not in the form received), it also has the elements of negative 
commons. Actors and networks of the contracting parties have the ability to 
access PGRFA through the multilateral system for appropriation, though 
only under the terms of benefit sharing or putting the protected varieties 
derived from the germplasms of the multilateral system into the global pool 
of germplasms. 
6.4 Conclusion 
PGRFA are an important component of agriculture biodiversity, a basis for 
food security and agriculture, and are the raw materials for breeding and 
development of plant varieties. Scholars have been discussing the regulation 
of the commons and property notions of PGRFA for a long time. PGRFA 
are, however, a complex resource for regulation due to several factors.  
There are complexities in the understanding of PGRFA as these resources 
possess tangible as well as intangible components of property, and are not 
entirely a natural resource commons or only a knowledge commons. There 
is also ambiguity in the classification of PGRFA as a good. For instance, not 
all subsets of PGRFA may be categorised as public goods or private goods 
or even common goods.  
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The international regulation of PGRFA is not free from complexity, as there 
exists a number of international agreements to govern PGRFA with 
different property rights domains. Such a complexity is visible when we 
apply the conceptual scheme used and developed in this chapter to analyse 
the global governance of PGRFA vis-à-vis the typology of PGRFA 
knowledge commons.  
The framework of PGRFA knowledge commons – that I developed and 
used in this chapter based on Drahos’ typology of intellectual commons – 
explains the shifts in common spaces available for access to and use of 
PGRFA at the global level due to different notions of commons and 
property. The framework shows that the international regulation of PGRFA 
has moved away from the elements of positive inclusive commons, as the 
use and exchange of PGRFA are now subject to the commons of exclusive 
and negative nature. This framework, however, does not necessarily allow 
us to suggest what types of commons could help a nation address its local 
and national interests in a particular given context of how issues of PGRFA 
governance are progressing at national and local levels.  
For example, the PGRFA knowledge commons framework does not itself 
suggest whether it is better for a nation to move down the path of, for 
example, positive inclusive commons, or whether nations are in a better 
situation when they exercise their rights to establish PGRFA as positive 
exclusive commons. Nations – since they do not have homogenous contexts 
or are at the same development stage – perhaps need to consider tailor-made 
sui generis options that recognise a variety of commons to manage PGRFA 
at national and local levels.  
For these reasons, a detailed analysis of the case of a country is important to 
enhance the effectiveness of the analysis of the global dynamics of PGRFA 
knowledge commons. As we will see in the coming chapters, various 
networks have pushed different visions of the knowledge commons in 
Nepal. Different actors and networks have been formed and mobilised at 
local, national and global levels to steer the flow of events of the regulation 
of the commons and property notions of PGRFA.  
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In this regard, particular attention needs to be given in understanding the 
PGRFA knowledge commons from the cases and experiences of the local-
level practices of access to and use of PGRFA, local-level PGRFA 
management dynamics, and the rights of local, indigenous and farming 
communities in relation to PGRFA and traditional knowledge. In the words 
of Hardinson (2006): 
“The commons movement is providing a much-needed antidote to the 
disease of hyper-enclosure of the public commons and the need to restore 
a balance between monopolies and the public good. But there are some 
troubling aspects of this movement as it stands. By failing to take into 
account the many different commons that exist, the commons movement 
may be creating some injustices of its own, in ways that parallel problems 
of enclosure. In particular, the commons movement inadequately takes 
into account the rights and aspirations of indigenous people and local 
communities.” 
Taking these insights further, the next two chapters analyse the case of 
Nepal, exploring the historical and emerging contexts (Chapter 7) and the 
contents (Chapter 8) of the national regulation of PGRFA knowledge 
commons. As in this chapter, the main focus would be to identify different 
visions of the commons among actors and networks (Chapter 7) and in the 
national laws to be implemented by Nepal in compliance with the CBD, 
TRIPS and ITPGRFA (Chapter 8). 
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Chapter 7 
Historical and emerging contexts of 
the regulation of PGRFA in Nepal  
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have provided a theoretical basis to explore the 
case of the regulation of PGRFA in Nepal in this and the next chapter. In 
this chapter, I first set a broader context of the first enclosure movement in 
Nepal, particularly highlighting the historical trends of enclosures of natural 
resources and their linkages with the second enclosure movement, that is, 
the enclosure of PGRFA through intellectual property rights. Then, I discuss 
historical and emerging contexts of the regulation of PGRFA in Nepal to 
understand how actors and networks have been formed and mobilised to 
steer the flow of events that matter for the national implementation of the 
international regulation of PGRFA we discussed in the earlier chapter.  
As international negotiations on the regulation of PGRFA have always 
witnessed, the conflict between the countries in the North and the South is 
due to diverse interests of private, civil society and community actors and 
networks. Matthews, in his book “Intellectual Property, Human Rights and 
Development” (2011), makes a comprehensive analysis of the role of non-
government organisations and social movements in generating responses to 
the globalisation of intellectual property regulation. Nepal also seems to 
have witnessed a similar trend. This is evident, as I discuss below, in 
Nepal’s participation in international treaties, agreements and bodies, and 
the involvement of national and international actors in policy discourse and 
the design of the regulatory principles and norms of the national regulation 
of PGRFA. 
The chapter’s focus is on Nepal’s struggle against the enclosure of policy 
space and the incidents of regulatory capture in regard to the development 
of sui generis national laws and policies to govern PGRFA in the era of the 
globalisation of regulation. As Braithwaite and Drahos (2000, p. 23) state, 
in the regulatory process of globalisation, “each regulatory domain has a 
distinct range of actors contending for victory at different sites.” We will 
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see that in Nepal, there is confrontation among a number of strategic actors 
of different sectors, nationally and internationally, in regard to the 
regulatory domains (sites) dealing with formality, informality, property and 
commons.  
In particular, the incidents of regulatory capture by international actors and 
networked confrontation among international, national and local actors are 
visible when I analyse the civil society movements like “No to UPOV” and 
“No to Monsanto” in Nepal. In incidents like these, for Nepal, the role of 
the non-government organisations as important third party gatekeepers has 
been key to avoid international and domestic pressures coming from the 
actors of the intellectual property domain. In the era of globalisation, the 
involvement of such third parties in the regulation of PGRFA is also a 
classic case of how meta-regulation has worked in Nepal. Non-government 
organisations have been active in monitoring and influencing regulatory 
behaviours and steering the flow of regulatory events in relation to the 
protection of customary norms of seed use and exchange, including the 
rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over PGRFA and 
traditional knowledge.  
Such developments also show that Nepal offers an important regulatory site 
of networked governance in which actors from the government and non-
government sectors create an enabling environment of network enrolment to 
support their visions of property and commons. As I will explain below, the 
government and some key non-government organisations have been 
partnering in the country to develop national laws and policies in 
accordance with the principles and provisions of the CBD, TRIPS and 
ITPGRFA, mainly with the aim of creating legal space to protect the rights 
of local, indigenous and farming communities. Below I start the analysis of 
this chapter by first discussing Nepal’s linkages with the first and second 
enclosure movements. 
7.2 The first enclosure movement: setting a broader 
context 
Before 1769, Nepal was fragmented into small principalities (states) under 
the two clusters called Baise and Chaubise. Prithvi Narayan Shah, King of 
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Gorkha, expanded his state by conquering the other states of Baise and 
Chaubise clusters, and finally, led to the founding of a unified Nepal. One 
of his major objectives behind the unification of Nepal was to maintain 
independence and security of his kingdom from the British colonisation 
(Regmi, 1999). As Nepal was never colonised, one may tend to suggest that 
there was no influence from the first enclosure movement that started in 
England in the 15th century and expanded in India and other colonised 
nations until the 19th century.  
On the contrary, a closer look at the historical trends of enclosures of 
natural resources in Nepal suggests that the country did not remain isolated 
from the trends of enclosures that were common in Britain or colonised 
countries. A reason is that the country’s resource governance was largely 
influenced by the then colonised India. For example, while promoting the 
enclosure of forests for trading timber with the British India Company, in 
1927, the government had formed an entity Kathmahal, and in 1942, had 
established the Department of Forests with the help of a British expatriate 
and a colonial representative named E.A. Smithies (Bajracharya, 1983; 
Robbe, 1954). 
If the history is any guide, over the last centuries, the state has not just 
enclosed forests, but also lands and irrigation systems. Though the cases of 
the enclosures of lands, forests and irrigation systems are not the focus of 
this research, these have been discussed briefly for three main reasons.  
First, as PGRFA are not isolated from lands and forests, it is important to 
discuss Nepal’s situation of the enclosure of lands and forests. For example, 
as we discuss in Chapter 8, the country’s CBD-compatible Access to 
Genetic Resources Bill of 2002 has recognised rights of the state, private 
persons and institutions, and local communities over PGRFA based on the 
ownership and use of land.  
Second, these cases highlight how common-pool resources have been made 
subject to restrictions for access and use, undermining traditional, 
customary and local practices of natural resource management. This aspect 
is especially important as the use, management and exchange of PGRFA, as 
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we discussed in Chapter 4, are closely related to traditional, customary and 
local practices in Nepal.  
Third, a brief discussion on the influence of the first enclosure movement in 
Nepal gives us an important link to move on to discuss the influence of the 
second enclosure movement on Nepal’s governance of PGRFA and local, 
traditional systems of use and exchange of PGRFA. 
While describing the cases of these enclosures below, I do not, however, 
intend to argue that Nepal witnessed these enclosures only due to the first 
enclosure movement initiated and expanded by Britain between the 15th and 
19th centuries. Probably, as is the case for all states in the world, these cases 
of enclosures are also the outcomes of the state’s objective to generate 
incentives to maximise wealth by economising on the use of resources, 
reducing the transaction costs and facilitating better resource allocation. Not 
surprisingly, the state has thus created and implemented measures for the 
protection of state sovereignty and private property rights in Nepal. 
7.2.1 Enclosure of lands 
Mainly after the unification of Nepal in 1769, interventions were made in 
favour of a few feudal, elite groups who largely represented the so-called 
high caste people such as Brahmin and Chetri. Such favours enabled the 
high cast people to capture the lands of indigenous people such as Limbu, 
Chepang and Tharu in different regions of Nepal. According to Cox (1990), 
the Kipat tenure system had enabled the indigenous people to use tribal 
lands as common property. It meant that the Kipat lands were not supposed 
to be treated as private property and sold to the members of other ethnic 
groups. Under this system, each person had a right to exclusively use the 
land but not to transfer the use right to the people outside the community, or 
sell the land (Regmi, 1976).  
Over a period of time, either as hired labourers or as new settlers in the 
post-unification period, the high caste people started to cultivate the lands 
being maintained as common property (Cox, 1990). Gradually, the 
government converted the Kipat tenure system into the Raiker tenure 
system, under which private land ownership was established based on 
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claims of ownership by whoever cultivating the lands at that time (Regmi, 
1976).  
This way, on the one hand, the Raiker tenure system enabled the state to 
generate revenue and exercise the right of foreclosure in the event of tax 
delinquency (Cox, 1990; Regmi, 1999). On the other hand, since land 
ownership is considered a symbol of status and a determinant of power in 
Nepal (Regmi, 1976; Sharma et al., 2014), the conversion of land from 
Kipat to Raiker largely benefitted the high caste people to emerge as 
politically and economically dominant landlords (Cox, 1990).  
According to the Nepal Living Standards Survey of 2010-11, only 74 
percent of the agriculture households own land, around 53 percent of these 
households hold less than 0.5 hectares of land, and 32 percent of households 
operate some land rented-in from others (CBS, 2011). Some scholars assert 
that the concentration of land in the hands of a few elites or the so-called 
landlords has negatively affected the landless, poor and indigenous people 
(Adhikari & Bjorndal, 2014; Adhikari, 2006; Stein & Suykens, 2014). It is 
one of the reasons that land ownership continues to remain a major source 
of political, economic and social tensions in Nepal (Bhandari & Linghorn, 
2012). An example of this is visible in the disputes at the courts where more 
than 60 percent of disputes are either directly or indirectly related to lands 
(Sharma et al., 2014).  
7.2.2 Enclosure of forests 
The enclosures of commons are not uncommon in the case of forests. 
Initially, local people were openly accessing and relying on forests for 
sustaining livelihoods. In the pre- as well as post-unification period, the 
rulers intensified the enclosure of forests by capturing the forest lands for 
resource extraction and agriculture, that too, in the interest of their closer 
allies (Malla, 2001). The enclosure of forests was intensified further in the 
period of the Rana dynasty (1846-1951).  
The Rana rulers reduced the Shah monarch to figurehead by capturing all 
the political power. The Ranas not only enclosed forests to trade timber with 
the British India Company, but also enabled a few elites and their families 
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to capture the forest lands in different forms such as Jagir and Birta 
(Regmi, 1999). Jagir, which was also practiced in India until its 
independence from the British colonisation in 1947, was promoted to 
provide lands to government officials in appreciation of their service to the 
Rana governments. Birta was a form of land grant for rewarding the priests, 
religious teachers, soldiers and other closer allies of the Rana family 
(Adhikari, 2011).  
The enclosure of lands promoted under the Rana regime is well-understood 
in how Malla (2001) describes the trend of land grabbing by the elites and 
the Ranas:  
“By 1950, one-third of the country's agricultural and forest lands had 
been granted to private individuals, and of that some three-fourths 
belonged to the Ranas…A significant proportion of the peasant farmers 
and their families were eventually forced to work as bondage labor 
(slaves) in the houses of local government functionaries and large birta 
owners.” 
Following the demise of the Rana dynasty in 1951, the first democratic 
government abolished the Birta system. The same government then 
nationalised the forests in 1957 through the Private Forests Nationalization 
Act. A major objective was to recover the forests from the private control of 
the feudal elites. In 1961, when the Shah king regained the political power 
and sacked the democratic government, all the forests were brought under 
the administration of the state (Guthman, 1997; Malla, 2001). Until the 
1980s, the state largely controlled the use of forests, but failed to control 
forest degradation. The control of forests by the state also made local lives 
more difficult by restricting people’s ability to use locally-available forest 
resources (Fisher, 1995).  
Such outcomes under the state-controlled forest regime created the need to 
think of innovative approaches for forest conservation, use and 
management. It led some forest officials to collaborate with the Nepal 
Australian Forestry Project to involve local forest users in forest 
management. Such involvement of local forest users has now been well-
structured in the famous national movement of “community forestry”.  
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Initially, as a new form of collaborative management of forests for 
empowering local people to exercise use and management rights, 
community forestry received regulatory space in the Master Plan of the 
Forestry Sector in 1988. Following the restoration of democracy in 1990, 
the new government enacted the Forest Act, 1993 and implemented the 
Forest Regulations, 1995. Both of these strongly favour the creation and 
expansion of community forests that were/are part of the state-managed 
national forests (Acharya, 2002; Graner, 1997).  
In Nepal’s community forestry, local people are not the “owners” of forests, 
but play the role of “proprietors” for forest management. Community forest 
user groups are given only the use and management rights to benefit from 
forest products and to contribute to conservation and sustainable use of 
community forests. As proprietors, they use the forest products, buy and sell 
such products in markets, and manage forest use with their collective choice 
rules (Agrawal & Ostrom, 2001). 
Community forests, with the involvement of 2.24 million households and 
more than 18,000 community forest user groups, manage over 1.7 million 
hectares of forests. This represents over 30 percent of the country’s total 
forest area with a strong potential to expand as many new user groups are 
being formed for community forest management in different parts of the 
country. Different cases of community forestry in Nepal have been studied. 
A number of scholars have provided evidence of local people’s self-
governing capacity to manage forests in an effective way, though there are 
wide variations in the degree of such success, for instance, between those in 
the hills and the Terai (low land) (Gautam et al., 2004; Malla, 2000; 
Nightingale, 2002; Pokharel & Suvedi, 2007; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001).   
7.2.3 Enclosure of irrigation systems 
As in the case of lands and forests, the trends of enclosures are also visible 
in Nepal’s irrigation systems. Historically, Nepal’s irrigation systems 
evolved and developed either through a religious trust, or individual 
initiatives and community efforts. This meant that even before the 
unification of Nepal, irrigation activities – water acquisition from the source 
to the delivery to the field – were locally controlled and managed by 
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farmers based on local rules and norms set for collective action (Pradhan, 
1990).  
While thousands of such farmer-managed irrigation systems are still 
operational, since the 1950s, the government has also promoted the agency-
managed (government-managed) irrigation systems in some regions of 
Nepal (Ostrom & Gardner, 1993). Donors such as the Asian Development 
Bank, the World Bank and CARE are a few major supporters of such 
government-managed irrigation systems. Comparing their performance and 
impacts, a series of studies have shown that on an average, farmer-managed 
irrigation systems have performed better than agency-managed irrigation 
systems on multiple dimensions, including the physical condition of the 
irrigation systems (Gautam et al., 1992; Lam, 1999; Ostrom, 2014; Ostrom 
et al., 1999).  
7.3 The second enclosure movement: the case of PGRFA  
As in the case of the first enclosure movement, Nepal has not managed to 
escape the influence of the second enclosure movement that has been 
expanding with the extension of intellectual property rights to privatise and 
capture the intangible knowledge inputs, including PGRFA (Boyle, 2003). 
Mainly since the 1960s, as the developed countries intensified the second 
enclosure movement by using intellectual property to privatise the use of 
knowledge products, Nepal also followed suit, though not specifically to 
deal with patents or breeders’ rights on plant varieties. After it started to 
implement periodic development plans since 1957, Nepal’s first patent law 
was introduced as the Patent, Design and Trademark Act, 196567. The Act 
defines patent broadly, covering:  
“any useful invention relating to a new method of process or 
manufacture, operation or transmission of any material or a combination 
of materials, or that made on the basis of a new theory or formula” 
(Section 2.a).  
67  Together with patent law, Nepal had also introduced Copyright Act, 1965, but its discussion is 
beyond the scope of this research. 
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According to a study68, the intellectual property laws of 1965 had come into 
effect at a time when the infrastructural developments and institutional 
arrangements were virtually non-existent to provide protection to and 
benefit from intellectual property. Nepal’s limited capacity to benefit from 
the intellectual property system is still evident from the data of registered 
patents provided by the Department of Industry during the main fieldwork. 
Until 2013, only 72 patents, of which 36 were domestic, had been 
registered. While comparing Nepal’s case with the world, it stands among 
the countries having the lowest patent applications and grants by origin69 
(Figure 7.1).  
Figure 7.1: Patent applications and grants by origin  
 
Source: http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/wipi/2014/pdf/wipi_2014_patents.pdf 
 
Moreover, even within limited number of registered patents, not a single 
patent deals with plant variety protection. Yet, it would not be right to 
assume that the discourse on the implications of the second enclosure 
movement for Nepal ends within the patent law of 1965. The global 
governance of PGRFA – along with major developments on property rights 
since the 1980s – has significant implications for the national governance of 
PGRFA, including local, traditional seed system in Nepal.  
68  http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001255/125505e.pdf (last accessed 10 December 2015). 
Though this study discussed this issue in the case of copyrights, it is equally applicable in the case 
of patents, which we verified through the data on the trends of patent registration.   
69  WIPO statistics database, http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/editIpsSearchForm.htm?tab=patent (last 
accessed 10 December 2015). 
Nepal 
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The country is a WTO member, and a contracting party to the CBD and the 
ITPGRFA. Nepal is undertaking a number of policy and legal measures to 
amend or introduce policies and laws relevant to these international 
instruments. Such measures are likely to change and/or affect the nature and 
the scope of the national regulation of PGRFA, and the dynamics of how 
farmers save, exchange and use seeds within local, traditional seed system.  
Before I discuss in the next chapter the salient features of Nepal’s 
traditional seed system and relevant national laws and policies in relation to 
commons and property notions, I discuss here the historical and emerging 
contexts of Nepal’s engagement with the global agreements, namely the 
CBD, the UPOV Convention, the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement, and the 
ITPGRFA. In the light of the second enclosure movement, these historical 
and emerging contexts build an understanding of the engagement, role and 
interests of different actors and networks in the reshaping of the policy 
discourse and regulation of PGRFA in Nepal.  
7.4 Emerging contexts of PGRFA regulation 
7.4.1 First recognition to ownership rights over plant varieties  
Until the late 1980s, Nepal did not have any law to govern the use, 
development, dissemination and marketing of seeds. The Seed Act, 1988 is 
the first example of such governance. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Act 
had been introduced after the country’s first National Seed Seminar in 1983 
– as an activity of the USAID-supported Seed Production and Input Storage 
Project – initiated a policy discourse to design a national seed law.  
The first legal recognition of the right of plant breeders in Nepal can be seen 
in the same Seed Act. It mentions that the National Seed Board may grant 
“ownership right” to breeders of seeds of new plant varieties under specified 
conditions (Section 5.6). However, the Act is silent about such conditions. 
During the fieldwork, an official of the Seed Quality Control Centre said:  
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“We are not sure about how to grant such an ownership right, 
particularly in the light of the national debates on intellectual property 
and farmers’ rights. The Seed Board has not so far received any variety 
release applications with claims from public- or private-sector breeders 
for ownership (exclusive) rights. This is a reason that until 2013, no 
breeder was provided with such rights, though hundreds of improved 
seeds have already been registered, released and certified for production 
and dissemination in Nepal” (Interview with KIGS#2).  
In connection with these issues, it is important to highlight that through the 
first amendment of the Seed Act in 2008, a provision was added to establish 
ownership rights over local varieties that have been traditionally used 
(Section 18A). The added provision does not elaborate on how local farmers 
would be entitled to such ownership rights, but only indicates that it would 
be done through specified rules. In order to enforce the same added 
provision, the revised Seed Regulation of 2013 then incorporates a 
provision for local farmers to register their traditional plant varieties as local 
varieties, but not specifying the ownership rights to which local farmers 
would be entitled (Rule 12.2). 
Though these regulatory systems for seed production and business are silent 
on the nature and scope of breeders’ and farmers’ ownership rights, the first 
recognition of breeders’ rights in 1988 and then the recognition of farmers’ 
ownership rights in 2008 demand an inquiry of the reasons behind such 
regulatory developments. A review of ‘grey’ literature and a further 
examination in the fieldwork revealed that Nepal’s policy discourse and 
governance of PGRFA have always been subject to influences from the 
regulatory trends and processes of globalisation, and there have been a lot of 
networked activities to steer the flow of events in relation to the regulation 
of PGRFA. 
7.4.2 WTO membership and CBD ratification 
In 1989, Nepal applied for the membership of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Nepal became a GATT-observer in 1993 and 
participated in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-
1994), which involved 123 countries to discuss the design of global 
regulations for trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related 
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intellectual property rights. Following the establishment of the WTO in 
199570, Nepal became a WTO observer and a Working Party of interested 
WTO members was formed for its accession to the multilateral trade body.  
As a requirement for new membership through accession, Nepal headed to 
join the WTO in 1998 by submitting the Memorandum on Foreign Trade 
Regime to the Working Party. The Memorandum covered all aspects of the 
country’s trade and legal regime, including policies and laws on trade in 
goods, trade in services, and intellectual property. This was followed by a 
lengthy process of accession negotiations with its Working Party members 
until 2003.  
Nepal’s ratification of the CBD in 1994 and involvement in WTO accession 
negotiations between 1998 and 2003 took the country’s trade and 
intellectual property policy discourse in a new direction. The discourse 
involved discussions on the implications of the WTO’s intellectual property 
regime for the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. The discourse also involved 
discussions on the conflict between the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, 
and the implementation challenges for their harmonisation at the national 
level.  
With a number of networked activities, some non-government organisations 
were developing awareness on the implications of the WTO’s intellectual 
property regime for farmers’ rights to save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds. 
They were also advocating for the protection of farmers’ rights to benefit 
from the use of their PGRFA and traditional knowledge at the local level. 
While recognising the significance of the CBD, such non-government 
organisations were also active in advocacy for the protection of the rights of 
local, indigenous and farming communities over genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.  
Some such non-government organisations were ActionAid Nepal, Pro 
Public and SAWTEE. In addition to these, some non-government 
70  After the conclusion and signing of the Final Act to the Uruguay Round in 1994, the GATT 
was replaced in 1995 by a treaty body in the form of the WTO, the most powerful rules-
based multilateral trade body.  
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organisations of indigenous communities and the Nepal office of the World 
Conservation Union (IUCN) were also calling for effective provisions for 
the protection of the rights of local and indigenous communities in 
intellectual property, and access and benefit sharing laws.   
The experts from some of these organisations claimed that Nepal would not 
be able to safeguard the traditional rights of farmers to save, exchange, 
reuse and sell seeds by opting for patent protection as set out by the TRIPS 
Agreement (Adhikari et al., 2000; Upreti & Upreti, 2002). Some other 
scholars also asserted that Nepal would lose by joining UPOV as the 
Convention does not allow for the protection of farmers’ rights to seeds and 
traditional knowledge (Gauchan et al., 2003). Some other studies suggested 
that Nepal should seek to implement a sui generis law to protect plant 
varieties. One of the suggestions was also to harmonise Nepal’s obligations 
under the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD, and importantly, create a balance 
between the rights of breeders and farmers (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2003).  
Based on such national discourse and taking into consideration the 
international responsibility to implement the CBD, the Ministry of Forests – 
as a focal point to implement the obligations under the Convention – took 
the lead in preparing the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy in 2002. The adoption 
of this Strategy then paved the way for the formulation of a national law on 
access to genetic resources and benefit sharing. In the same year, the 
Ministry of Forests prepared the first draft of the Genetic Resources 
(Access, Use and Benefit Sharing) Bill, 2002 and circulated it for comments 
to relevant stakeholders (to be discussed in the next chapter).  
In the case of policy discussions on the TRIPS Agreement and the rights of 
breeders and farmers, a “No to UPOV” campaign played a vital role in 
organising civil society actors to voice against the pressure for Nepal to join 
UPOV in 2003. This case shows that in the event of an attempt of regulatory 
capture by global actors, Nepali civil society actors emerged as important 
third party gatekeepers and convinced the government not to join the UPOV 
Convention. 
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7.4.3 No to UPOV campaign  
After the submission of the Memorandum on Foreign Trade Regime in 
1998, Nepal negotiated bilaterally with a number of Working Party 
members for WTO membership. The major ones were Australia, Canada, 
China, the European Union, India, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand and the 
US. Nepal was able to complete its last Working Party meeting on 15 
August 2003, but finalising the terms and conditions to accede to the WTO 
was not easy for a least-developed country (LDC) like Nepal.  
As in the case of other acceding countries such as Cambodia, Nepal was 
also asked to join UPOV71. On 9 August 2003, the US, as a Working Party 
member, sent a note implying that Nepal would have to agree to become a 
UPOV member for the protection of plant varieties. The government of 
Nepal had received such a note a day before its delegates were scheduled to 
travel to Geneva for the last Working Party meeting. According to a key 
informant who was involved in accession negotiations:  
“Though the US had initially asked Nepal to join UPOV during 
negotiations, some European countries had also asked Nepal to consider 
joining UPOV and other global bodies dealing with intellectual 
property” (Interview with KIGS#4).   
Following this external pressure, an anxious team of government delegates, 
headed by the Ministry of Commerce, called for an immediate meeting on 
the same day. A trade policy expert from a non-government organisation 
was also invited to the meeting of the government delegates. The expert was 
from SAWTEE. The meeting prepared a brief note citing reasons for 
Nepal’s unwillingness to join UPOV. The note also made a point to 
71  Pressures for developing and least-developed countries to become a member of the UPOV 
Convention are not a new phenomenon. A few developed countries willing to promote 
intellectual property system for plant variety protection have often emerged as key players in 
exerting such pressures. They convince or force their developing and least-developed 
counterparts to agree to join UPOV or introduce a patent system to safeguard the interests of 
private plant breeders and seed companies. Such pressures generally come through trade 
deals such as bilateral and regional trade agreements (Antons & Hilty, 2015; Khatoon, 2013; 
Vivas-Eugui, 2003). The pressures to join UPOV or agree to implement broad patents are 
also exerted during accession negotiations for WTO membership, which is also referred to 
as “WTO plus” or “TRIPS plus” conditions (El-Said, 2005; Forsyth, 2013).  
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negotiate based on a policy space/option provided by the TRIPS Agreement 
to devise a national sui generis law for the protection of plant varieties.  
Following this, there were two major developments in Nepal’s struggle to 
avoid the pressure to join UPOV, one at the domestic level and the other at 
the WTO level. At the domestic level, a day after the government delegation 
left for Geneva, the trade expert of SAWTEE played a key role in informing 
other civil society organisations about the pressure from the Working Party 
member to join UPOV. SAWTEE was also the secretariat of the National 
Alliance for Food Security in Nepal (NAFOS), a loose national network of 
more than 20 civil society organisations and the FAO Nepal.  
On 11 August 2003, a meeting of the NAFOS network was held. The 
meeting discussed strategic issues to help the government delegation avoid 
the pressure to join UPOV72. On 13 August 2003, the secretariat of the 
NAFOS network followed up with the government delegates in Geneva 
about the situation in the Working Party meeting. According to a key 
informant involved in this campaign:  
“Soon after the delegates informed that it was becoming hard for them to 
fend off the pressure to become a member of UPOV, NAFOS members 
decided to build up further support for No to UPOV campaign by 
involving media and other stakeholders, including the leaders of the 
politically affiliated farmers’ organisations” (Interview KICS#1).  
As part of this campaign, a press conference was organised by NAFOS in 
the capital Kathmandu on 13 August 2003. The next day the national dailies 
were full of coverage about the pressure for Nepal to join the UPOV 
Convention73. The media coverage explained Nepali experts’ views on 
UPOV’s negative implications for Nepalese agriculture, including the rights 
of farmers to save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds. The media coverage also 
highlighted the experts’ argument that UPOV membership is neither a 
72  As important outcomes, the NAFOS members published articles in national dailies and posters 
with the title “Say No to UPOV”. The articles and posters were published in English as well as 
Nepali language, and circulated to a variety of organisations, including media, community-based 
organisations and farmers’ groups. 
73  "US proposes Nepal to sign UPOV", NepalNews.com, Kathmandu, 14 August 2003.  
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/2003/august/arc781.htm (last accessed 2 February 2015). 
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mandatory requirement under the TRIPS Agreement, nor a necessary 
condition for WTO accession.   
At the WTO level, the “No to UPOV” campaign, mainly the media 
coverage, was used by the government delegates as a major agenda in the 
Working Party meeting. With such support at the domestic level, the 
government was finally able to become a WTO member in 2004 without 
any mandatory obligation to join UPOV74. This is well-reflected in Nepal’s 
Working Party Report for Accession to the WTO. As the Report suggests, 
Nepal does not have any obligation to become a UPOV member and can 
make a future decision on this based on its “national interest”. The 
following sentence from the Report also shows Nepal’s independent line: 
“…Nepal would also look at other WIPO and IP related Conventions, 
e.g., Geneva Phonograms Convention, UPOV 91, WIPO Copyright 
Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, in terms of 
national interest and explore the possibility of joining them in the future, 
as appropriate (WTO, 2003, p. 40).” (emphasis added) 
Nepal’s successful campaign against the pressure to join UPOV draws 
attention to a number of lessons that a country not willing to join UPOV can 
learn. Some studies on Nepal’s campaign against UPOV membership have 
also been done. Such studies include a comparative study of Nepal and 
other countries such as Cambodia and Vanuatu, and a case study “Nepal: 
The Role of an NGO in Support of Accession”, published in a book by the 
WTO in 2005 (Adhikari & Adhikari, 2004; Adhikari & Dahal, 2004; 
Andersen & Winge, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2005).  
From the regulatory viewpoint of this thesis, one of the important lessons is 
in relation to the active involvement of civil society actors in the regulation 
of PGRFA. This case shows the use of meta-regulation through which non-
government organisations have played a major role in safeguarding the 
national and local interests. This case also represents an example of 
networked governance in which the actors from the government and non-
government sectors have worked together to develop national agenda for 
74  http://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/farmers-rights-endangered-by-the-cafta (last 
accessed 2 February 2015). 
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global negotiations in addition to preventing the incidents of regulatory 
capture by the global actors of the North. As we will discuss in the sections 
below, such cases are also visible in various other networked activities of 
the government and non-government organisations. 
However, we will also see that irrespective of such an achievement to 
secure the policy space needed for a sui generis law for the protection of 
plant varieties by the networked activities of the civil society and 
government actors, the subsequent developments have not been fully 
positive. The government and civil society actors continue to witness a 
number of constraints and challenges in their efforts to design, draft and 
enforce a sui generis law for breeders’ and farmers’ rights.                    
7.4.4 Drafting of a sui generis law for breeders’ and farmers’ rights  
As part of its WTO accession deal, Nepal has made a commitment to 
implement TRIPS in compliance with its obligations under the Agreement. 
As an LDC member, it made a commitment to implement all the substantive 
provisions of the TRIPS Agreement by December 2005, which was also the 
end of the transition period the LDC members had been initially granted.  
In the Working Party Report, Nepal has made a specific commitment on 
plant variety protection75. It committed to develop “a separate free-standing 
Act” for the protection of plant varieties. Nepal has stated that through this 
legislation, it intends to “protect the rights of related stakeholders in 
accordance with the needs of the country”. According to a key informant 
from the government sector:  
“This wording in Nepal’s commitment had much to do with the No to 
UPOV campaign launched by NAFOS. The accession deal provides 
Nepal with policy space to devise a sui generis law for protecting the 
rights of not just breeders, but also of farmers who rely on subsistence 
agriculture and local systems of use, reuse, exchange and sale of seeds” 
(Interview KIGS#5).  
75  As for its compliance with TRIPS, the commitment is also to amend the Copyright Act, 2002. For 
other major intellectual property protection, Nepal has committed to devise an Industrial Property 
(Protection) Act, as the existing Patent, Design and Trademark Act, 1965 does not meet the 
requirements of the TRIPS Agreement (WTO, 2003). 
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After WTO membership, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce initiated 
the law-making process. In consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture, a 
draft was prepared as Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill in 
2005. The bill did not come into implementation by the end of 2005, which 
was a timeline agreed by Nepal in its Working Party Report. It was because, 
being an LDC member, Nepal was able to obtain a further transition period 
until June 2013 for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement76. 
Following such an extension of the transition period, though Nepal did not 
pursue the enactment of the bill, pressures to introduce a law that strongly 
favours the private sector and seed companies did not stop.  
Seed associations and companies from Europe and the US continuously 
networked with local seed companies and traders for a national legal regime 
that recognises breeders’ rights of the kind protected in UPOV. Nepali seed 
entrepreneurs were invited to international meetings in Europe and Asia, 
and were educated about the need for Nepal to join UPOV and have a seed 
law that protects breeders’ rights. The Seed Entrepreneurs’ Association of 
Nepal, in association with the European Seed Association, also organised a 
training of trainers (TOT) for local seed traders and government officials in 
2006. According to a key informant from the national seed association of 
private seed traders:  
“I, along with some members of the Seed Entrepreneurs’ Association of 
Nepal, were convinced by the foreign seed companies that without a 
regime for plant breeders’ rights, Nepal would not receive foreign 
investment for variety development and plant breeding, and benefit from 
technology transfer needed for the development of breeding 
programmes. The foreign seed companies also told us that local seed 
traders would miss business and job opportunities if there would be no 
foreign investment in Nepal’s seed sector due to absence of an effective 
intellectual property system” (Interview KIPS#1).  
76  On 29 November 2005, the Council for TRIPS extended the transition period until 1 July 2013 for 
all LDC members, recognising “the special needs and requirements of least-developed country 
Members, the economic, financial and administrative constraints that they continue to face, and 
their need for flexibility to create a viable technological base”. See, 
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres05_e/pr424_e.htm (last accessed 2 February 2015). 
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With support from international seed actors and agencies, the Seed 
Entrepreneurs’ Association of Nepal continuously engaged in formal and 
informal negotiations with the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
the National Seed Quality Control Centre. The members of the Association 
lobbied for UPOV membership and the enactment of a UPOV-style plant 
variety protection act in national seed seminars and meetings of the 
government and the non-government organisations. Foreign seed companies 
and domestic seed traders were not, however, alone in their mission to ask 
Nepal to provide for plant breeders’ rights through a formal law. As a key 
informant from the civil society organisation claimed:  
“The experts of the USAID-sponsored project “Nepal Economic, 
Agriculture and Trade Activity (NEAT)”77 also suggested that Nepal 
pursue a regime for the protection of breeders’ rights, and revise the 
Seed Act, 1988 to incorporate a similar protection” (Interview with 
KICS#4). 
Due to these developments, some non-government organisations working 
on these issues took the lead in collaborating with the Ministry of 
Agriculture, the National Seed Quality Control Centre and the Nepal 
Agriculture Research Council. Their objective was to help the government 
utilise TRIPS flexibilities to devise a sui generis law that respects the spirit 
of the “No to UPOV” campaign.  
Such an initiative of the non-government organisations was led by 
SAWTEE, Pro Public and LIBIRD. Another collaborating non-government 
organisations was the Centre for Environmental and Agricultural Policy 
Research, Extension and Development (CEAPRED). The government 
included some of these organisations in committees formed for policy and 
law making, including in the National Agriculture Biodiversity 
Coordination Committee formed for the implementation of Nepal’s 
Agriculture Biodiversity Policy, 2007. For the revision of the Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005, an expert committee was 
formed with the collaboration of the representatives of the government and 
non-government organisations. This is an example of how a country like 
77  Also see, http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-and-government-nepal-
partner-create-and-distribute-food (last accessed 2 February 2015). 
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Nepal can use networked governance to steer a more independent process of 
policy formulation on the issues raised by the international regulation of 
PGFRA and the globalisation of intellectual property regulation. 
In addition to the government officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
Nepal Agriculture Research Council and the National Seed Quality Control 
Centre, the committee included the non-government representatives of 
SAWTEE, LIBIRD and CEAPRED. The committee also included two legal 
experts, one from the Ministry of Law and the other from the International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD). The ICIMOD, as 
a regional inter-governmental centre serving the eight regional member 
countries, was implementing an access and benefit sharing programme and 
helping the Ministry of Forests to devise national strategies and policies for 
the implementation of the CBD through national measures.  
The expert committee met several times between 2007 and 2011, and 
revised the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005. The 
committee recommended a number of revisions and strengthened the 
provisions on farmers’ rights in relation to intellectual property-protected as 
well as farmers’ varieties of PGRFA (these provisions will be discussed in 
the next chapter).  
The committee members of the non-government organisations also 
recommended the authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture to coordinate 
and consult with the Ministry of Forests. This recommendation was made to 
help the government avoid the possible conflict between the Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005 and the Genetic Resources 
(Access, Use and Benefit Sharing) Bill of 2002. The non-government 
organisations also recommended the government officials to improve these 
bills by seeking views of farmers and local groups based on their local 
experiences on biodiversity conservation and use.  
Between 2009 and 2011, as a step further for the required policy and 
legislative reforms in a new political context of Nepal, the two leading non-
government organisations – SAWTEE and LIBIRD – organised local-level 
awareness meetings and workshops. These two organisations also took the 
lead in making further revisions to the bill and submitted the revised bill to 
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the officials of the Ministry of Agriculture. Following the revision of the 
Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005, the same 
committee members also collaborated in the revision of the Seed Act, 1988, 
Seed Regulation, 1995, Seed Policy, 1999 and Agriculture Biodiversity 
Policy, 2007. These revisions were made mainly to strengthen the rights of 
local, indigenous and farming communities in line with Nepal’s willingness 
to benefit from the implementation of the national laws that are compatible 
with the TRIPS Agreement, the CBD and the ITPGRFA (to be discussed in 
the next chapter). 
On 11 June 2013, the Council for TRIPS made another decision on the 
transition period for the LDC members of the WTO, extending the timeline 
for the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement until 1 July 2021. This 
encouraged the Ministry of Agriculture not to pursue the enactment of the 
Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill in 2013, and postpone its 
implementation until June 2021. Yet, there were other developments that 
threatened the country’s policy choice and space to address its national 
needs, mainly after Monsanto, a multinational seed company, used its 
networks to expand its seed market in Nepal. It led the country into another 
civil society campaign, the “No to Monsanto in Nepal”.  
7.4.5 No to Monsanto in Nepal  
In 2009 and 2010, Nepal’s several districts of the Terai region suffered a 
crop failure as a total of 46,000 hectares of hybrid maize production 
collapsed. The local farmers of Bara, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Parsa and 
Nawalparasi districts reported that their maize plants grew up to 4 meters 
tall but without developing kernels. This resulted into a massive loss of 
maize production and financial traps for thousands of resource-poor 
farmers.  
Media news reported a number of factors behind the failure of these hybrid 
maize seeds78. Some agronomists suspected that the failure was due to bad 
78  http://www.dw.de/agronomists-suspect-gm-seeds-behind-nepal-crop-failure/a-6003064, 
http://www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/onairhighlights/nepal-seeks-explanation-for-
corn-crop-failure, http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/04/01/money/early-
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seeds or an early sowing of seeds by farmers. Some others, including the 
Monsanto’s Indian manufacturers and suppliers, claimed that it was due to 
unusual cold weather, and not because of the quality of seeds. Some others 
blamed it on the illegal imports of “defective hybrid and genetically 
modified” seeds via open and porous Nepal-India borders. During the 
fieldwork, an official of the Seed Quality Control Centre was of the view 
that:  
“Local agrovets and farmers used the informal channels to access the 
bad seeds, either in ignorance of the seed regulation or due to negligence 
towards quality control and safety measures of the law” (Interview with 
KIGS#3).  
Notwithstanding such claims, the protest by farmers and strong support 
from civil society organisations forced the government to finally 
compensate the farmers for their loss. According to a key informant from 
the government sector:  
“Due to inadequate preparation in times of such a crisis, the government 
could not negotiate with the Monsanto’s Indian suppliers for any amount 
of compensation. Instead, the government was compelled to announce a 
relief package of NRs. 200 million from its own budget” (Interview with 
KIGS#6).  
Despite the losses and sufferings of local farmers, the interviews revealed 
that this issue contributed positively on two fronts. First, it did alert the 
authorities at the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Seed Quality 
Control Centre to the need to become more responsible in the 
implementation of seed laws. According to a government official:  
“Soon after this case, the government revised its Seed Regulation, 1995 
and added a provision on compensation to farmers. In cases of crop 
failures or losses, the new provision enables farmers to claim 
compensation if seeds are found to have been supplied with bad quality 
or misinformation” (Interview with KIGS#2).  
sowing-of-maize-seeds-blamed-for-repeated-crop-failures/247129.html (last accessed 2 February 
2015). 
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Second, this issue contributed to unite the voice of civil society 
organisations against multinational seed companies like Monsanto. In the 
words of a key informant of a civil society organisation:  
“Following the failure of hybrid seeds of maize in the Terai districts, the 
civil society organisations started to get united for a movement against 
companies like Monsanto. Such a movement took momentum after civil 
society organisations became active with a No to Monsanto campaign, 
mainly after Monsanto’s networks with state, private and diplomatic 
organisations became further visible” (Interview with KICS#4).  
Nepal’s movement against Monsanto reveals that civil society organisations 
started to stage protests after Monsanto tried to use its networks for the sale 
and distribution of Monsanto’s seeds in Nepal. An example of such network 
use is a formal plan designed by the USAID through its NEAT project in 
September 2011. The USAID’s plan was to work with the Ministry of 
Agriculture to plant Monsanto’s hybrid maize seeds in farmers’ fields by 
piloting a hybrid maize production project for 20,000 Nepali farmers of 
three districts: Chitwan, Nawalparasi and Kavre. As the news about it came 
to the notice of Nepali civil society organisations, protests started in social 
networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook, including through a 
facebook account “Stop Monsanto in Nepal”79, which had around 3,500 
followers at that time, and 4,530 followers as of 20 December 2015.  
Gradually, civil society actors scaled up their protests by organising 
meetings and rallies, including a silent protest rally in front of the US 
Embassy in Kathmandu. Some civil society experts and activists used print 
and electronic media to argue that Nepali farmers would gradually lose 
ownership and control over local seeds/landraces by approving such a pilot 
project. Due to widespread protests against such an attempt of regulatory 
capture, the Ministry of Agriculture finally decided to avoid the agreement 
with the USAID and Monsanto, and eventually, did not implement the pilot 
project for hybrid maize plantation.  
Another example of Monsanto’s tactics to use its networks to promote the 
marketing of its seeds in the Nepali seed market is its alliance with the 
79  https://www.facebook.com/stopmonsantoinnepal/ (last accessed 20 December 2015). 
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domestic private sector. In December 2013, an advertisement appeared in a 
national daily calling for bulk buyers of Monsanto’s seeds. It was published 
by a local company “CG Seeds and Fertilisers Pvt. Limited”, which is a 
Nepali subsidiary of Chaudhary Group, one of the major private business 
enterprises in the country. The advertisement frustrated the civil society 
organisations as it was clear that Monsanto partnered with a local seed 
enterprise to market its seeds in Nepal. A number of civil society actors – 
including a network of non-government organisations “The National Right 
to Food Network” – started to raise their voices against the local company 
and Monsanto.  
International experts such as Vandana Shiva, an environmental activist, also 
supported the civil society campaign in Nepal. She published an article on 
Monsanto’s bio-imperialism80 and gave an interview to a national daily 
condemning the tactics of multinational seed companies81. On 22 December 
2013, she also made a public speech in a nationally reputed platform of 
Social Science Baha, informing a mass of Nepali stakeholders from 
different fields about the bio-imperialism of Monsanto82. 
Some scholars suggested the government and stakeholders that they analyse 
Monsanto’s tactics based on a series of events. According to Adhikari 
(2013), Monsanto’s entry into Nepali seed market had its roots in earlier 
events relating to pressure applied by the US on Nepal to join UPOV during 
WTO accession. Since this did not happen, in 2011, a few months before 
the USAID made its plan public, the US had signed a Trade and Investment 
Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Nepal. However, it takes time for a 
TIFA to eventually result into an effective comprehensive agreement. The 
entry of Monsanto through the route of the USAID’s project was a well-
designed plan to move the issue through the guise of foreign aid (Adhikari 
2013).        
80  http://archives.myrepublica.com/2012/portal/?action=news_details&news_id=38786 (last 
accessed 2 February 2015).  
81  http://www.ekantipur.com/the-kathmandu-post/2013/12/23/development/interview-vandana-
shiva/257294.html (last accessed 2 February 2015). 
82  http://www.soscbaha.org/downloads/mcrl2013.pdf (last accessed 2 February 2015).  
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Following the growing civil society protests against Monsanto, the local 
company “CG Seeds and Fertilisers Pvt. Limited” tried to clarify the issue 
in a press meet in Kathmandu on 20 December 2013. The company stated 
that it would not import genetically modified seeds and their deal with 
Monsanto was to market hybrid seeds only83. The protest did not stop there, 
and the issue took a new turn, following a decision from the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court issued an interim order on 8 January 2014 banning the 
import of genetically modified seeds, including from Monsanto84.  
Since then, the government authorities started to impose restrictions on the 
import of all seeds from Monsanto. Monsanto has not, however, left any 
stone unturned to seek entry into the Nepali seed market. The company met 
the officials of the National Seed Quality Control Centre and the Crop 
Development Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture in February 2014, 
seeking the entry of its hybrid seeds into the Nepali market. According to a 
government official:  
“The nationwide protests against Monsanto have put them in an 
awkward standoff, forcing them to even restrict the import of hybrid 
seeds, though the Supreme Court’s decision only restricts the import of 
genetically modified seeds” (Interview with KIGS#6).   
Due to the order to ban genetically modified seeds, the government 
authorities said that there was a confusion regarding the existing policy and 
law, and future policy and legislative initiatives they need to undertake in 
cases like this. According to one of the respondents:  
“The existing National Agriculture Policy, 2004 does not ban the use of 
genetically modified organisms but calls for regulation. Similarly, the 
revised Seed Regulation bans the use and import of seeds with 
terminator genes, but allows for the registration of genetically modified 
seeds on the basis of a biosafety report” (Interview with KIGS#5).  
The government officials further added that Monsanto and many other 
international seed enterprises were already selling seeds in different regions 
83  http://myrepublica.com/portal/index.php?action=news_details&news_id=66538 (last accessed 4 
February 2015). 
84  http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2014-01-08/supreme-court-says-no-to-gm-seeds.html 
(last accessed 4 February 2015). 
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of Nepal through local seed entities. The government officials were not, 
however, sure why Monsanto was strongly pursuing the Nepali seed market, 
which is one of the world’s smallest markets for formal seeds.  
Some officials and informants from the civil society organisations expressed 
the view that probably, Monsanto’s interest lies in using the diversity of 
topography that Nepal has for trial plantations in different agriculture 
systems of the mountain, hill and low land regions. Some of the informants 
also said that Nepal’s experience with Monsanto has much to do with what 
is happening in its neighbouring country India, with which Nepal shares 
open borders on three sides, except in the North. According to an informant 
of the civil society sector:  
“Monsanto’s struggle to capture India’s seed market is often weakened 
by strong movements of civil society organisations and the government 
of India’s global positions in favour of the protection of farmers’ rights. 
By capturing the market of other smaller South Asian countries like 
Nepal, Monsanto’s long-term plan could be to seek further influence in 
India’s seed market, which is progressively ahead in terms of 
technological growth, including in agriculture biotechnology and 
adoption of high-yielding varieties” (Interview with KICS#3).  
The regulatory influence of Monsanto’s networks in Nepal is visible from 
what a senior authority of the Crop Development Directorate of the Ministry 
of Agriculture had to say:  
“Monsanto and other foreign seed companies have already been able to 
establish networks with senior bureaucrats and politicians. On the issue 
of banning seeds from such companies, we might not be in a decisive 
position at a future date, as Monsanto has been lobbying for market 
expansion even at the level of the ministers” (Interview with KIGS#6).  
While a policy decision awaits on whether Nepal will impose long-term 
restrictions on the import of genetically modified and hybrid seeds of 
multinational seed companies, there are some other developments that are 
no less important for the governance of PGRFA. These developments relate 
to Nepal’s preparation to implement the ITPGRFA.  
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7.4.6 Preparation for the implementation of the ITPGRFA   
Nepal has been a member of the FAO Commission on PGRFA since 1994. 
Nepal was also a signatory country at the time of the establishment of the 
ITPGRFA by the FAO Conference in November 2001. As in the case of the 
CBD, TRIPS and UPOV, the case of Nepal shows that state and non-state 
actors and networks worked in different ways to apply the principles of 
networked governance which helped in shaping a policy discourse on why 
Nepal should join the ITPGRFA. As briefly discussed below, such a 
discourse also identified benefits Nepal has in implementing farmers’ rights 
at the national level, and finally led to the revision of its Agriculture 
Biodiversity Policy of 2007.  
After the Treaty’s entry into force in 2004, Bioversity International, in 
partnership with the Nepal Agriculture Research Council, supported the 
government in gaining an understanding of the Treaty and helped it to 
prepare for its ratification through an international project “Genetic 
Resources Policy Initiative (GRPI)”. Two scientists of the Nepal 
Agriculture Research Council – one of them was a coordinator of the GRPI 
Nepal and the other a member of its multistakeholder taskforce – assessed 
Nepal’s prospects and challenges stemming from the implementation of the 
Treaty. This is also an example of networked governance showing how 
countries like Nepal gain capacity from networks. Through networked 
activities, the members of the taskforce published a book in 2006 
recommending the government to become a contracting party of the Treaty. 
Their main recommendations were in relation to benefits Nepal could derive 
from the utilisation of the Treaty’s multilateral system of access and benefit 
sharing, and a legal space available to all parties to implement farmers’ 
rights at the national level (Gauchan & Upadhyay, 2006).  
Non-government organisations like SAWTEE, Pro Public and ActionAid 
Nepal were also part of the multistakeholder taskforce of the GRPI 
initiative. SAWTEE and Pro Public promoted the policy dialogue on how 
the Treaty’s recognition of farmers’ rights would help Nepal strengthen its 
sui generis options for farmer-friendly policies and laws on PGRFA.  
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The parliament of Nepal approved the instrument of ratification of the 
ITPGRFA in 2007. The government, however, delayed the submission of 
the instrument to the Treaty’s Secretariat, and Nepal formally became a 
contracting party only in 2010. In view of this development, non-
government organisations like SAWTEE, LIBIRD and USC Canada Asia 
collaborated in a joint initiative to advance a policy discourse on Nepal’s 
obligations under the ITPGRFA.  
On 9 February 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture formed a team of experts 
from the government and non-government organisations to revise Nepal’s 
Agriculture Biodiversity Policy, 2007 in accordance with the country’s 
obligations under the international agreements. Initially, this Policy was 
introduced in line with the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy Paper of 2002, 
which the government had developed in view of the implementation of 
CBD commitments.  
The majority of the members of this expert committee were from the earlier 
committee formed for the revision of the Plant Variety Protection and 
Farmers’ Rights Bill and other seed laws. SAWTEE, LIBIRD and USC 
Canada Asia shared their project’s resources to organise meetings of the 
expert committee formed to revise the Agriculture Biodiversity Policy. 
Besides addressing the needs of the ITPGRFA, this process intended to seek 
the Agriculture Biodiversity Policy’s harmonisation with related laws and 
policies dealing with the CBD and the TRIPS Agreement. 
In 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture signed an agreement with Bioversity 
International for the implementation of the GRPI Phase II. Following this, 
the experts of the GRPI II project made further revisions to the Policy. The 
revision intended to create an institutional mechanism to include Nepal’s 
PGRFA in Annex 1 of the ITPGRFA by identifying the national gene bank 
as a focal agency. Then on 14 November 2014, Nepal approved the 
revisions to the Policy, introducing a revised Agriculture Biodiversity 
Policy.    
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7.5 Conclusion 
Nepal has never remained isolated from the trends of enclosures that 
scholars discuss as the first and second enclosure movements. The first 
enclosure movement in Nepal is well reflected in the trends of enclosures of 
physical, tangible resources such as lands, forests and irrigation systems. An 
important aspect of the enclosures of these physical resources is their 
linkages with the second enclosure movement that promotes the capture of 
intangible resources like PGRFA through intellectual property rights. As 
PGRFA contain physical property and are located in lands and forests of 
private or public property, the regulatory framework on PGRFA has to 
consider these aspects while conceptualising the property domains 
applicable for the use and management of PGRFA.  
Nepal’s Patent, Design and Trademark Act of 1965 is the first example of 
the country’s involvement in the second enclosure movement. The Act does 
not, however, deal with patents and plant breeders’ rights over plant 
varieties. Nepal’s legislative initiative of 1988, that is, the introduction of 
the Seed Act, is another example of its inclination towards the second 
enclosure movement. Through this Act, Nepal not only made an attempt to 
create a formal seed system, but also to provide ownership rights to 
breeders. Since the Act is silent on the nature and scope of ownership rights, 
not a single variety in Nepal has so far been registered with plant breeders’ 
rights.  
An analysis of the historical and emerging contexts of the regulation of 
PGRFA in Nepal suggests that such a situation is, however, likely to change 
as Nepal is moving ahead to implement national laws to fulfil the 
obligations under the CBD, TRIPS and ITPGRFA. Importantly, the case of 
Nepal offers important insights about how actors and networks at global, 
national and local levels, and from state as well as non-state sectors, have 
been interacting to steer the flow of events in regard to the regulation of 
PGRFA.   
Clearly, Nepal’s case shows that the country is a site of network 
confrontation on matters relating to the regulation of PGRFA. On the one 
hand, there are developed countries – such as the US and foreign seed 
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companies like Monsanto and some others from Europe – pushing for a 
stronger plant variety protection law in Nepal. In particular, some foreign 
seed companies, mainly Monsanto, have even got into their network the 
members of the Seed Entrepreneurs’ Association of Nepal, and high-level 
bureaucrats, politicians and ministers.  
On the other hand, there are some government authorities of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Ministry of Forests who have collaborated with the 
initiatives of non-government organisations to develop sui generis national 
laws on access and benefit sharing, plant variety protection and farmers’ 
rights. These are important developments in regard to the use of networked 
governance in Nepal. Also, the recognition to the role of the non-
government organisations in the regulation of PGRFA shows that meta-
regulation has helped Nepal in steering the flow of regulatory events that 
matter for the governance of PGRFA and the protection of the rights of 
local, indigenous and farming communities. The campaigns such as No to 
UPOV and No to Monsanto are social movements that have contested the 
enclosure of policy space Nepal needs for protecting its mission to 
safeguard the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities. These 
are also the cases that show Nepal’s ability to prevent the incidents of 
regulatory capture by the actors of the intellectual property domain.  
After these conclusions, it is important to examine whether Nepal’s policy 
and legislative initiatives involving the interaction between state and non-
state actors have been able to address the dynamics of local, customary 
practices of seed use and exchange and the PGRFA knowledge commons. 
In view of these aspects, the next chapter analyses the contents of the 
regulatory provisions of relevant policies and laws, including the draft 
legislation Nepal is considering to implement to fulfil the obligations under 
the CBD, TRIPS and ITPGRFA. 
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Chapter 8 
National regulation of PGRFA 
knowledge commons  
 
8.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter showed the case of network confrontation between 
state and non-state actors at global and national levels, discussing the 
historical and emerging contexts of the regulation of PGRFA in Nepal. As a 
whole, the chapter provided an analysis of how Nepal is struggling to 
implement international agreements governing the use and exchange of 
PGRFA.  
Taking further the policy discourse in Nepal in view of the PGRFA 
knowledge commons, this chapter first highlights the salient features of 
Nepal’s local, traditional seed system in relation to the elements of positive 
inclusive commons. Then, the chapter makes an analysis of the contents of 
national governance of PGRFA in order to provide an account of Nepal’s 
departure from the elements of positive inclusive commons to a complicated 
system of multiple layers of commons, of both inclusive and exclusive 
nature.  
The chapter analyses how the CBD-compatible Genetic Resources Bill of 
2002, which is still in the draft form, intends to set new regulatory 
principles for access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing, including 
on issues of sovereignty and ownership of genetic resources. Then the 
chapter briefly discusses the key provisions of Nepal’s Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005, which is drafted by the 
government to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. Finally, the chapter 
analyses the key aspects of the revised Agriculture Biodiversity Policy of 
2014, which intends to implement the obligations under the ITPGRFA. In 
the analysis of these policy and legal initiatives, I use the same analytical 
framework of PGRFA knowledge commons that I discussed in Chapter 6 in 
relation to the international agreements.  
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8.2 Local, traditional seed system: a case of positive 
inclusive commons  
As discussed in Chapter 4, Nepali farmers are widely integrated into local, 
traditional seed system that is characterised by farmer-to-farmer seed 
networks and that relies on open access, use, exchange and sharing of seeds, 
including traditional knowledge. For the analysis of this chapter, such 
features then raise a pertinent question: whether the traditional seed system 
in Nepal is a case of positive inclusive commons. An answer to this question 
is not simple. It requires us to establish a case that within the farmers’ seed 
system in Nepal, the fundamental elements of positive inclusive commons 
exist – that is, all human beings, regardless of geography, race or culture, 
own and use PGRFA, though only with the consent of the commoners.  
Nepali farmers, as discussed in Chapter 4, make efforts through farmer-to-
farmer seed networks to use, save and exchange seeds at individual, 
household and community levels. They do not hold ownership rights to 
exclude others from using their seeds but take PGRFA as a common 
property and cultural heritage. Their societal and cultural values are 
integrated in their practice of saving, sharing and exchanging seeds in such 
a way that open access to and sharing of seeds form the basis of their 
agriculture and livelihoods. Their societal and cultural values of saving and 
exchanging seeds, or sharing traditional knowledge, are not confined to a 
local area, but extend in other districts, regions, and even countries.  
In addition, they do not differentiate between farmers and visitors, whether 
they come from government or non-government or international 
organisations. They welcome visitors with great hospitality, and provide 
them germplasms and share their traditional knowledge without any formal 
conditions. Based on the same values, they also adopt and localise the 
improved seeds they obtain from the formal seed system or other sources. 
All these features support the case that not just Nepali farmers, but many 
other stakeholders, regardless of geography, race or culture, are using the 
country’s PGRFA based on the principles of open access and a global 
commons. In particular, native and local seeds of local, traditional seed 
system are not protected by any ownership rights to exclude or prevent 
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others from using, saving and exchanging PGRFA. These features of local, 
traditional seed system form an important element of positive inclusive 
commons.  
Importantly, these features are not only evident from the use and exchange 
mechanisms farmers practice through farmer-to-farmer networks. These can 
also be substantiated by looking at a table of the historical trend of the 
exploration of PGRFA since the 1930s (Table 8.1). It shows that since the 
1930s, Nepal is involved in plant exploration activities of international 
missions, providing germplasms, as ex situ collections, to different 
international missions.  
Table 8.1: A historical trend of the exploration of PGRFA in Nepal by 
different international missions  
International missions Team Year 
Germany Heerlich 1937-1938 
Japan H. Kihara and S. Nakao 1952-1953 
UK J.R. Witcombe and A.M. 
Martimore 
1971 
UK L.W. Beer 1975 
IBPGR W. Erskine and J.J. Bourgois 1979 
FAO P. Whiteman 1979 
IBPGR M. Lizuka and M. Nakagahara 1984 
Japan Japan/Nepal 1986 
IRRI IRRI/Nepal 1988 
Japan Japan/Nepal 1988 
IBPGR IBPGR/Nepal 1990 
Japan Japan/Nepal 1993 
IRRI Lu BR 1988, 1999 
Source: Bhatt (2013) 
 
During the fieldwork, government authorities, including the ones involved 
in some of these missions, disclosed that the practice of plant exploration 
and seed collection has always been based on an implicit notion that 
PGRFA are a common cultural heritage. In the words of an official of the 
Nepal Agriculture Research Council:  
“Only based on bilateral letters by the international missions (countries 
and gene banks), and in some cases, simple material transfer agreements, 
the government authorities remained involved in such plant exploration 
activities and provided accessions to thousands of crop germplasms to 
the international missions” (Interview with KIGS#11).  
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Such international missions included plant exploration teams of developed 
countries like Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom (UK). The missions 
also included international organisations like the International Board for 
Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), FAO and IRRI. The figure below shows 
rice accessions provided from different locations of Nepal to the national 
and international gene banks through such plant exploration programmes 
(Figure 8.1).  
Figure 8.1: Rice accessions from different locations of Nepal to 
international gene banks  
 
Source: Bhatt (2013). 
 
2672
40 121 6
1141
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
International
Rice Research
Institute
Vavilov
Institute
United States
Department of
Agriculture
West African
Rice
Development
Association
National
Genebank
A total of 2,839 rice accessions 
provided from different locations to the 
following international genebanks  
174 
 
Interestingly, not only Nepal provided access to germplasms to the 
international missions. During the fieldwork, the government authorities of 
the Nepal Agriculture Research Council said that national and regional 
agriculture research and breeding programmes of the country also collected 
exotic plant varieties for breeding and dissemination in Nepal, for example, 
from international agriculture research centres such as IRRI and CIMMYT, 
and countries of different regions such as Bangladesh, Columbia, India, the 
Philippines, Sweden, Taiwan, Thailand and the US (we discussed these 
trends in Chapters 3 and 4).  
One may, however, raise a question that for Nepal’s PGRFA to represent a 
case of positive inclusive commons, evidence of the consent of the 
commoners to use PGRFA is important. To answer this, we can assume that 
in local, traditional seed system, the consent of the commoners (farmers) is 
embedded in their societal and cultural values of sharing and exchanging 
seeds and traditional knowledge. In other words, by promoting the practice 
of openly accessing, sharing and exchanging seeds, they also provide or 
obtain consent to use PGRFA.  
During the fieldwork, the authorities of the Nepal Agriculture Research 
Council, including the ones involved in plant exploration activities, further 
said that they did not have any experience of completing a formal process to 
obtain consent from the local commoners of PGRFA. They said that as and 
when asked, local farmers did not express their grievances or reservations in 
regard to their consent to share seeds and traditional knowledge. Thus, it 
can be ascertained that Nepali farmers are closely linked with local, 
traditional seed system as positive inclusive commoners. When inferring 
such a conclusion, we should, however, also remain aware of the legislative 
developments that affect Nepal’s case of positive inclusive commons, 
mostly due to the influence from the global governance of PGRFA. While 
within local farming communities relying on local, traditional seed system, 
seeds are still being shared as positive inclusive commons, below I discuss 
how the legislative development in relation to access and benefit sharing 
rules is likely to create a different scenario.  
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8.3 Regulating access to and use of genetic resources: 
departure from positive inclusive commons  
A CBD-compatible Genetic Resources (Access, Use and Benefit Sharing) 
Bill of 2002 is the first legal initiative in Nepal that aims to mark a major 
departure in the regulation of access to and use of not only PGRFA, but also 
other genetic resources. Among other things, it intends to bring into force a 
bilateral access and benefit sharing agreement to be negotiated and 
concluded between the providers and recipients of the genetic resources.  
8.3.1 Coverage: defining the terms and procedures of access  
In its entirety, the Bill, excluding human genetic resources, deals with the 
regulation of access to and use of not just agricultural crops, but also of 
medicinal plants and animal breeds. The Bill builds on the definitions 
adopted by the CBD to define genetic materials and genetic resources. 
According to the Bill, “genetic materials” mean complete or partial part of 
plant, animal, microorganism or virus containing functional units of 
heredity and “genetic resources” mean genetic materials of actual or 
potential value under in situ as well as ex situ conditions in Nepal (Sections 
2.c and 2.d). The definition of genetic resources also includes components 
or derivatives of all other genetic resources, implying that the law would 
also cover isolated molecules or compounds, or a mixture of them.  
The Bill defines the term “access” to cover the collection, acquisition and 
possession of genetic resources and genetic materials. The term “access” 
also covers access to traditional knowledge, skill, innovation, technology 
and practice of local community (Section 2.g), meaning that the Bill also 
regulates access to intangible knowledge property of local communities. 
Then the Bill defines the term “use” as the use of biological or genetic 
resources or genetic materials for study, research, commercial, or industrial 
or any other purpose (Section 2.h). 
With such definitions and coverage, the Bill requires that a license to 
access, use and export genetic resources should be obtained from the 
National Genetic Resources Council, which is an autonomous body formed 
through this law to implement its provisions on access, use and benefit 
sharing. Such a license is not, however, applicable for any local community 
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to use genetic resources, as their use and exchange are the basis of 
livelihoods for most farmers relying on agriculture biodiversity.  
As the Bill puts it, “…no local community shall have to obtain approval or 
license pursuant to this Act for the use of genetic resources and genetic 
materials through traditional knowledge” (Section 10.1). The Bill defines 
local communities to mean “inhabitants including indigenous nationalities 
having access to biological or genetic resources or genetic materials on the 
basis of traditional knowledge, skill, innovation, technology and practice or 
using such resources or materials or living in or around of the place of 
origin of such resources or materials” (Section 2.i). As also shown in Figure 
8.2, for the third parties, other than local communities, a number of 
procedures are to be completed to obtain license to access, use and export 
genetic resources.  
Figure 8.2: Step-wise procedures to obtain a license to access, use and 
export genetic resources and genetic materials 
 
The first step is to apply for preliminary study, scientific research and 
sample collection. It requires the third parties to also provide information in 
regard to right and ownership of the genetic resources to be studied or to be 
Application for preliminary study, scientific research and sample collection
Submission of proposal for license, together with a technical report 
and a report on benefit sharing
Organisation of public hearing by the National Genetic 
Resources Council for prior informed consent 
An initial environmental test report or an environmental impact 
assessment may be demanded by the Council
Discussion on the proposal, for which, the Council may 
constitute a negotiation committee
Submission of a recommendation report by the negotiation 
committee mentioning whether or not to give approval for license
Agreement for the license to the third party with a range of details 
pertaining to access, use and export
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collected as samples, including information about traditional knowledge 
(Section 11.1.h). The second step is to submit a proposal for license, 
together with a technical report and a benefit sharing report (Section 12). 
The proposal should also include comprehensive details of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge; information in regard to right and ownership of 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge of local communities; and 
details of expected financial and scientific outcomes from access, use and 
export (Sections 12.e, 12.j and 12.k).  
The third step is then to organise a public hearing for prior informed 
consent, for which the National Genetic Resources Council is responsible 
(Section 13.1). It is mandatory for the third parties or their representative to 
be present in any public hearing (Section 13.5). The Council shall have to 
publish the notice relating to public inquiry in at least two national and local 
newspapers and should forward the required details to the relevant local 
government institution, local communities and local organisations for 
organising public hearing at the local level (Section 13.1). If the genetic 
resources requested for access and use are in two or more villages, districts 
or municipalities, the Council may make arrangements for public hearing 
through appropriate local bodies (Section 12.4).  
The fourth step is the environmental impact assessment. The Council, based 
on the nature of the proposal for access and use by the third party, shall take 
a decision on whether or not to ask for an initial environmental test report or 
an environmental impact assessment to be conducted as per the prevailing 
law of Nepal (Sections 14.1 and 14.2). 
The fifth step is the discussion of the proposal, for which, the Council may 
constitute a negotiation committee. This committee will discuss the 
proposal taking into account (1) technical report; (2) benefit sharing report; 
(3) recommendation received from the local government bodies based on 
public hearing; and (4) if applicable, environmental impact assessment 
(Section 16.1). The committee shall include a technical person, an expert in 
the field of law and management, representatives of the local bodies and 
local communities, and if the owner of the genetic resource is a person or an 
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institution, a representative of the same person or institution (Sections 16.2 
and 16.3).  
After completing all the formal procedures, the same committee shall 
submit a recommendation report, and within the next 30 days, the Council 
shall take a decision on whether or not to conclude the agreement with the 
third party (Sections 16.6 and 16.7). The Council shall not conclude such an 
agreement if the proposal is contrary to the prevailing laws on environment 
and biological diversity; causes adverse impacts to the life or health of 
human beings, animals and plants; causes degradation to soil and decline in 
productivity; causes adverse effects to food security; and negatively impacts 
livelihoods of local communities, including indigenous nationalities. If 
these conditions are met, then the Council – before granting license to the 
third party in a prescribed format – shall inform the third party to conclude 
the agreement. 
These provisions in the Bill clearly indicate that Nepal is intending to 
introduce such a CBD-compatible law that sets new procedures and 
conditions of access and use of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. 
While such procedures and conditions are likely to bring about a new 
regulatory structure for access, use, prior informed consent and benefit 
sharing, the Bill, with its provisions on state sovereignty and ownership 
over genetic resources, is also geared towards affecting the elements of 
positive inclusive commons prevalent in local, traditional seed system.  
8.3.2 Sovereignty and ownership 
In the spirit of the CBD, the Bill states that sovereign rights over genetic 
resources shall rest with the state of Nepal (Section 3). There is no further 
provision to explain the nature and scope of such sovereign rights. Yet, it 
certainly establishes the state as the sole and legitimate regulator to govern 
the entire genetic resources of the territory of Nepal – whether these exist in 
in situ conditions in public and private lands, forests and waters resources, 
or in ex situ conditions at the national gene bank and research centres.  
As discussed in Chapter 6, state sovereignty on PGRFA is a case of state-
level positive exclusive commons. It means, PGRFA that are within the 
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territory of Nepal do not remain positive inclusive commons of all human 
beings, but come under state sovereignty and remain subject to national 
regulation of access and use. While determining access and use rules, 
Section 4 of the Bill has enabled the state, as an exercise of its sovereign 
rights, to establish ownership over the country’s genetic resources at three 
levels.  
At the first level, a person or an institution will be entitled to ownership of 
genetic resources if these exist in any building, land, forest and water 
resources that are under the ownership of or in use by a person or an 
institution (Section 4.a). At the second level, if genetic resources exist in 
any building, land, forest and water resources that are under the ownership 
of or in use by more than one person or institution, the ownership of genetic 
resources is vested in local communities (Section 4.b). At the third level, the 
state will have the ownership over genetic resources not covered by 
Sections 4.a and 4.b (Section 4.c).  
It means that state-level positive exclusive commons are subject to 
ownership by the state, as well as private persons, institutions and local 
communities. This way, access and use rules for PGRFA create other layers 
of commons from state-level positive exclusive commons. While the 
PGRFA that are owned by the state become state-owned positive exclusive 
commons, the PGRFA that come under the ownership of local communities 
become community-owned positive exclusive commons. As these PGRFA 
are owned and used by local communities, their access and use by the third 
parties then become subject to consent from and benefit sharing with local 
communities.  
Moreover, the PGRFA that come under the ownership of private persons or 
institutions become the resources under private appropriation like a private 
property. It means that access to and use of these commons become subject 
to consent from and benefit sharing with the owners, that is, the same 
private persons or institutions. Figure 8.3 shows how Nepal’s initiative to 
comply with the CBD has led to the design of a law that deals with multiple 
layers of commons and property dynamics created due to state sovereignty 
and ownership over genetic resources. 
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Figure 8.3: Multiple layers of commons created due to the concepts of 
sovereignty and ownership 
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Third, the Bill’s recognition of ownership over genetic resources is not 
based on the concept of intangible knowledge property, but depends more 
on the ownership or use of physical property such as buildings, lands, 
forests and water resources. It means that the concept of physical property 
domains – private property, community property and state property – will 
prevail to establish ownership over genetic resources. Complications can 
also be added as physical ownership and use of lands, forests and water 
resources keeps changing among different persons and institutions, for 
example, through the sale of private lands and forests, change of national 
forests into community forests, or enclosures of natural resources or 
community property by the state or private individuals. As we saw in 
Chapter 7, the enclosure of lands and forests by the state has already led to 
significant property rights implications in Nepal. 
Moreover, such provisions also indicate that if a farmer or local 
communities, for example, stop planting the seeds of a particular native crop 
due to a preference for other or modern seeds and do not save such native 
seeds within their lands, they will not be able to gain benefits from future 
commercial use of such seeds by others. Such an emphasis on physical 
property domains also may not be in favour of landless or poor farmers as 
they may not be able to own or always hold incentives to protect and own 
native seeds.  
During the fieldwork, local farmers in all three sites – Bara, Lalitpur and 
Sindhupalchok – had reported that many of their local seeds are not in their 
lands or even in their village, though they still remember their traits and 
characteristics. Some poor farmers had also expressed their inability to 
continue to conserve local seeds, as they were gradually becoming inclined 
to use improved seeds. These trends surely indicate that there would be 
implications from physical property dynamics for identifying who owns 
PGRFA. 
Fourth, the Bill does not explain anything about “ownership rights”. If we 
take how commons scholars perceive the types of ownership rights in a 
commons, there are, as discussed in Chapter 5, “authorised users”, or 
“claimants”, or “proprietors”, or “owners” (Ostrom & Schlager, 1996). 
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Since the Bill establishes ownership over genetic resources based on the 
concept of physical property domains, it is clear that the “owners” of 
genetic resources will have all the rights of access, use, management, 
exclusion and alienation as long as they hold ownership over or use physical 
property in which the same genetic resources are available. In such 
conditions, in the exercise of their rights of access, use, management, 
exclusion and alienation, the Bill also enables the owners of genetic 
resources to require the third parties to obtain their prior informed consent 
for access and use, and share with them the benefits derived from such 
access and use.  
8.3.3 Prior informed consent 
According to the Genetic Resources Bill of 2002, prior informed consent is 
an important principle and regulatory tool to restrict unauthorised access to 
resources. Such consent, on the basis of complete and correct information, 
needs to be obtained from the person, institution or local communities in 
two situations. The first situation in which prior informed consent is 
required is in relation to preparing a “record” (kind of documentation) that 
should contain information such as place of origin of genetic resources, 
their availability, ownership domains, using method, status, importance, and 
other prescribed matters including, if applicable, relevant traditional 
knowledge of local communities (Section 6.4 and 7.1). The Bill also 
contains some provisions outlining the procedures to prepare, as well as 
rules about registering and publishing such records (Section 6 and 7). 
During the fieldwork, the government authorities suggested that such 
provisions would assist them to regulate the practices of obtaining, 
documenting and publishing information about genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge, and ensure that the third parties obtain the consent of 
the owners. In this regard, an informant working in a national non-
government organisation provided important information regarding a pilot 
project of the IUCN Nepal and the Ministry of Forests that obtained and 
documented information about local genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge in a number of villages. In his words:  
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“Between 2003 and 2005, a number of experts of indigenous, non-
government organisations became vocal and asked if the project 
appropriately obtained prior informed consent from the indigenous 
communities and organisations for documenting such information. Due 
to such disputes, in recent years, some non-government and government 
organisations, with the involvement of local communities, have started 
to maintain such records through community biodiversity registers” 
(Interview with KICS#2).   
The second situation in which prior informed consent is required is in 
relation to the requirement for the third parties to get approval for a license 
to access, use and export genetic resources. For this, the Council is 
supposed to make an arrangement for public hearing at the community level 
so as to obtain the consent from local communities. The informants from the 
government as well as non-government organisations expressed the view 
that such a requirement would curb biopiracy and misappropriation of local 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. They also said that the 
requirement to obtain prior informed consent would help in ensuring that 
benefits are channelled to the consent providers, that is, actual owners or 
right holders.  
Some researchers and scientists from the national gene bank, the national 
agriculture research centre and the agriculture college, however, said that 
the requirements of prior informed consent and benefit sharing would 
discourage researchers and scientists, especially from public sector and 
universities, to go to local areas. According to a scientist of the Nepal 
Agriculture Research Council:  
“Researchers and scientists would find it difficult to negotiate for access 
and use through public hearing, particularly when they are not accessing 
and using the resources for commercial purposes. Therefore, 
researchers’ interests, in fact I should say rights, in relation to study and 
research should also be addressed in this law by relaxing conditions for 
non-commercial access and use of resources and traditional knowledge” 
(Interview with KIGS#10).   
Citing similar concerns, some informants also called for clear, simplified 
procedures to obtain prior informed consent from a private person or an 
institution or the government. The Bill, as mentioned above, only provides 
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for the organisation of public hearing to obtain prior informed consent from 
local communities, not clearly mentioning how to obtain such consent from 
private persons or institutions or the government.    
8.3.4 Benefit sharing 
Benefit sharing could be monetary or non-monetary or a combination of 
both. Nepal’s Genetic Resources Bill only mentions monetary benefits 
accrued from access to and use of genetic resources (Section 24). For an 
arrangement of the distribution of monetary benefits, it puts an emphasis on 
who owns the resources and how any derived benefit can be distributed 
(Figure 8.4). 
Figure 8.4: Distribution of monetary benefits accrued from access to 
and use of genetic resources  
 
From the benefits accrued as per Figure 8.4, the Bill further states that the 
owners of the genetic resources shall have to provide 10 percent of the 
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commencement of this law. The Council is also given the authority to 
conclude the agreement with the concerned party for sharing the benefits 
derived from access to and use of genetic resources located outside Nepal 
If state owns genetic resources 
or genetic materials
If a person or an institution or a 
local community owns genetic 
resources or genetic materials
•50 percent to the 
government
•30 percent to the 
Council
•20 percent to the local 
community
•51 percent to the owner 
(person, institution, or 
local community)
•29 percent to the 
Council
•20 percent to the local 
community
185 
 
for ex situ or other purposes. However, during the fieldwork, some 
informants, including from the Ministry of Forests, expressed the lack of 
domestic capacity to track such cases of access and use, including biopiracy.        
On the issue of distribution of benefits, the government authorities stated 
that the sharing of benefits with all stakeholders, irrespective of who owns 
the resources, is justified as the state has sovereign rights and also 
responsibilities to ensure distributive justice from any access and use of the 
country’s genetic resources. A government authority of the Ministry of 
Forests said:  
“The Bill’s distribution mechanism of the benefits derived from the 
access and use of genetic resources and materials are in the interest of 
all, including local communities. While making an arrangement to 
receive a share of the benefits accrued from the genetic resources of 
private persons, institutions and local communities, the state has also 
expressed its commitment to share the benefits it derives from access to 
and use of state-owned genetic resources and materials” (Interview with 
KIGS#8).     
On the other hand, experts working on access and benefit sharing issues in 
the non-government organisations take the view that the law should review 
its benefit sharing mechanism as it largely benefits the state than local 
communities. An informant working with community-based non-
government organisation said:  
“A national benefit sharing fund or a community benefit sharing fund 
can be considered to ensure that monetary benefits are channelled to a 
fund to be utilised for conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity” (FGD#2).  
Some informants of non-government as well as government organisations 
also called for creating a legal process to generate non-monetary benefits 
and sharing of such benefits through conservation- and development-related 
activities at the local level. They feared that sharing of monetary benefits 
would invite conflicts between the state and local communities.         
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8.3.5 Intangible knowledge property: traditional knowledge and 
intellectual property rights  
The Bill deals with intangible knowledge property rights issues at two levels 
– traditional knowledge of local communities and intellectual property 
rights. The Bill defines traditional knowledge as the knowledge, skill, 
innovation, technology and practice existing for a long time in local people 
or a community regarding conservation or use of biological resources or 
genetic resources or genetic materials (Section 2.k). It does not state 
anything about what traditional knowledge rights are, but makes a legal 
provision that such rights rest with the concerned local communities 
(Section 5.1).  
Another important feature in this regard is the Bill’s provision that if any 
local community possesses traditional knowledge important for 
conservation and use of genetic resources that are owned by a person or an 
institution or the government, priority would be given to the same 
community for access to, use and sharing of benefits of the same genetic 
resources (Section 5.2). It means two completely different things.  
First, notwithstanding who owns the genetic resources, local communities 
will have priority to access and use such resources, and also obtain a share 
of the benefits derived from their use by others. It is a positive scenario 
from the viewpoint of local communities. For instance, as discussed before, 
even if a farmer or local community has stopped planting the seeds of a 
particular crop and does not possess ownership over such seeds as per the 
provisions of the Bill, such a farmer or local communities, based on 
traditional knowledge, may benefit in terms of access to such seeds or 
obtain benefits from their access and use by third parties.  
Second, notwithstanding the traditional knowledge of local communities, 
any person or an institution or the government may obtain ownership over 
genetic resources, based on the claim that such resources exist in their 
physical property like private lands or forests or water resources. It also 
means that notwithstanding the traditional knowledge of community-level 
positive exclusive commoners about a particular plant variety, a person or 
an institution can become the private owners of the same plant variety. It is 
a negative scenario from the viewpoint of local communities. For example, 
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as many farmers in the fieldwork sites reported, the loss of their local seeds 
from their lands – by virtue of such a provision – will not enable them to 
continue to remain the owners or positive exclusive commoners of the seeds 
they, based on their traditional knowledge, used to conserve and plant in the 
past. 
Coming to the issue of another intangible knowledge property, that is 
intellectual property rights, the Bill mentions that “any person or 
institution…may acquire intellectual property right over any substance or 
the process of its use as per the prevailing laws”, but only after obtaining the 
license to access, use and export genetic resources as required by this law 
(Section 23.1). It means that after concluding the agreement to access, use 
and export genetic resources with the Council, any person or institution can 
obtain intellectual property rights over genetic resources to use such 
resources. Irrespective of such a provision, the Bill does not allow anyone to 
“register publicly known traditional knowledge”, or “genetic resources and 
genetic materials available in the nature” for the purposes of obtaining 
patent or a similar right. It implies that for anyone to claim such rights, they 
must prove that the claimed substance or process is new, and meets the 
other criteria of intellectual property determined in the prevailing laws of 
Nepal. 
What these provisions on intellectual property rights mean is that state-
owned and community-owned positive exclusive commons as well as 
privately owned PGRFA can be accessed and used by the third parties, and 
later on, such parties can claim intellectual property rights over the “new” 
products derived out of such access and use. This way, Nepal seems to have 
adopted the principle of the ITPGRFA in that there cannot be any 
intellectual property claim over materials in the received form, but resources 
under any form of ownership may become subject to appropriation based on 
mutually agreed terms of access, prior informed consent and benefit 
sharing.  
8.4 The sui generis law on plant varieties  
Nepal is not a UPOV member or observer, though most of its neighbouring 
South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
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have observer status. Following WTO membership, Nepal has drafted the 
Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 2005 for fulfilling its 
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. The preamble to the Bill indicates 
three objectives for which this law is desirable for Nepal. The first objective 
is to promote crop variety development and protection for agriculture 
development, sustainable food security and management of agriculture 
biodiversity. The second objective is to encourage research, investment and 
technology transfer for crop variety development and protection. The third 
objective is to protect the rights of breeders and farmers.  
8.4.1 Coverage: defining the terms of plant varieties  
The Bill deals with plant varieties of crops, vines and trees. The Bill also 
covers in its regulation the propagating materials, including seeds, of plant 
varieties. For this law, plant varieties should have a clear, separate and 
special identity and could be in the form of local varieties, farmers’ 
varieties, breeders’ new varieties, essentially derived varieties85 and 
genetically modified varieties (Section 2.b).   
The Bill defines local variety as any traditional plant variety that is within 
the territory of Nepal and that is in the knowledge or under information and 
use of local farming communities for generations (Section 2.m). Farmers’ 
varieties are varieties that have the characteristics of distinctness, uniformity 
and stability and have been registered by farmers under this law (Section 
2.l). It means that local varieties are different from farmers’ varieties as the 
latter has to be registered by farmers, meeting the criteria of distinctness, 
uniformity and stability.  
In the case of breeders’ new varieties, breeders must register these varieties 
under this law and such plant varieties should not only have, as in the case 
of farmers’ varieties, the characteristics of distinctness, uniformity and 
stability, but also be new (Section 2.f). It means that breeders’ new varieties 
should have an additional characteristic of novelty for enabling the 
inventors of the new plant varieties to exercise plant breeders’ rights.  
85  Essentially derived varieties are the varieties that have been derived predominantly from the 
initial variety and that have retained the essential characteristics of that initial variety (Sections 
2.g and 2.h of the Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 2005). 
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8.4.2 Breeders’ and farmers’ varieties and rights  
The Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 2005 is similar to the 
UPOV Convention in the case of breeders’ varieties and breeders’ rights, 
but moves beyond the UPOV system to deal with farmers’ varieties and 
farmers’ rights. 
8.4.2.1 Registration of breeders’ new plant varieties  
Any breeder can apply for registration of new plant varieties with the 
registrar of the Plant Variety Protection Committee formed to enforce the 
provisions of this Bill. The applicant breeder will have to provide the 
evidence of distinctness, uniformity, stability and novelty of the plant 
variety to be registered (Section 5.1). The applicant breeder, in accordance 
with Section 5.1, should also provide a range of other details such as 
denomination of the plant variety; information regarding whether the plant 
variety is genetically engineered and if genetically engineered, a risk 
assessment report; and declaration that terminator technology is not 
embedded into the plant variety.  
The applicant breeder should also provide information about the source and 
geographical details of the variety used for breeding and development of the 
new plant variety, including passport data; and the evidence that an 
agreement has been done with the indigenous community or local people or 
farmers for prior informed consent and benefit sharing in the case of the use 
of their plant variety by the breeder. If the above-mentioned requirements of 
Section 5.1 are not met, the registrar will not register the plant variety. The 
plant variety that seriously affects the environment, cultural and religious 
norms, and public morale and interest will not also be registered as 
breeders’ new plant variety (Section 9.1).  
During the fieldwork, an official, who previously led the drafting of the Bill 
on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture, said that through these provisions, 
Nepal has clearly indicated that the country does not want to provide 
approval to register seeds with terminator technology, and in the case of 
genetically engineered ones, will give approval for registration only based 
on a biosafety risk assessment. He, however, also said:  
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“Given the influence of Monsanto to export hybrid seeds in Nepali seed 
market, the existing national debates on genetic engineering and the 
interim order issued by the Supreme Court to halt the import and use of 
genetically modified seeds, the government needs to reconsider the 
provisions of this Bill and make changes to safeguard the interests of 
farmers and citizens” (Interview with KIGS#5).  
Two other informants from the Ministry of Agriculture and the Nepal 
Agriculture Research Council said that with conditions of registration and 
non-registration for new plant varieties, Nepal enjoys certain policy 
flexibilities and space to prevent the registration of new plant varieties if 
such varieties, for example, affect public interest and the environment. They 
also said that the expert committee formed to revise this Bill (in which they 
were involved) gave serious consideration to including the “disclosure 
requirement” so that the providers and geographical locations of the initial 
varieties would be identified and the requirements of obtaining prior 
informed consent and concluding benefit sharing agreement be imposed on 
breeders who apply to register new varieties by using the varieties of 
farmers or other owners.  
8.4.2.2 Breeders’ ownership certificate and rights 
Unlike the Seed Act of 1988 (as discussed in Chapter 4), the Plant Variety 
Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill, 2005 is not silent on breeders’ 
ownership rights. As per the Bill, breeders can obtain an ownership 
certificate by registering their new plant varieties and exercise certain 
breeders’ rights over new plant varieties. While exercising their rights, 
breeders can prevent others from or require authorisation for production, 
reproduction, conditioning for the purpose of propagation, sale, distribution, 
export and import of the propagating materials of their new plant varieties 
(Section 20.1). Breeders also have the right to transfer or sale or permit to 
use their breeders’ rights to any other person or institution (Section 20.2).  
These rights to breeders clearly indicate that a UPOV-like system of plant 
breeders’ rights is likely to be implemented in Nepal to promote the 
interests of breeders, including private seed entities. These breeders’ rights 
are not, however, without exceptions and limitations. Breeders are not 
allowed to exercise their rights in respect of the use of the propagating 
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materials of the new plant varieties for certain acts of others. Such acts 
include private or non-commercial uses of the propagating materials of the 
protected new varieties; study, teaching and research on the propagating 
materials of the protected new varieties; and plant breeding and 
development on the propagating materials of the protected new varieties 
(Section 22).  
The informants from the private sector and the government agencies 
considered these exceptions to breeders’ rights – almost the same as those in 
the UPOV Convention – important for accommodating the interests of other 
breeders, farmers and researchers. Most informants from the non-
government organisations, however, questioned if the government or the 
private sector would be able to use these exceptions to advance national and 
local interests. An informant from the non-government organisation said:  
“Nepal’s public and private sector, forget about local farmers and 
organisations, lack technological capacities to promote research and 
breeding for developing new varieties out of plant breeders’ rights-
protected new varieties” (FGD#1).  
Breeders’ rights can also be subject to provisions on compulsory licensing. 
Under certain circumstances, any other person or institution can apply to 
exploit a new plant variety registered by a breeder and the registrar can 
issue a compulsory license to authorise the applicant person or institution to 
produce and supply the seeds of the breeders’ rights-protected variety 
(Sections 23 and 24). Such circumstances include the breeder’s inability to 
supply the new variety’s propagating materials as per farmers’ demands for 
three years after the registration of the same variety.  
A Compulsory licence may also be issued to any other person or institution 
if the breeder is found to have engaged in anti-competitive practices in 
relation to supply, price determination, sale and distribution, including the 
imposition of inappropriate prices that farmers and public at large cannot 
afford to pay to purchase the seeds of the protected new variety.  
The informants involved in the drafting of this Bill said that the provisions 
on compulsory licensing have been incorporated based on lessons learnt 
from global conflicts on TRIPS and public health issues (Correa, 2002; 
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Drahos, 2007; Matthews, 2004). According to the informants, as 
compulsory licensing has enabled developing countries such as Brazil, India 
and Thailand to produce generics of patent-protected drugs (Ford et al., 
2007), such provisions would also be critical in the field of seed production 
and business, for instance when plant breeders’ rights would limit farmers’ 
access to seeds due to anti-competitive practices.  
On this matter, a seed entrepreneur believed that if the government creates 
an enabling environment for plant variety research, breeding and 
development, Nepali seed entrepreneurs would be in a position to use 
compulsory licencing and deliver seeds of varieties protected by plant 
breeders’ rights.     
8.4.2.3 Registration of and rights over farmers’ varieties  
In order to register plant varieties as farmers’ varieties and related 
knowledge, farmers will have to apply by providing the required samples of 
the plant varieties, denomination to adequately identify the varieties, and 
details of related knowledge (Section 28.2). The registrar will then inspect if 
the variety is distinct, uniform and stable. The registrar will also issue a 
public notice to verify if other farmers express their reservations or claim 
ownership over the same variety and related knowledge. If all conditions of 
registration are met, the plant variety, including related knowledge, will be 
registered for protection under the law as farmers’ variety and related 
knowledge.  
Farmers are given three types of rights in relation to the registered farmers’ 
varieties and related knowledge. First, without paying any fee, farmers have 
the right to register the plant varieties and related knowledge they have been 
using, protecting and promoting (Section 27.2.a). This right is considered 
important because it will not only enable farmers to avoid any financial 
burden to register the local plant varieties as farmers’ varieties, but will also 
establish ownership of such varieties with ownership certificates.  
The informants working with the farmers and local communities, however, 
said that if the criteria of distinctness, uniformity and stability are strictly 
followed by asking farmers to provide technical details and passport data, 
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most farmers would not be able to register local plant varieties as farmers’ 
varieties. They also said that maintaining technical details and meeting such 
requirements demand costs that poor farmers cannot afford to bear without 
organisational, or financial and technical support.  
Second, farmers have the right of prior informed consent in cases of access 
to farmers’ varieties and related knowledge for the sake of research and use 
for commercial purposes (Section 27.2.b). This means that farmers’ prior 
informed consent must be obtained, but only if research and use of farmers’ 
varieties and related knowledge are for commercial purposes. This is further 
supplemented by the third right given to farmers in regard to farmers’ 
varieties and related knowledge, that is, farmers have the right to know 
about the primary, secondary or any other use of their varieties and 
knowledge for bioprospecting (Section 27.2.c).  
The drafters of the Bill expressed the view that such rights would require 
the third parties to go through a process of obtaining prior informed consent, 
and disclose the information regarding any commercial use. They also said 
that since these rights are limited for commercial or bioprospecting 
purposes only, any other farmers or local communities or researchers will 
not be obstructed to access and use farmers’ varieties for non-commercial 
purposes. This would, among other things, protect the rights of other 
farmers to save, exchange, reuse and sell farm-saved seeds of the registered 
farmers’ varieties.   
8.4.2.4 Farmers’ rights over breeders’ new varieties 
Another important feature of the Bill is its recognition of five types of 
farmers’ rights over breeders’ new varieties. First, farmers have the right to 
save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds (in non-branded form) of the breeders’ 
new varieties. This right addresses the local needs and preferences of local 
farmers to continue to advance their practices of saving, reusing, 
exchanging and selling seeds within local, traditional seed system.  
Most informants from the government and non-government sector said that 
such a right would ensure that farmers are able to localise plant breeders’ 
rights-protected seeds as per their needs and preferences and be less 
194 
 
dependent on the formal seed market. Some informants, however, raised a 
concern that a frequent increase in the exercise of such a right by farmers 
may, on the one hand, lead to the erosion of local PGRFA and related 
knowledge, and on the other hand, encourage farmers to informally promote 
the sale of protected seeds. A seed entrepreneur said:  
“The law should not be broadly dealing with the sale of protected seeds 
by farmers, even if they are only allowed to sell without using the brand. 
The law should elaborate under what conditions farmers can use and sell 
protected seeds. Farmers may be allowed to sell protected seeds 
produced within their farmlands with some ceiling of land size clearly 
indicated so that only small farmers exercise such a right” (Interview 
with KIPS#2). 
Second, if breeders develop and register plant varieties by using farmers’ 
varieties and related knowledge, farmers have the right to obtain a share of 
the benefits derived from the commercial use of their varieties and related 
knowledge. This right creates conditions for farmers to benefit from any 
commercial use of their varieties and related knowledge. Since farmers’ 
varieties often originate from local varieties, the Bill provides that for 
access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing rules in relation to local 
varieties and traditional knowledge, the prevalent national law on access 
and benefit sharing will be applicable. The drafters of the Bill said that it 
was purposively done as it is important to limit the focus of the Bill on 
farmers’ varieties and breeders’ new varieties. According to them, the 
national access and benefit sharing law under the CBD is the right legal 
framework to deal with access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing 
conditions for local varieties and traditional knowledge.  
Third, farmers have the right to nullify breeders’ rights, or claim 
compensation or ownership over new varieties if breeders are found not to 
have registered new varieties without obtaining their prior informed 
consent, concluding benefit sharing agreement and disclosing the source of 
origin and community of the initial variety. This right is in favour of 
farmers to make sure that breeders comply with “disclosure requirements” 
and do not commercialise farmers’ varieties and related knowledge without 
due recognition, consent and benefit sharing. The informants from the 
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drafting committee disclosed that this provision had been discussed at 
length and agreed upon not only to protect farmers’ rights, but also to 
design a sui generis plant variety protection law that demands the 
implementation of “disclosure requirements” from plant breeders, or 
anybody willing to commercialise farmers’ varieties and related knowledge.   
Fourth, farmers have the right to receive compensation for any loss if the 
breeders of the new varieties supply bad seeds, or export, import, sell and 
distribute seeds with misleading and wrong information. According to the 
informants from the Ministry of Agriculture, the incorporation of farmers’ 
right to receive compensation in the sui generis plant variety protection law 
is intended to oblige the breeders of new plant varieties to supply seeds with 
good quality and correct information.  
Fifth, farmers have the right to access seeds of new varieties if breeders fail 
to supply seeds as per farmers’ demand, or engage in anti-competitive 
practices for the sale and distribution of seeds. This right demands that the 
government finds alternative systems to ensure that seeds are supplied as 
per farmers’ demand, well in time and at affordable prices. According to an 
informant from the National Seed Quality Control Centre:  
“It is wise that the law includes provisions on compulsory licencing to 
make sure that if circumstances arise, there is legal space for others, 
including the domestic private seed entities, to produce and market the 
seeds of protected new plant varieties” (Interview with KIGS#1).   
8.4.2.5 The case of private property rights vs commons 
As we discussed above, the TRIPS-compatible Plant Variety Protection and 
Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005 provides for breeders’ rights over new plant 
varieties that breeders must prove to be new, distinct, uniform and stable. 
The Bill also provides for farmers’ rights over new varieties of breeders and 
over farmers’ varieties (and related knowledge). The breeders’ rights-
protected varieties could be the varieties derived from local varieties, or 
farmers’ varieties, or essentially derived varieties, or other varieties such as 
varieties accessed in other countries or stored in ex situ collections in Nepal 
or outside. With the characteristics of distinctness, uniformity and stability, 
farmers’ varieties must be derived from local varieties or varieties accessed 
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by farmers for domestication, use and exchange at the local level. How do 
such rights and plant varieties of breeders and farmers relate or belong to 
the typology of PGRFA knowledge commons we discussed in the context of 
the international regulation of PGRFA in the earlier chapter? 
What is similar between the UPOV Convention and Nepal’s Bill on plant 
variety protection is the scope of and exceptions to breeders’ rights. The 
UPOV Convention clearly provides that the following acts in respect of the 
propagating materials of the protected varieties requires the authorisation of 
the breeder: production or reproduction (multiplication); conditioning for 
the purpose of propagation; offering for sale; selling or other marketing; 
exporting, importing, stocking for any of the purposes of production or 
reproduction and importing (Article 14). Nepal’s Bill on plant variety 
protection too enables breeders, in respect of their propagating materials of 
the new varieties, to prevent others from or require authorisation for 
production, reproduction, conditioning for the purpose of propagation, sale, 
distribution, export and import (Section 20.1).  
Similarly, as per the UPOV Convention, breeders’ rights would not extend 
to acts done for: privately and for non-commercial purposes; experimental 
purposes; and breeding other varieties and exploiting new varieties provided 
the new variety is not a variety essentially derived from another protected 
variety (the initial variety) (Article 15). According to Nepal’s Bill on plant 
variety protection also, breeders are not allowed to exercise their rights in 
respect of the propagating materials of the new plant varieties for certain 
acts: private or non-commercial; study, teaching and research; and plant 
breeding and development (Section 22).  
While being similar to the UPOV system of plant breeders’ rights, it is 
important here to highlight two issues that have been differently provisioned 
in Nepal’s Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill. First, the Bill, 
compared to UPOV, provides for a lesser period of protection for breeders’ 
rights. While Section 14 of the Bill specifies a protection period of 18 years 
for plant varieties of vines and trees, and 15 years for other plant varieties, 
Article 19 of the UPOV Convention provides for a minimum of 25 years of 
protection for trees and vines, and 20 years for other plant varieties.   
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Second, unlike the UPOV Convention, the Bill includes strong provisions in 
favour of farmers and local communities. By weakening the farmers’ 
privilege or exemption through revisions in 1978 and 1991, the UPOV is 
moving away from inclusive elements to exclusive elements. However, 
Nepal’s Bill on plant variety protection aims to move closer to incorporate 
the inclusive elements. The Bill does so by strongly recognising the rights 
of farmers over new plant varieties. Such rights not only allow farmers to 
save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds of the breeders’ new varieties, but also 
empower them in relation to prior informed consent and benefit sharing. 
Farmers’ right to access seeds, and in this regard the provisions on 
compulsory licencing for fair, regular supply of seeds of the protected new 
varieties, also add to the inclusive elements. In other words, the Bill uses the 
idea of a negative commons to enable ease of appropriation by farmers. It is 
an example of where the negative commons can serve the poor. 
Similarly, with provisions for farmers’ rights over farmers’ varieties and 
related knowledge, it creates a legal route for farmers to register their 
varieties and related knowledge and obtain ownership rights. In this respect, 
what is clear is that Nepal also intends to empower farmers to become 
positive exclusive commoners of the varieties they prove to have the 
characteristics of distinctness, uniformity and stability. It means that the Bill 
enables farmers to register a local variety they have been conserving and 
using in their physical property as a collectively owned farmers’ variety, 
that is, as a positive exclusive commons. However, in cases, when an 
individual farmer may register a local variety, he/she may establish private 
ownership over the use of such varieties. 
It is important here to highlight that in the case of local varieties that 
farmers may register as farmers’ varieties under this law, the revised Seed 
Regulation, 2013 has a provision for farmers to register their traditional 
plant varieties as local varieties and include such varieties in the national 
registry of plant varieties (Rule 12.2). In addition, the Genetic Resources 
Bill of 2002 also covers in its remit local varieties, meaning that access to 
local varieties is subject to prior informed consent, benefit sharing and other 
conditions specified.  
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In this respect, what is not clear is whether ownership rights overlap or to 
what extent registration of and ownership over a local variety and a farmers’ 
variety would be similar or different. It is also not clear if prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing issues become complicated at the local level 
when a farmers’ variety is derived from a local variety that could be 
already, or may fall, under the ownership of a farmer or a local community 
under the revised Seed Regulation or CBD-compatible Access to Genetic 
Resources Bill of 2002.  
The informants from the National Seed Quality Control Centre and the 
Ministry of Agriculture said that it would not be complicated as farmers’ 
varieties, for the purpose of the plant variety protection law, must be 
distinct, uniform and stable in comparison to the initial varieties, be these 
local or native or public domain varieties. The informants from these 
government agencies were not, however, sure if a farmer or a farmers’ 
group should go through the processes of access, prior informed consent 
and benefit sharing to register farmers’ varieties, if and when these varieties 
are derived from local or other varieties owned by other farmers.  
As discussed earlier, according to Nepal’s Genetic Resources Bill of 2002, 
local communities are not required to obtain any license to use genetic 
resources through traditional knowledge, but it is not clear if farmers need 
to obtain a license or prior informed consent and conclude benefit sharing 
agreement if they want to register a local variety as a farmers’ variety. Some 
informants found such provisions to have property rights implications for 
local, traditional seed system which relies on open access, sharing and 
exchange of seeds at the farmers’ level. Some informants from the 
community-based organisations observed that it would create a complicated 
system as farmers may not have the interest and capacity to negotiate for 
access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing, nor to provide the 
evidence of the variety’s distinctness, uniformity and stability. An expert 
working with the local farmers in a project on agriculture biodiversity 
conservation asked:  
“Why would farmers be willing to register a local variety as a farmers’ 
variety, mostly when they are not in a position to enter into seed 
business?” (FGD#2).  
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He emphasised that poor farmers would not find this beneficial as they 
cannot commercialise and market the seeds of farmers’ variety. According 
to him, it would probably be in the interest of community-based seed 
producers’ groups or community seed banks to research on local varieties 
and register them as farmers’ varieties for commercial purposes.  
On the other hand, some informants believed that such provisions on 
farmers’ varieties and rights are not only critical to safeguard the interests of 
farmers to emerge as seed producers of farmers’ varieties, but also 
important from the viewpoint of generating sui generis legal options to 
recognise and protect farmers’ rights that have been identified for protection 
in the ITPGRFA.     
8.5 Nepal’s policy on agriculture biodiversity and 
ITPGRFA: an attempt to harmonise different layers of 
commons  
After Nepal’s entry into the ITPGRFA as a contracting party in 2010, the 
Ministry of Agriculture decided to revise Nepal’s Agriculture Biodiversity 
Policy, 2007. Initially, this Policy was introduced in line with the Nepal 
Biodiversity Strategy Paper of 2002, which the government had developed 
in view of the implementation of CBD commitments. The revised 
Agriculture Biodiversity Policy, 2014 is so far the only policy document 
that guides Nepal to devise a law pursuant to the commitments and 
obligations under the ITPGRFA.  
8.5.1 Coverage: defining the terms  
The Policy covers entire genetic resources and materials for food and 
agriculture, including those of plants and animals that are available in in situ 
and ex situ conditions. It defines “access to agriculture genetic resources” as 
collection, acquisition and possession of genetic resources or materials or 
traditional knowledge owned by others. It also defines “farmers” as a person 
or a community who develops and uses genetic resources or materials or 
traditional knowledge.  
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8.5.2 Focus: setting of four policy objectives 
The Policy’s strength is in its four policy objectives and different initiatives 
the government plans to undertake under these objectives. It is important to 
highlight that these four policy objectives have been aligned with national-
level obligations covered by different Articles of the ITPGRFA for its 
contracting parties. The first policy objective is to recognise, conserve, 
develop and sustainably use agriculture biodiversity and traditional 
knowledge. Under this objective, the government plans to promote 
programmes to support and strengthen in situ conservation, ex situ 
conservation and sustainable use of agriculture genetic resources, all of 
which are covered in Articles 4 and 5 of the ITPGRFA.  
The second policy objective is to protect farmers’ rights to agriculture 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, which is in line with the 
provisions on farmers’ rights of Article 9 of the ITPGRFA. Under this 
objective, the government aims to protect farmers’ rights to save, exchange, 
reuse and sell farm-saved seeds, and to participate in local- and national-
level decision-making processes. The government also seeks to undertake 
initiatives to provide compensation to farmers from the parties who cause 
loss to farmers by biopiracy, illegal sale and distribution of seeds, and 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge.  
The third policy objective is to share, and fairly and equitably distribute, the 
benefits, derived from access to agriculture genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge. On this, a major focus is on ensuring sharing of benefits with 
farmers. For an arrangement of sharing and distribution of benefits, the 
Policy calls for a legal system, which would also form and provide 
resources and rights to a national institution. Such an institution has not 
been identified but the Policy makes it clear that all aspects of the 
implementation of the ITPGRFA would be regulated through a one window 
system.  
Under this objective, the Policy also includes two other important 
provisions. One provision is about establishing partnership and coordination 
with related institutions for making a legal arrangement for mutually agreed 
terms, prior informed consent, and benefit sharing between resource 
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providers and receivers, which seems to be incorporated in view of the 
implementation of the national law under the CBD. The other provision is in 
relation to making an arrangement to prevent the negative implications of 
intellectual property rights for farmers’ rights, which is in view of the 
implementation of the national law under the TRIPS Agreement.       
The fourth policy objective is to contribute towards adaptation to and 
mitigation of climate change impacts and sustainability of ecosystems. 
Under this objective, the Policy bans the use of seeds embedded with 
terminator technology but aims to make an arrangement to adopt and 
implement biosafety measures for study, research, use, development and 
import of genetically modified organisms.  
8.5.3 Bilateral and multilateral systems: access and property 
rights dynamics 
As far as PGRFA, traditional knowledge and farmers’ rights are concerned, 
the revised Agriculture Biodiversity Policy, 2014 is a major policy 
document to determine how Nepal will implement laws and programmes for 
access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing. In relation to this, 
though the Policy focusses mainly on making a legal arrangement to 
implement, coordinate with and benefit from the multilateral system of 
access and benefit sharing of the ITPGRFA, it also touches upon the need to 
coordinate with the bilateral system of the access and benefit sharing law 
under the CBD. In that context, what is more important to understand is 
how the coverage of the two regimes of access and benefit sharing governed 
by the CBD and the ITPGRFA would affect issues of PGRFA management 
and use, and importantly, access and property rights dynamics, including 
farmers’ rights. 
The informants from the national gene bank, the national agriculture 
research centre and the Ministry of Agriculture said that the government, in 
collaboration with Bioversity International and some national organisations, 
has started to prepare for the implementation of the multilateral system of 
access and benefit sharing and other provisions of the ITPGRFA. As all 
contracting parties are required to include their PGRFA falling under Annex 
1 in the multilateral system, the government has mobilised the national gene 
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bank to collect plant germplasms and related information from different 
parts of Nepal for conservation as well as submission to the multilateral 
system. The officials of the national gene bank and the Ministry of 
Agriculture said that as an initial step, 3,624 varieties of different food crops 
and forages have been proposed for inclusion in the multilateral system. 
Such varieties comprise 226 crop varieties86 – including varieties with local 
landraces – released, registered and denotified in Nepal under the Seed Act, 
1988; 1,927 accessions87 provided by Nepal to CGIAR; 1,403 accessions88 
provided by Nepal to foreign genebanks; and 8 forages.  
It means that there is already a kind of consensus reached among the 
government authorities to include certain PGRFA into the protected global 
commons of the ITPGRFA. Some non-government organisations have, 
however, cautioned the government not to undertake all PGRFA as state 
property or under the management and control of the state. According to an 
informant of the non-government organisation:  
“As there is no legal mechanism in force to determine who owns what 
PGRFA or traditional knowledge, it is early for the government to 
prepare the list of varieties to be included into the multilateral system” 
(Interview with KICS#5).  
While the CBD-compatible national law for access and benefit sharing and 
the TRIPS-compatible national law for plant variety protection and farmers’ 
rights are still in draft forms, a national law pursuant to the ITPGRFA’s 
multilateral system and farmers’ rights, as the Policy itself states, is yet to 
be arranged. In such circumstances, there is no clarity on how to legally 
recognise or establish or provide property rights over PGRFA at the national 
level and how such property rights would affect access, prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing dynamics. For instance, which PGRFA are 
under state control, and which others are local or farmers’ varieties are yet 
to be legally recognised, documented and established.  
86  Released varieties: 176; denotified varieties: 34; and registered varieties: 16. Of these, 20 varieties 
are local landraces. 
87  Accessions of maize, wheat, rice, finger millet, barley, chickpea, grass pea and lentil. 
88  Accessions of maize, wheat, rice, necked barley, chickpea, grass pea, rapeseed, lentil, beans and 
rice bean. 
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These property rights issues are critically important as, for example, the 
state has the obligation to include Annex 1 PGRFA – that are under the 
management and control of the state, and in public domain – into the 
multilateral system, but can only encourage natural and legal persons (like 
farmers and breeders) to include their PGRFA into the multilateral system. 
In this case, whether any PGRFA of Nepal would be subject to multilateral 
access and benefit sharing under the ITPGRFA or the bilateral access and 
benefit sharing under the CBD is largely affected by the property rights 
dynamics. Thus, before making any decision to include certain PGRFA into 
the multilateral system, the government needs to be clear about two things: 
first, property rights of PGRFA and traditional knowledge; and access, prior 
informed consent, benefit sharing conditions applicable to PGRFA that are 
owned under different property rights domains.  
These issues mean that along with the implementation of related laws, while 
the government may decide to include Annex 1 PGRFA that are state-
owned positive exclusive commons into the multilateral system of the 
ITPGRFA, the inclusion of PGRFA that are privately-owned or community-
owned may be subject to prior informed consent or access agreement with 
private individuals or institutions or local/farming communities. For 
example, if a farmer privately owns a PGRFA (or a local community 
collectively), he or she may either chose to include that PGRFA into the 
multilateral system of access and benefit sharing, or keep it within his/her 
discretion for access only through bilaterally or mutually agreed terms of 
consent, use and benefit sharing.  
8.6 Conclusion 
Nepali farmers consider seeds the crucial gift of the creator, a common 
cultural heritage to be shared with the notion of trust and reciprocity, and 
not a commodity to be privately and exclusively owned and used. 
Irrespective of geography, race and culture, seeds – as a positive inclusive 
commons – are shared and used not only among farmers, but they also 
provide their seeds and share their knowledge with visitors, including 
people from government, non-government and international organisations.  
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However, Nepal has geared towards designing and implementing new 
policy and legal measures that reshape the national governance of PGRFA 
with implications for local, traditional practices. As the provisions of the 
CBD-compatible Genetic Resources Bill of 2002 suggest, regulatory 
principles for access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing would 
make a departure from the exchange and use of PGRFA within local, 
traditional seed system as a positive inclusive commons to the creation of 
different layers of commons: state-owned and community-owned positive 
exclusive commons. Additionally, based on the possession of physical 
property (like lands, forests and water resources), the Bill also seeks to 
establish ownership rights of private persons and institutions over genetic 
resources. All of these dynamics of commons and property have 
implications for use and exchange of PGRFA within the local seed system. 
Yet, what is important to note is that Nepal has given a major focus on 
establishing the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities over 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge, keeping in view the spirit and 
objectives of the CBD. The same focus is also visible in the case of the 
TRIPS-compatible Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 
2005. This Bill has provisions on plant breeders’ rights as in the UPOV 
Convention, but at the same time, also recognises farmers’ rights over 
breeders’ rights-protected varieties. This way, the Bill uses the idea of a 
negative commons to enable farmers to appropriate protected varieties 
through the protection of the rights to save, use, exchange and sell farm-
saved seeds. Similarly, the Bill enables farmers to become positive 
exclusive commoners of farmers’ varieties which they derive from local 
varieties. However, in this case, it may also lead to a difficult situation if an 
individual farmer, based on a local variety, registers a farmers’ variety as 
private property and not as a positive exclusive commons.  
The revised Agriculture Biodiversity Policy of 2014 also plays a major role 
in reshaping the national regulation of PGRFA. The Policy calls for legal 
arrangements to not only protect farmers’ rights, but also to implement the 
multilateral system of access and benefit sharing of the ITPRGFA at the 
national level. Thus, on the one hand, the implementation of the Policy is 
directed towards making farmers positive exclusive commoners of local 
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PGRFA and traditional knowledge, and on the other, it also aims to include 
Nepal’s Annex 1 PGRFA under the ITPGRFA’s multilateral system, that is, 
a protected global commons. What is lacking in this regard is, however, a 
legal arrangement to first identify which PGRFA are state-owned and which 
others are community- or farmer- or privately-owned so that it is easy to 
determine the conditions and processes to be followed for such an inclusion. 
It is certain that Nepal cannot choose to stay out of the global systems or 
processes. But what Nepal can do is to generate sui generis policy 
flexibilities to advance its national and local interests, including those of 
local communities. In this respect, an important thing to do is to develop a 
sui generis policy and legal framework to understand that PGRFA are not 
merely a physical, tangible property but also an intangible, knowledge-
based property. With such dual characteristics, as opposed to physical 
property-based traditional commons, PGRFA are not a homogenous 
resource but exist in different forms: local varieties, farmers’ varieties, 
breeders’ varieties, modern and high-yielding varieties, genetically 
engineered varieties, essentially derived varieties, etc. In that sense, what is 
needed is to assess the significance and role of multiple layers of commons 
that are applicable to different forms of PGRFA, including in relation to 
access, prior informed consent and benefit sharing.  
These issues bring us to the last important part of the thesis in which 
Chapters 9 and 10 discuss the concepts, goals, objectives and impacts of the 
organised seed saving initiatives in Nepal. The purpose is to analyse how 
and why local dynamics of conservation, use and management of PGRFA 
and traditional knowledge are being reshaped in Nepal following the 
creation and expansion of community seed banks and what their 
implications are in relation to the formal and informal seed systems and the 
regulation of the PGRFA knowledge commons. Since the idea of 
establishing community seed banks in different regions of the country has 
its linkages with the global initiatives, Chapter 9 briefly analyses the 
contexts of the seed savers’ networks of developed countries and the 
community seed banks of developing countries, also exploring the typology 
of community seed banks discussed by scholars.   
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Chapter 9 
Global experiences of seed savers’ 
networks and community seed banks  
 
9.1 Introduction 
Most of the discussion on seed savers’ networks and community seed banks 
are in ‘grey’ literature. Similarly, most of the academic literature on these 
seed saving initiatives, together with ‘grey’ literature, are focussed on their 
significance and contribution to local livelihoods or environmental 
sustainability. There is limited focus on whether these initiatives in the 
developed and developing world have any similarity or difference in terms 
of their objectives or whether there are any linkages in relation to their 
creation and expansion, for example, in terms of actors and networks.  
Building on ‘grey’ and academic literature, this chapter provides a 
description of a number of initiatives of seed savers’ networks in developed 
countries and community seed banks in developing countries. It provides an 
overview of how and why farmers in both developed and developing 
countries took the initiative to form and mobilise seed savers’ networks and 
community seed banks to regulate the use of seeds at the local level.  
Specifically, the chapter seeks to analyse if these initiatives for regulation of 
seeds at the local level are guided by similar objectives, also discussing the 
typologies of community seed banks. The chapter also aims to identify the 
actors and networks of these initiatives, mainly to examine if the same or 
similar actors and networks were behind the creation and expansion of 
community seed banks in Nepal, something I will discuss in the next 
chapter. 
9.2 From ex situ conservation to community-led 
conservation 
Between 1850 and 1950 – also called the first era of plant exploration and 
collection – famous plant collectors such as Frank Meyer, Wilson Popenoe, 
Nikolai Vavilov and David Fairchild collected useful and rare genetic 
resources and preserved them in botanical gardens and germplasm 
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collection centres (Cohen et al., 1991; Harlan, 1992). Mainly after the 
1950s, along with the rise of commercial interests in the seed business and 
the biotechnological progress, some countries, especially those in the North, 
started to put further emphasis on ex situ conservation. One of the major 
objectives was to benefit from the availability and use of genetic resources 
for plant breeding (Van Dooren, 2009).  
Today, more than 1,750 gene banks and 2,500 botanical gardens worldwide 
are storing ex situ collections of genetic resources. In 2010 itself, the total 
number of accessions conserved ex situ worldwide reached 7.4 million, a 
rise of approximately 20 percent (1.4 million) from 199689 (FAO, 2010). 
With the largest collections in the Consortium of International Agriculture 
Research (CGIAR) centres, mostly since the 1960s, there has been 
substantial research in the improvement of plant breeding, as well as the 
development and dissemination of improved, new varieties, including 
through the Green Revolution.  
Though a major objective of ex situ conservation is to create a system to 
back-up the genetic resources that are under extinction or that might be lost 
from native ecosystems, the global collections of plant germplasms have 
remained instrumental in promoting modern plant breeding, mainly in the 
interest of industrial agriculture in developed countries. Especially, public 
agriculture research centres and private institutions have used the ex situ 
collections to promote the Green Revolution of high-yielding varieties and 
to pursue a rapid growth of DNA-based modern agricultural biotechnology 
coupled with an extension of the  intellectual property system into 
agriculture.  
The FAO’s Second Report on the State of the World’s PGRFA 2010 rightly 
observes the influence of modern breeding as follows: 
 
 
89  As global initiatives, the Millennium Seed Bank Project of the Royal Botanic Gardens, Kew and 
the Svalbard Seed Vault in Norway also store ex situ collections. The Millennium Seed Bank 
Project has 67,341 and the Seed Vault has 839,805 ex situ collections (Eastwood et al., 2015). 
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“Modern breeding has resulted in crop varieties that meet the 
requirements of high-input systems and strict market standards…Strong 
consumer demand for cheap food of uniform and predictable quality has 
resulted in a focus on cost-efficient production methods. As a result, 
over the last decade multinational food companies have gained further 
influence and most of the food consumed in industrialized countries is 
now produced beyond their national borders. This pattern of food 
production and consumption is also spreading to many developing 
countries, especially in South America and parts of Asia…” (FAO, 
2010, p. 4) 
Ex situ conservation techniques are considered important as an approach to 
address the threat of the loss of genetic resources, as well as to promote 
plant breeding and variety development through ex situ collections. 
However, excessive reliance on such techniques for development of the 
formal seed system and limited focus on in situ techniques might not be a 
good idea from conservation as well as developmental viewpoints (Hawkes 
et al., 2012).  
This is particularly important when – as a result of continued pressures for 
developing and least-developed countries to shift from subsistence to 
commercial agriculture and informal to formal seed system – a large amount 
of genetic diversity and traditional knowledge has already been lost from 
smallholdings and in situ conditions. In the developing world, about 80 
percent of food production still comes from farmers with smallholdings and 
the majority of such farmers rely on conservation and use of native, local 
crop varieties and seeds under traditional seed systems and in situ 
conditions90 (FAO, 2010). 
The rapid loss of native and local varieties and seeds is a concern in many 
areas. The regular use and exchange of such varieties and seeds by farmers 
are considered an important way to conserve agricultural biodiversity, 
sustain climate-resilient agriculture and promote organic food (Jarvis et al., 
2000; Pautasso et al., 2013; Wood & Lenne, 1997).  
The locally domesticated native or adapted varieties and seeds are rich in 
genetic diversity, demand less chemical inputs, and are easily available and 
90  http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/022/am646e.pdf (last accessed 27 February 2015). 
209 
 
                                                 
affordable to farmers. The native and local plant varieties also have 
evolutionary potential because of regular adaptation to natural and local 
environmental conditions, and possess adaptive traits to respond to climate 
and natural disasters, for example, by emerging as flood- and drought-
tolerant varieties (Naess, 2013; Sthapit et al., 2008; Villa et al., 2005; 
Zeven, 1998). Such seeds, as important raw materials for crop 
improvement, also offer public and private value for food security and 
future breeding as these constitute a conspicuous source of genetic variation 
unlike modern crop seeds which depend on a precariously narrow genetic 
base (Gauchan et al., 2005; Jarvis et al., 2000).  
Within local seed systems or in situ conditions, a regular practice of farmer-
to-farmer seed exchange is the basis of the evolution and development of 
native and local seeds. Farmers generally save, exchange and use seeds 
relating to  their needs and preferences within farmer-to-farmer seed 
exchange networks (Almekinders et al., 1994; Rohrbach et al., 1997). 
Since the evolution of agriculture, farmer-to-farmer seed exchange networks 
have been deeply rooted in customary and traditional practices to protect 
native and local seeds as a commonly shared resources, and not as privately-
owned or -controlled resources (Lewis & Mulvany, 1997). Over time, the 
global and national contexts of seed use and exchange have, however, been 
changing. Seeds are seen more as a private commodity than a “common 
heritage of humankind” or a “global commons” (Halewood et al., 2013). 
An organised effort to reverse the loss of native, local seeds and promote 
their use in farmers’ fields and gardens can be seen in initiatives undertaken 
to form seed savers’ networks in developed countries and community seed 
banks in developing countries. Initiated as a grassroots-level campaign since 
the 1970s, such seed savers’ networks and seed banks are emerging as an 
institutional response to enhance crop genetic diversity and promote the use 
and exchange of native and local plant varieties in more than 40 countries.  
However, the trend and practices of ex situ collections and on-farm use of 
crop varieties and seeds by such networks and banks have been rarely 
discussed. According to Vernooy (2012, p. 4), “no systematic, in-depth 
comparative analysis has been carried out of community gene/seed banks in 
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their variety of forms”. According to Engels et al. (2008), there also exists a 
kind of confusion regarding their typology as community initiatives are 
popular as community seed banks as well as community gene banks. They 
state, “the typology of community genebanks and community seedbanks is 
rather confusing, and little has been published in the scientific literature” 
(Engels et al., 2008, p. 151).  
9.3 Seed savers’ networks in the developed world 
Irrespective of the presence of a vibrant formal seed system for regulated 
seed marketing and trade, and the enforcement of intellectual property rights 
in agriculture, organised initiatives for conservation and exchange of local 
(heirloom) varieties have momentum even in developed countries like the 
US, Canada, Australia, the UK and other European countries.  
In 1975, the first of this kind of network appeared in the US as Seed Savers 
Exchange, a not-for-profit organisation. With over 24,000 accessions of 
open-pollinated varieties, the network has more than 13,000 members. 
Encouraging “participatory preservation”, each year this network promotes 
the conservation and use of thousands of open-pollinated and heirloom 
varieties by facilitating exchange of their seeds among its members, who are 
mostly farmers and gardeners (Volkening, 2006). The network claims that 
all varieties offered for exchange and sale in their catalogue are varieties 
free from genetic modification. Of particular importance is the Seed Savers 
Exchange’s strong dedication to oppose the strategies and tactics of the 
agricultural biotechnology industry. In their website, the network, as one of 
the original signers of the Safe Seed Pledge in 1999, states:    
“Agriculture and seeds provide the basis upon which our lives depend. 
We must protect this foundation as a safe and genetically stable source 
for future generations. For the benefit of all farmers, gardeners and 
consumers who want an alternative, we pledge that we do not knowingly 
buy or sell genetically engineered seeds or plants. The mechanical 
transfer of genetic material outside of natural reproductive methods and 
between genera, families or kingdoms, poses great biological risks as 
well as economic, political and cultural threats…”91.  
91  http://www.seedsavers.org/About-Us/ (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
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Canadian farmers and scientists dedicated to the conservation of food 
diversity through the protection of heritage and locally adapted seeds were 
the second network to initiate a similar campaign in 1984. Known as Seeds 
of Diversity, this network believes in People Protecting the People’s Seeds 
and only offers for exchange and sale the varieties that are non-hybrid, non-
patented and free from genetic modification. It is not a seed company but a 
national-level member-to-member seed exchange organisation that builds 
on the partnership of gardeners, farmers, seed companies, educators and 
researchers. One must become a member to participate in the seed exchange 
and access thousands of varieties of vegetables, grains, herbs, fruits and 
flowers saved by other members across the country. Exchange of seeds is 
facilitated through a members-only Seed Directory, which is published each 
year with information about offerings of seeds by members92. 
Australian farmers too have started a similar network. Formed as a 
registered charity in 1986, the Seed Savers’ Network provides open-
pollinated seed stock to individuals, groups and communities. It also 
promotes preservation gardens and seed banks for the availability and 
exchange of non-hybrid, open-pollinated plant varieties. The network has a 
mission to “free seed” and believes in helping and encouraging gardeners 
and farmers to share seeds and food, grow from own seeds or get or give 
some at local seed networks.  
In the initial 20 years, the Seed Savers’ Network collected and stored open-
pollinated, non-hybrid seeds of native and local crops in the field of Byron 
Bay in northern New South Wales of Australia. By 2014, it expanded its 
network covering over a hundred local seed savers’ groups in different parts 
of Australia. Since 2014, Australia’s Seed Savers’ Network has also opened 
registration for seed savers’ groups in other countries of Africa, Asia and 
Europe. The members of the Seed Savers’ Network are farmers and 
gardeners sharing and exchanging information and seeds. The network 
views local seeds as a cultural heritage and works to conserve and exchange 
92  https://www.seeds.ca/faq (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
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such seeds as a critical way to ensure environmental sustainability and 
sustainable agriculture93.  
In the UK, there not only exists the Sussex Community Seed Bank, which is 
a group of passionate farmers living in Glynde and the surrounding villages 
and towns in Sussex, but also a number of other seed savers’ groups formed 
to protect and promote the use of open-pollinated seeds in different 
locations of the country94. According to the Sussex Community Seed Bank:  
“…it is every human being’s right to be able to save their own seed, as 
our ancestors have done for thousands of years. This right can only be 
achieved through the use of open-pollinated varieties which breed true to 
type year after year, as nature has always done. The more commonly 
used F1 Hybrids do not breed true to type year after year because the 
seed companies retain the two parents that have produced the F1 Hybrid 
and consequently we cannot save that seed but have to purchase new 
seed every year from the seed companies95.” 
In France, a non-profit association called AgroBio Périgord96 serves as a 
seed network to which seven other community-level seed networks are 
associated for exchange and testing of farmers’ varieties among members 
(de Boef et al., 2013). In other European countries too such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Italy, there exist a variety of groups and associations 
operating as seed savers of open-pollinated varieties of different types of 
crops (Vernooy et al., 2015).  
The seed savers’ networks of the developed world have also shown 
increased interest in partnership in the developing world. For instance, 
Australia’s Seed Savers’ Network, between 2002 and 2005, channelled 
small grants of AUD1,000 to AUD5,000 to support seed saving projects in 
countries such as Afghanistan, Brazil, Cambodia, India, Indonesia and 
Solomon Islands97. How seed savers’ networks of developed countries are 
93  http://seedsavers.net/ (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
94  http://www.sussexcommunityseedbank.com/#/seed-links/4575657219 (last accessed 24 July 
2015). 
95  http://www.sussexcommunityseedbank.com/# (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
96  http://www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/Submission_ACRA.pdf (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
97  http://seedsavers.net/shop/home/about-seed-savers/our-global-reach/ (last accessed 
24 July 2015). 
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related to and support the community initiatives in developing countries is 
surely an important issue, particularly when the developing world too has a 
history and practice of establishing and mobilising community seed banks.  
9.4 Community seed banks in the developing world 
In developing countries, community seed banks have been in existence in 
different sizes and structures. These banks are seen as important institutions 
to promote on-farm conservation of local plant varieties and traditional 
knowledge (Feyissa, 2000; Mazhar, 2000; Ramprasad, 2007; Vernooy et al., 
2014). Community seed banks are also known or referred to as community 
gene banks, community seed reserves, community seed wealth centres, seed 
huts, agro-biodiversity resource centres, participatory learning centres, 
diversity field fora, village seed banks and community-based seed systems 
(Sthapit, 2012). 
With their different names, such community seed banks are in operation in 
developing and least-developed countries of Africa to Latin America to 
South-east and South Asia, for example, in Bangladesh, Brazil, Bolivia, 
China, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, France, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Mali, 
Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, Senegal, 
Thailand, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
One of the major works that attempts to track the history of the origin and 
evolution of community seed banks is Vernooy et al. (2015). As the 
literature suggests, the oldest community seed banks came into operation in 
the 1970s or so. For example, the community seed bank of São Thomé in 
Nova Alagoa of Brazil was already found to have been conserving two 
types of common bean in 1974, though it expanded to cover local varieties 
such as of cowpea, lima bean, sorghum, pigeon pea and maize in the years 
ahead (FAO, 2014).  
In the 1980s, the significance of initiating community seed banks to 
conserve and sustainably use local seeds was well recognized. The Rural 
Advancement Foundation International98, which monitored the impacts of 
98  Now known as the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration (ETC Group), 
http://www.etcgroup.org/content/rafi-becomes-etc-group (last accessed 24 July 2015). 
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technologies in agriculture and corporate mergers and acquisitions related to 
seeds for more than 30 years, produced a Community Seed Bank Kit in 
1986 (Vernooy, 2012), aimed at educating people as to why community 
seed banks are important and how they need to be established.  
Later on, this kit was used by other organisations, for example, by the 
Canada-based international development agency Unitarian Service 
Committee of Canada (USC Canada), and the UK-based registered charity, 
Practical Action99. Based on the same kit, these organisations prepared an 
Action Sheet advocating the significance of protecting local crop diversity 
through community seed banks and the steps involved in creating 
community seed banks100.  
Since the late 1980s, USC Canada has been supporting the setting up of 
community seed banks across many countries through its Seeds of Survival 
Programme101. Along with USC Canada, there are other organisations too, 
as discussed hereunder, that came to the forefront to establish and mobilise 
community seed banks in different regions of the world. For instance, a 
Norway-based development agency, the Development Fund102, has also 
been playing a major role in facilitating the establishment of community 
seed banks in different regions of the world.  
In addition to the international non-government organisations, several local 
non-government organisations and public research organisations such as the 
national gene banks of developing and least-developed countries too have 
supported the establishment and functioning of community seed banks. 
Since the 1970s, due to the initiatives of such agencies and local 
99  Formerly known as the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG), 
http://practicalaction.org/.  
100  www.paceproject.net 
101  Seeds of Survival (SoS) is the approach USC Canada uses to promote long-term food security 
for marginal farming communities in developing countries. The SoS Programme was launched 
in Ethiopia in 1989 to save threatened crop varieties from extinction – a real challenge given 
that it was a time of severe drought. See, http://usc-canada.org/what-we-do/sos/ (last accessed 
12 August 2015). 
102  The Development Fund supports organisations of different regions to work with small-scale 
farmers in their fight against hunger and poverty, http://www.utviklingsfondet.no/en (last 
accessed 12 August 2015). 
215 
 
                                                 
communities, hundreds of community seed banks, as briefly highlighted 
below, have come into operation in different regions of the world.  
9.4.1 Community seed banks in Africa 
Following the impacts of a tragic drought in Ethiopia’s local agriculture, 
since 1989, the national gene bank of Ethiopia called the Institute of 
Biodiversity Conservation (IBC)103 started to reintroduce local varieties 
under the Seeds of Survival Programme of USC Canada and then to support 
community seed banks in the 1990s. Later on, Ethio-Organic Seed Action 
(EOSA), a non-government organisation formed in 2003, took over the 
responsibility of mobilising community seed banks and enabled them to be 
organised as legal entities under the umbrella of so-called “conservation 
cooperatives” (de Boef et al., 2013). 
Similarly, a non-government grassroots organisation, the Relief Society of 
Tigray, established community seed banks in 1988 in Tigray in northern 
Ethiopia during times of war. Developed as a response to hardship and 
famine, these community seed banks were organised at woreda (district) 
and operated at tabia (local) levels. From 1991, these seed banks, each 
governed by a seed bank committee and supported by the Development 
Fund, emerged not only as seed savers but also as important instruments of 
post war recovery (Bezabih, 2008; Thijssen et al., 2008).  
In Zimbabwe, in 1998, a community seed bank was established in Uzumba 
Maramba Pfungwe district to restore and seize a further loss of indigenous 
crop varieties due to the drought of 1991/92. The functioning of this bank 
was later on coordinated by the Community Technology Development 
Trust, a people-centred non-government organisation. The Trust, with 
support from the Development Fund and other agencies, is also involved in 
the management of community seed banks in two other districts, Chiredzi 
and Tsholotsho, which are characterised as semi-arid regions with five times 
more crop diversity than in high rainfall areas104 (Mujaju et al., 2003).  
103  Formerly known as the Plant Genetic Resources Centre, Ethiopia. 
104  http://www.eseap.cipotato.org/UPWARD/Publications/Agrobiodiversity/pages%20294-
301%20%28Paper%2038%29.pdf (last accessed 10 August 2015). 
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What is interesting in the case of Zimbabwe is the presence of other types of 
community seed banks that primarily focus on meeting farmers’ demand of 
open-pollinated, improved seeds released through the formal seed sector’s 
research institutions. Through seed growers’ active involvement in Seed 
Growers’ Associations, these community seed banks only conserve a small 
quantity of the seeds of traditional crop varieties, and focus extensively on 
the production of the seeds of improved varieties for exchange and sale with 
their members as well as non-members of Kaoma, Mpika and Chipata areas 
(Nakaponda, 2010).  
9.4.2 Community seed banks in Latin America 
The Chile-based Centro de Educatión y Techlogia (CET), which is helping 
farmers to become self-sufficient by reducing their dependence on formal 
seed markets, works on community seed banks in a number of Latin 
American countries (Vernooy, 2012). In 2007, a community seed reserve 
called Nueva Esperanza Concepcion Sur was established in Honduras, and 
in 2010, Quilinco community seed reserve in Guatemala. Both of these were 
formed under the Collaborative Programme on Participatory Plant Breeding 
in Mesoamerica, which was launched in 2000 with support from the 
Development Fund to implement national projects in Costa Rica, EI 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Cuba (de Boef et al., 2013).  
In Brazil, besides the community seed bank of São Thomé, there are 
hundreds of community seed banks in operation. The Semi-Arid Paraíba 
Network (ASA/PB), formed in 1993, has helped to establish more than 800 
community seed banks, involving over 800 families in 63 municipalities. 
ASA/PB is a network of 350 civil society organisations, which aim to 
strengthen the autonomy of small-scale farmers throughout the Paraíba state 
of Brazil (de Boef et al., 2013; FAO, 2014).  
Likewise, in Peru, there exists not specifically a typical community seed 
bank but an interesting Potato Park (Parque de la Papa). The Park 
conserves hundreds of native potato varieties in more than 12,000 hectares 
of land between 3,000 and 5,000 meters above the sea level. Located in 
Pisaq in the Sacred Valley of Peru, the park is considered the brainchild of 
the Quechua-Aymara Association for Sustainable Communities (ANDES in 
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Spanish) and brings together more than 8,000 farmers of the six Quechua 
communities to collectively benefit from the conservation and use of native 
potato varieties105.  
9.4.3 Community seed banks in South-east Asia 
The South-east Asia Regional Initiative for Community Empowerment 
(SEARICE), a non-government South-east Asia-based regional 
organisation, had supported a local non-government organisation called 
CONSERVE to establish a community seed bank in the Philippines in 1992 
(Vernooy, 2012). SEARICE, together with the Bohol Island State 
University, also helped and trained local farmers to set up an organic rice-
based community seed bank in Bohol in 1998106.  
Since SEARICE works with rural communities to re-establish the role of 
farmers in the conservation of traditional seeds and the development of new 
varieties, it has established centre-based and community-based seed banks 
to support community efforts of collection, conservation, development and 
utilisation of local plant genetic resources and traditional knowledge. They 
believe in the notion of “seed sovereignty” with a strong advocacy for the 
protection of farmers’ rights, including farmers’ access to and control over 
seeds107.  
Similarly, in 2000, the Thung Kong Community Seed Bank was initiated in 
the mountainous Nan Province in North Western Thailand. This bank works 
to address the challenges of insufficient seeds by conserving and promoting 
the use of local seeds and traditional knowledge. In order to fulfil seed 
requirements, this community seed bank generates support from rice 
research institutes, local government offices and universities.  
Its activities are also integrated into the local high school curriculum. The 
operation of this seed bank has gone hand in hand with the establishment of 
a farmer field school. This school teaches local farmers about the principles 
105  http://www.parquedelapapa.org (last accessed 10 August 2015). 
106  http://searice.org.ph/2013/08/16/boholano-farmers-put-up-organic-rice-seed-bank/ (last accessed 
10 August 2015). 
107  http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/global/more-than-money/community-seed-banks 
(last accessed 10 August 2015). 
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of plant genetic resources, curatorship of traditional seeds, and methods of 
participatory plant breeding and integrated farming. This way, the Thung 
Kong Community Seed Bank not only forms the basis of initial seed supply 
for farmer groups across the country but also serves as an educational 
model for high school students (Fund, 2011).  
9.4.4 Community seed banks in South Asia 
Since 1994, Unnayan Bikalper Nitinirdharoni Gobeshona (UBINIG), a 
policy and action research organisation in Bangladesh, started to 
operationalise the idea of community seed bank as community seed wealth 
centres and seed huts. These seed wealth centres and seed huts were initially 
addressing the challenges raised by the floods and a cyclone in the late 
1980s. In recent years, these have emerged as important local institutions to 
ensure farmers’ control over their seeds and traditional knowledge, thereby 
protecting seed sovereignty at farmers’ level (de Boef et al., 2013; Vernooy, 
2012).  
Being linked with a Nayakrishi seed network of 300,000 farmers, 
UBINIG’s six community seed wealth centres and 26 seed huts have been 
promoting a philosophy of Nayakrishi Andolan (New Agriculture 
Movement). As part of this philosophy, these institutions have been 
conserving and regenerating seeds of local needs with no use of pesticides 
and no use or gradual decrease of chemical fertilisers in around 20 districts 
(Kelly, 2008). UBINIG argues that seeds and genetic resources are the 
common resources of the community and must be conserved at the 
household and community level (Fund, 2011; Mazhar, 2000).   
In India, several non-government organisations have initiated community 
seed banks in different states, covering local farming households, including 
women farmers. In 1992, the Genetic Resource Ecology Energy Nutrition 
(GREEN) Foundation started community seed banks in Southern India, 
initially in the drier areas of the Indian states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. 
The Foundation, which also believes in seed sovereignty, has helped more 
than a dozen such seed banks to operate within a Community Seed Bank 
Network, and to separately maintain hundreds of varieties of indigenous 
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seeds, mainly with the involvement of women farmers108 (Ramprasad, 
2007).   
In 1994, the Academy of Development Sciences also undertook a similar 
initiative in the Indian state of Maharashtra, primarily focussing on the 
conservation, multiplication, use and exchange of important indigenous rice 
varieties of four local districts of the Konkan region109. Their rice-based 
community seed bank has been able to store 260 rice varieties, of which 60 
varieties are in high demand among local farmers (Tuxill & Nabhan, 2001).  
The Deccan Development Society, a grassroots organisation working with 
India’s voluntary associations of poor women in drought-prone areas of the 
Medak District of Andhra Pradesh, is another important organisation to 
facilitate the work of community seed banks in India. It has been helping 
farmers to conserve non-hybrid local seeds and promote organic food 
through community-level gene bank since 1996. This bank has also 
developed a seed distribution network with an objective of ensuring the re-
emergence of local crop varieties110. Vandana Shiva’s Navdanya111, a 
women-centred movement for the protection of biological and cultural 
diversity, has also helped in setting up over 100 community seed banks 
across different states of India, calling for farmers’ self-reliance in seed and 
the protection of farmers’ rights through seed sovereignty (Shiva, 2015). 
Similarly, there are other non-government organisations such as the Centre 
for Indian Knowledge System, MS Swaminathan Research Foundation and 
Gene Campaign which have been supporting the creation and mobilisation 
of a number of community seed banks in different states of India (Vernooy, 
2012). Also important are the community seed banks created by the Centre 
for Sustainable Agriculture in 70 villages in Andhra Pradesh and 20 villages 
in Maharashtra of India. The Centre believes that these community seed 
108  http://www.greenconserve.com/content/community-seed-banks (last accessed 12 August 2015). 
109  http://base.d-p-h.info/en/fiches/premierdph/fiche-premierdph-4113.html (last accessed 12 August 
2015). 
110  http://biotech-monitor.nl/4106.htm (last accessed 12 August 2015). 
111  Navdanya means “nine seeds”, symbolising protection of biological and cultural diversity, and 
also the “new gift”. See, http://www.navdanya.org/earth-democracy/seed-sovereignty) (last 
accessed 12 August 2015). 
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banks serve “to create a knowledge commons for the conservation and 
revival of existing varieties as well as for practices of participatory plant 
breeding aimed at evolving new varieties”112 (Dafermos & Pol, 2014, p. 1).  
As in the case of India, more than a hundred community seed banks are in 
operation in different districts and villages of Nepal (see the next chapter). 
In addition to these country- and local-level community seed bank 
initiatives, there are two other developments that directly relate to the 
expansion and effectiveness of community seed banks in South Asia, which 
is a biodiversity-rich region, largely relying on subsistence agriculture for 
farmers’ livelihoods and food security.  
First, local, community-based non-government organisations of the region 
have created networks and partnerships among community seed banks that 
are in operation in countries such as Bangladesh, India and Nepal. For 
example, they not only conduct field visits and organise joint workshops, 
but also build each other’s capacity to better manage community seed banks 
through cross-learning under their community-based biodiversity 
management programmes113. Also interesting is the fact that a local, 
community-based non-government organisation in Nepal, called LIBIRD, 
has partnered with the Royal Government of Bhutan, “to train and build 
capacity on Community Seed Bank management and further strengthen and 
up-scale Bhutanese Seed Banks”114. It is also important to note that non-
government organisations like LIBIRD are also in partnership with similar 
organisations like SEARICE of South-east Asia for cross-learning and 
collaboration to safeguard the rights of local communities involved in 
community seed banks, participatory plant breeding and other local 
biodiversity management activities.  
Second, eight governments of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC), comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
112  https://floksociety.co-ment.com/text/ZAea6mHLrqG/view/ (last accessed 16 August 2015). 
113http://libird.org/app/projects/view.aspx?record_id=26&origin=results&QS=QS&st_4347= 
equalsorafter&f1_4347=today&viewby=100&union=AND&top_parent=214 (last accessed 16 
August 2015). 
114  http://www.planttreaty.org/sites/default/files/Bhutan-fact%20sheet.pdf (last accessed 16 August 
2015).  
221 
 
                                                 
India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, have sought regional 
cooperation through the establishment of a regional-level SAARC Seed 
Bank.  
In November 2011, South Asian governments agreed to promote 
cooperation for a regional seed bank by signing onto the SAARC Seed 
Bank Agreement. They also adopted the Framework for Material Transfer 
Agreement that is applicable to the operationalisation of the SAARC Seed 
Bank Agreement, mainly for facilitating easy movement of seed and 
planting materials across South Asian countries. The Agreement calls for 
the maintenance of a Seed Reserve under the Seed Bank, consisting of 
quality seeds of common varieties of rice, wheat, maize, pulses and oilseeds 
(Article VI)115.  
Though this Agreement is yet to enter into implementation as the Maldives 
has not ratified it, civil society-led policy discussions in South Asia have 
observed this Agreement more as a “regional seed enterprise” for 
cooperation on improved seeds than a regional seed bank that protects and 
enhances the use of local varieties. It is because the Agreement neither 
states anything about creating a link with community seed banks of South 
Asia, nor gives priority to conserve and use traditional seeds of crops 
important for the region. The Agreement only requires SAARC Member 
States to undertake planned approaches to increase the seed replacement 
rate at a faster rate (Article III). It basically means that the Agreement, for 
increasing seed replacement rate, only intends to promote cooperation for 
the use of improved, modern seeds supplied through the formal seed system 
(Adhikari, 2010).  
9.5 Typologies of community seed banks 
Different typologies of seed banks have been constructed. Such typologies 
largely depend on the location, type, size and nature of farming to the needs 
of conservation, use and development determined by community-specific 
geographical, economic, social, cultural and political contexts of a particular 
country or a region. Globally, community seed banks can be found “in a 
115  According to the Agreement, initially, governments would collaborate on the availability of rice, 
wheat, pulses and oilseeds, and gradually other crops may be considered. 
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diversity of forms in terms of function(s), size and scope, governance and 
management, physical appearance, technical aspects (e.g., seed storage 
facilities and techniques) and impact” (Vernooy, 2012, p. 3). Probably, the 
first attempt to identify a typology of community seed banks that operate 
across the globe was made by Lewis and Mulvany (1997). In their view, the 
typology of community seed banks varies according to storage methods and 
the institutional arrangements needed to set up and maintain the banks. 
They categorise seed banks into two broad categories: individual seed 
storage and collective seed storage.  
In an individual seed storage system, seeds are retained on farm by separate 
individual farm households for next season. This is in fact a typical feature 
of the local, traditional seed system, in which farmers exercise their 
customary rights to save, reuse and exchange seeds within their own 
households. In a collective seed storage system, seed saving occurs when 
farmers, either self-organised or assisted by outside organisations, 
coordinate which seeds to secure for cultivation and/or for conservation 
(Lewis & Mulvany, 1997).  
In addition to the classification of individual and collective seed storage 
systems, Lewis and Mulvany (1997), as shown in Table 9.1, have also 
categorised community seed banks, also including seed savers’ networks, 
into five types. This classification is based on the criteria of type of seeds 
stored, and seed exchange and multiplication mechanisms. In this 
classification, an important issue to note is the fundamental distinction 
between the presence of de facto community seed banks and organised 
community seed banks.  The seed banking practices of farmers are deeply 
rooted in traditional, cultural norms for many generations. In the case of  de 
facto community seed banks, farmers themselves have been separately 
storing and locally multiplying seeds at the household level and exchanging 
them through traditional or formal and informal institutions for the purpose 
of ensuring seed and food security.   
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Table 9.1: Five types of community seed banks  
Types Nature Features 
De facto 
community seed 
banks 
the sum of all seed 
storage in a 
community 
• in existence for a long time 
• individual households 
• operate informally 
• made up of separately stored, locally 
multiplied, farmers’ and modern varieties  
Community 
seed exchange 
organised exchange 
of some stored 
seeds from de facto 
community seed 
banks 
• some have existed for a long time as 
traditional institutions, while others have 
formed at a later stage 
• operate semi-formally  
• made up of individually stored, locally 
multiplied, farmers’ and modern varieties 
Organised seed 
banks 
new institutions of 
organised 
collection, storage 
and exchange of 
seeds 
• individually and collectively stored 
• operate formally  
• made up of locally multiplied, modern 
and farmers’ varieties 
Seed savers’ 
networks 
new networks for 
organised storage 
and distribution of 
seeds 
• store between individuals and groups in a 
wide spread of geographical locations 
• made up of mainly farmers’ and non-
commercial varieties 
Ceremonial seed 
banks 
sacred groves and 
reserves 
• collectively managed and exchanged 
according to local (often religious) 
customs and traditions 
• seeds (usually vegetative) are common 
property resources 
• conservation is not the primary function 
but occurs as a consequence of their 
existence 
Source: Lewis and Mulvany (1997) 
   
However, as modern seeds like hybrids and intellectual property-protected 
seeds came to affect such practices, or sources of seed availability at the 
local level are diminished due to socio-economic and environmental factors, 
organised community seed banks have been  created and supported by 
external agencies, internationally and nationally, primarily to prevent the 
loss of local varieties.  
Over time, organised community seed banks in some countries have been, 
however, also emerging as a registered legal entity to expand the seed 
business of local, and in many cases, improved seeds of the formal seed 
system. Some seed banks, in other words, can act as bridge for the formal 
seed system. The case of community seed banks of Zimbabwe, as briefly 
discussed above, is an example in which seed growers of the bank engage in 
the production and sale of improved seeds more like a seed enterprise than 
in the conservation and exchange of seeds of local varieties. This then 
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brings us to an important issue. Are community seed banks a backup system 
of landraces or an evolving enterprise to offer seed production and business 
opportunities at the local level, or both?  
In this regard, Engels et al. (2008) discuss the need to understand a 
fundamental distinction between a community seed bank and a community 
gene bank. According to them, a community seed bank is a collective seed 
store and exists as an “organised seedbank” for serving as a source of seed 
for crop production. On the other hand, a community gene bank is “an 
organisational unit that provides genetic diversity maintenance services to 
the farming communities”, serving as a backup system for local seeds of 
different crop varieties (Engels et al., 2008). Similarly, Sthapit (2012) 
observes three types of community seed banks: community gene banks, 
community seed banks, and community gene and seed banks (Table 9.2).  
Table 9.2: Typology of community seed  and gene banks  
Parameters Community gene banks Community seed banks 
Goal and purpose In situ conservation; seed and 
food security; community 
custodianship and support; 
access and control over 
resources; farmers’ rights 
Community-level seed and food 
security; seed sovereignty; 
community empowerment; 
community resilience 
Function Access to crop genetic 
resources 
Availability of seed 
Type of seed Traditional varieties; varieties 
free from genetic modification 
Traditional varieties; modern, 
improved varieties; products of 
participatory plant breeding; 
hybrid but varieties free from 
genetic modification 
Scale of operation Community level Community level with networks 
Governance Local organisation Local organisation  
Sustainability Community biodiversity 
management fund 
Community biodiversity 
management fund; community-
based seed production 
programme; community-based 
revolving fund 
Collective actions Yes with social responsibility 
of conserving rare and unique 
plant genetic resources 
Yes 
Promoted by Non-government organisations Non-government organisations, 
government and donors 
Source: Sthapit (2012) 
 
According to him, initially, external and local non-government agencies in 
countries like India and Nepal promoted community gene banks to prevent 
the loss of local varieties. Community seed banks were supported to ensure 
225 
 
access to quality seeds. Interestingly, he finds that a combination of these 
two banks is now being applied by farming communities so as to integrate 
farmers’ seed system into local markets through an integrated set up of 
community seed banks (Sthapit, 2012).  
It is important to highlight that Engels et al. (2008) too find situations in 
which hybridisation of a community seed bank and a community gene bank 
is visible in countries like Ethiopia. However, whether community seed 
banks, with a community-based seed production and marketing approach, 
should engage in the production and sale of improved seeds of the formal 
seed system is a question that merits special attention. Sthapit (2012) argues 
that the term “community seed bank” should not be used by any institution 
if it does not conserve plant genetic resources.      
9.6 Conclusion 
In the developed world, it is clear that seed savers’ networks and groups 
have been organised and are in operation with their sole focus on extending 
networks for exchange of heirloom and open-pollinated varieties that are 
non-hybrid, non-patented and free from genetic modification. Evidently, 
one of the crucial objectives of the seed savers’ networks in developed 
countries is to find alternatives to the state-led regulations that promote 
industrial agriculture. This way, the seed savers’ groups are an organised 
network of farmers and gardeners who believe in saving and expanding 
farmers’ choices and preferences to promote the conservation, use and 
exchange of the seeds of heirloom and open-pollinated varieties for 
sustainable agriculture and organic farming.  
For these networks, seeds of their preferences and needs are the properties 
of an open source seed sharing and exchange network formed within their 
local practices of seed exchange as a common cultural heritage. However, 
their mission is not without complications, mainly because of the 
implications for seed-saving practices from restrictive seed laws and ever-
expanding monopolistic outreach of intellectual property system in 
agriculture and seed business, for example, in Australia and Canada 
(Phillips, 2005, 2008; Van Dooren, 2009).  
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In the developing world, community seed banks have come into existence 
from the 1970s onwards for a variety of reasons.  These include their use as 
a post-war recovery instrument, as a field bank of local varieties, and as an 
enterprise to produce, exchange and sell seeds of local and modern varieties 
of both informal and formal seed systems. There also exists a debate 
regarding the typology of community seed banks: whether they should serve 
only to protect and advance the use of local varieties or whether they should 
also engage in the production and sale of modern varieties of the formal 
seed system. Yet, what is importantly common between the seed savers’ 
networks of the developed world and most of the community seed banks of 
the developing world is their dedication and conviction towards promoting 
the use and exchange of seeds as a commons, allowing members as well as 
non-members to produce and reproduce their seeds.  
As in the case of developed countries, the countries in the South too face 
challenges to operationalise the idea of community seed banks and promote 
the conservation, use and exchange of local seeds. Most of these countries 
have either strengthened the formal seed system by weakening the farmers’ 
seed system, or have implemented or are in the process of implementing 
intellectual property rights in agriculture.  
The rising pressures from the industrial seed lobby to use modern seeds are 
creating additional operational challenges for those community seed banks 
that promote the conservation, use and exchange of local varieties and work 
towards the protection of farmers’ rights through the seed sovereignty 
framework. In the words of Vanaja Ramprasad, a chief promoter of the idea 
of community seed banks in India:  
“The GREEN Foundation team often felt dwarfed by the opposition of 
the big multinationals, universities and the scientists who regarded 
them as reactionary, trying to take science backwards by promoting 
the use of traditionally used crops or varieties. We went through 
cycles of despair and frustration as our work was often looked at with 
disbelief. But our strong belief in our work made us continue” 
(Ramprasad, 2007, p. 21). 
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Chapter 10 
Community seed banks in Nepal  
 
10.1 Introduction 
Seed storage and exchange, or banking, is not a new phenomenon in Nepal. 
As discussed in previous chapters, for generations, the so-called informal 
seed system – that is, local, traditional seed system – has been an integral 
part of Nepal’s agriculture. Majority of farmers in Nepal save, exchange, 
reuse and sell seeds of local plant varieties at the household as well as 
community level. According to the typology of community seed banks of 
Lewis and Mulvany (1997) we discussed in Chapter 9, Nepal’s local seed 
system that relies on self-regulatory norms and practices of seed use and 
exchange can be considered an example of de facto community seed banks. 
What makes Nepal more interesting is the presence of hundreds of 
organised community seed banks. Starting from one organised community 
seed bank in the 1990s, there are now more than 100 community seed banks 
operating in more than 30 of the 75 districts of the country. Initially 
supported by international and national non-government organisations and 
gradually by the Department of Agriculture and other institutions, these 
organised community seed banks are known as Samudayik Biu Bainks in 
Nepali language. Like any monetary bank, these banks function based on 
deposit and lending of seeds, the collective terms of which are set and 
agreed by its member farmers, generally in consultation with their initiators 
and supporters.  
This chapter explores the idea and objectives of community seed banks in 
Nepal, identifying actors and networks involved in their creation and 
expansion and linkages with similar movements in the developed and 
developing world. The chapter also discusses the community seed banks 
that are emerging to interact with formal as well as informal seed systems. 
Finally, the chapter, presenting a typology of community seed banks,  
discusses the role of seed banks in relation to the management of PGRFA 
knowledge commons, mainly focussing on local vs modern varieties.  
228 
 
10.2 Origin of the idea of community seed bank 
As the first-ever organised community seed bank, a two-storey building was 
constructed in 1997 in the Dalchoki village of the Lalitpur district. The 
establishment of the Dalchoki Community Seed Bank was supported by the 
Nepal country office of the Ottawa-based USC Canada, as part of its 
Integrated Community Development Programme, a programme that had 
been in the district since 1991.  
A difficult terrain with a risky, rough road to the district’s headquarters 
without any public transport indicates the hardships of farmers in Dalchoki, 
which lies 2,200 meters above the sea level as an underdeveloped Southern 
hill village of the central development region. Yet, local farmers were 
gradually inclining to use improved, modern seeds and fertilisers of the 
formal seed system accessed from public entities and traders from the 
district, thereby leading to the erosion of local plant genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge.  
Alarmed by such trends, USC Canada Nepal took the lead and implemented 
the concept of community seed banks based on a two-pronged strategic 
approach. According to a farmer of the bank:  
“The first strategic approach aimed at preventing the erosion of local 
genetic resources through documentation and storage of local seeds and 
traditional knowledge in the bank. The second strategic approach aimed at 
mobilising the bank to facilitate farmer-to-farmer exchange of stored seeds 
for farmers’ enhanced access to and use of local seeds” (FGD#5).  
With such strategic approaches, since 1994, collection of local seeds and 
their documentation, conservation and production in Dalchoki and other two 
villages – Nallu and Ghusel – were initiated, gradually expanding the work 
in seven other villages of the same district. Through the physical set-up, 
training on seed selection, collection, storage, conservation and exchange 
the members of the bank were empowered to collect, store and exchange 
seeds of local plant varieties with members and other local farmers.  
10.3 Expansion of the idea of community seed bank 
After a few years, but in a very systematic and organised manner, the 
second community seed bank was established in 2003 in the Kachorwa 
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village of the Bara district. It lies in the Indo-Gangetic plains of the central 
development region bordering India. As part of a global project on 
Strengthening the Scientific Basis of In Situ Conservation of Agriculture 
Biodiversity (1997-2006), this time, the idea of setting up a community seed 
bank in Bara was adopted by the Nepal Agriculture Research Council, an 
apex body for agriculture research in the country, and LIBIRD. The project 
was supported by Bioversity International, which, as a member of the 
CGIAR, works in Americas, Asia Pacific Oceania and Sub-Saharan Africa 
as a research-for-development organisation.  
Mainly because of the shared open border with India, the Bara district was 
already exposed to the officially and unofficially imported modern seeds 
and fertilisers. It faced a major challenge of preventing the loss of local 
seeds and traditional knowledge. In addition, local seed traders and public 
entities too were promoting the seeds of the formal seed system in the 
district. In the focus group discussion in Bara, a farmer of the bank said: 
“The in situ project had surveyed the availability of more than 30 local 
varieties of rice in 1998, but after a few years, another survey by the same 
project showed a substantial decrease of more than 50 percent in the 
availability of those varieties in our community. A further investigation 
revealed that local farmers were more inclined to use modern seeds than 
local seeds. Evaluating these trends, the project team worked with us to 
mobilise local farmers’ groups to set up a community seed bank and scale 
up the conservation initiatives for local landraces and traditional 
knowledge” (FGD#4).   
Then, in 2006, USC Canada Nepal facilitated the setting up of its second 
and Nepal’s third community seed bank (named as Agrobiodiversity 
Resource Centre) in Ranibas village of the Sindhuli district in the central 
development region. This was done as part of the People’s Empowerment 
Programme, which was being implemented in the district since 2000. The 
idea was to institutionalise the on-farm conservation efforts and save and 
facilitate exchange of local crop seeds of cereals, pulses and vegetables 
(Shrestha et al., 2012a).  
Building on the regular seed exchange initiatives that are widespread within 
local, traditional seed system, the Sustainable and Equitable Development 
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Academy (SEDA), with the support of a globally networked development 
organisation called ActionAid, then emerged as a major actor in promoting 
the community seed bank initiative in Nepal. Since 2007, SEDA has 
established community seed banks in the Jumla district of the mid-western 
development region, starting in Lamra and Talium villages.  
These banks have stored seeds of more than 60 local varieties, including 
those of cereals and legumes. This initiative was later extended in 
Kartikswami, Garjyangkot and Badki villages of the same district. SEDA 
views that community seed banks should only store the seeds of local crops, 
and not those of the hybrids and improved varieties of the formal seed 
system116. The latter are often disseminated or supplied, as we discussed in 
Chapter 4, by the government units, national and regional agriculture 
research institutes, non-government development agencies and private seed 
entities. 
Based on the lessons learned from the in situ project of the Bara district, 
between 2007 and 2009, LIBIRD played a leading role in expanding the 
community seed bank initiative in different regions of Nepal. With donors’ 
assistance, they established 14 other community seed banks in different 
villages across the country, from the southern plain lowlands in the Terai 
region to the northern high hill area, and from the east to the western parts 
of the country.  
In 2007, it supported the establishment of village-level community seed 
banks in Bardiya, Kailali and Kanchanpur districts; in 2008, in Kailali and 
Kanchanpur districts; and in 2009, in Jhapa, Sankhuwasabha, Dhading, 
Tanahu, Nawalparasi, Doti and Jumla districts. LIBIRD emphasises the 
need to promote collection, storage, regeneration, multiplication and 
distribution of local crop seeds; protect traditional knowledge; and 
strengthen farmers’ local, traditional seed system.  
 
116  http://www.agriculturesnetwork.org/magazines/global/regional-food-systems/neglected-no-more 
(last accessed 10 September 2015).  
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10.4 Government’s involvement to set up community 
seed banks 
Following local ownership and successful results of the work of community 
seed banks initiated by the non-government organisations, the Ministry of 
Agricultural Development too started to set up community seed banks since 
2009. To initiate a planned, strategic approach to create and promote 
community seed banks in all development regions of the country, the 
Ministry first prepared an “Operational Guideline on Community Seed 
Banks”.  This is also the first-ever government policy document on 
community seed banks.  
The Guideline’s main objective is to enhance access, exchange, use and 
management of quality seeds of modern varieties by making arrangements 
of production, processing and storage in a community undertaking. Though 
the Guideline also aims to promote conservation and use of local landraces, 
its major target is to introduce formal seed quality systems (seed 
certification, quality declared seed and truthful labeling). According to an 
official of the Department of Agriculture:  
“The Operational Guideline is the first-ever comprehensive policy on 
community seed banks in Nepal. As per the Guideline’s objectives, all of 
the government-supported community seed banks focus on the 
production and dissemination of improved varieties, mainly to increase 
the seed replacement rate of improved seeds, which is in line with the 
objectives of the National Seed Policy and seed laws. The Guideline 
targets to initiate a joint action by farmers and regional seed testing 
laboratories of the government so that there is an effective arrangement 
for seed production, dissemination and their replacement as per the law. 
In the long run, we also aim to conserve local landraces” (Interview 
KIGS#6). 
Based on the same Operational Guideline, in 2009, the Department of 
Agriculture established community seed banks at the village level in three 
districts: Dadeldhura in far-western Nepal, Sindhupalchowk in the central 
development region, and Okhaldunga in the eastern development region. 
Then in 2011, the Department extended its work with farming communities 
by establishing community seed banks in two other districts: Gulmi in the 
western development region and Jajarkot in the mid-western development 
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region. It also expressed its commitment to establish 10 others in other 
districts, covering all the development regions.  
In 2011, another government entity, the Agriculture Genetic Resources 
Conservation Centre (the national gene bank established in 2010) also 
initiated a community seed bank in Simariya village of the Sunsari district 
in the eastern development region. Unlike the Department of Agriculture, 
the national gene bank seeks to mobilise a community seed bank for the 
purpose of promoting the use and documentation of local crop species, like 
a field-level gene bank. Also, the national gene bank came up with a 
programme to support the existing community seed banks, previously 
established by other organisations, mainly for the purpose of documenting 
and collecting the physical samples of local crop species from villages for 
conservation and characterisation at the capital-based gene bank.  
10.5 Oxfam’s initiation to set up community seed banks 
In 2009, a new trend of establishing community seed banks originated from 
the non-government sector.  It was introduced by the Kathmandu-based 
Nepal office of Oxfam International, a charity-based development 
organisation. As part of its Sustainable Livelihood and Food Security 
Programme, Oxfam Nepal facilitated the establishment of around 90 
community seed banks at the village as well as ward117 levels. Two districts 
were involved in this initiative, with 25 seed banks being established in 
Dadeldhura in far-western Nepal and 65 in Dailekh in mid-western Nepal. 
Out of these, 14 community seed banks are operating at the village level and 
rest of the 76 banks at the ward level.  
While establishing these community seed banks, Oxfam Nepal has linked 
both of its village-level and ward-level seed banks with seed-producing 
farmer groups and village-level cooperatives. Their purpose is to promote 
the marketing of quality seeds and facilitate access to the relevant services 
and external inputs, including fertilisers. As a mobiliser of the community 
seed banks established by Oxfam Nepal says:  
117  Nine wards form a village (village development committee) in Nepal. 
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“Oxfam Nepal undertakes a multi-stakeholder approach of engaging not 
only local farmers, but also village development committees, district line 
agencies of the government, and the private sector including local seed 
suppliers and traders. Our focus is primarily on the use of improved seeds 
for increased food production, which we call a food-security approach. 
This is quite similar to the approach taken by the community seed banks 
supported by the Department of Agriculture” (Interview with KICS#4). 
10.6 Modalities to establish community seed banks  
Different modalities are followed to establish community seed banks in 
Nepal. Such modalities depend on a range of factors, such as farmers’ 
traditional practices of seed exchange and use, presence of farmers’ groups, 
nature of farming, trends in the loss of local seeds and traditional 
knowledge, farming and food security needs, exposure to the formal seed 
system, location, etc.  
Community seed banks were initially formed with the involvement of 
individual farm households that had an interest to share, conserve, use and 
exchange local seeds and traditional knowledge. In this process, some 
community seed banks were formed based on the existing farmers’ groups, 
and others with the formation of new groups.  
Generally, within a community seed bank, a seed bank committee is 
constituted with 7 to 11 members, including women farmers and farmers 
representing indigenous groups. The committee meets regularly to review 
operational modalities, assess the trends in conservation and exchange of 
seeds, and suggest the future course of action.   
In the case of Nepal’s first community seed bank in Dalchoki, 38 groups of 
farmers of Dalchoki and other villages were formed as part of the Integrated 
Community Development Programme being implemented by USC Canada. 
These groups were then familiarised with the concept of community seed 
banks, and were supported to document local agricultural biodiversity of the 
area in community biodiversity registers. Then, a physical set up for the 
community seed bank was provided in the form of a new concrete building 
with seed storage facilities in the basement. The basement remains naturally 
cold in all seasons.   
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Figure 10.1: Major steps generally followed to establish organised 
community seed banks 
 
 
 
In the case of the second community seed bank in Kachorwa, the National 
Agriculture Research Council and LIBIRD had initially formed 22 groups 
of farmers as part of their global in situ project. Later on, the same project 
established a community seed bank by involving local groups of farmers. In 
recent years, in Kachorwa and the other 14 villages, where community seed 
banks have been established with support from LIBIRD, a Biodiversity 
Conservation and Development Committee has been formed at the level of 
all wards to form a village-level local institution. The mandate of this 
committee is not only to manage community seed banks, but also coordinate 
Step 1: Participatory 
assessment of a 
geographical area by 
involving farmers 
•Map the local area’s richness in agricultural biodiversity and the 
trends in the use and loss of local seeds and traditional 
knowledge 
•Assess farmers’ needs and preferences in terms of conservation, 
use, access and exchange of local seeds at informal and formal 
levels
Step 2: Identification 
of the existing 
farmers’ groups or 
formation of new 
groups 
• Initiate collective actions to manage community seed banks 
•Develop locally-agreed and -owned rules and procedures, and 
form a local governing body (seed bank committee) to operate 
the banks 
Step 3: Selection of a 
suitable site to set up 
a community seed 
bank
•Determine that the site is accessible, convenient, and safe for 
saving and exchanging local, native seeds at the local level
Step 4: Development 
of physical 
infrastructure and 
management of 
equipment
•Establish a physical set up (building or cottage) for institutional 
arrangements to access, collect, select, produce, use, save and 
exchange local, native seeds 
•Ensure that local seeds are clean, dry, safe and sufficient to 
store, use and exchange by using seed drier, grader, temperature 
recorder, storage bins, etc.
Step 5: 
Operationalisation of 
the community seed 
bank
•Collect local seeds through diversity fairs or contacts with 
farmers and their groups 
•Produce local seeds to maintain seed quality and replenish on a 
regular basis to ensure that seeds of good quality are available 
for conservation and exchange
•Raise awareness on the significance of saving and exchanging 
local seeds and ways to benefit from the banks
•Promote participatory research, conservation, selection, 
breeding, production and exchange of local seeds with in situ
and ex situ conservation techniques
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overall farm conservation, research and breeding activities of local farmers. 
According to an official of LIBIRD: 
“The Biodiversity Conservation and Development Committee works 
closely with the government’s local administration, that is, Village 
Development Committees. This way, the committee that we are supporting 
will be the appropriate local group of farmers to represent in policy 
making and development activities of the local government. This approach 
is meant to assist the government in local development and conservation 
activities, and at the same time, also enable local groups to work as active 
watchdogs and promoters of farmers’ rights over seeds and traditional 
knowledge” (FGD#2). 
Oxfam Nepal established community seed banks in a different way. At the 
macro level, the village-level community seed banks were established and 
provided with the responsibility to coordinate and network with the ward-
level community seed banks. Generally, Oxfam Nepal first forms a seed 
producers group, establishes a seed management committee, registers the 
committee at the District Agriculture Development Office of the 
Department of Agriculture, formulates a steering committee for quality 
assurance, and constructs a community seed bank structure with locally 
available resources as far as possible. Finally, these seed banks are also 
networked with cooperatives formed by farmers involved in the community 
seed banks, mainly to link them with local markets, and formal seed actors 
and agencies at the village and district level.   
10.7 Effectiveness of community seed banks  
There is hardly any research that questions the work and effectiveness of 
community seed banks in Nepal. Community seed banks are considered an 
effective model of both in situ and ex situ conservation, an inclusive seed 
storage and distribution system, a fair local institution to provide access to 
seeds based on farmers’ preferences and needs, a participatory approach to 
strengthen the informal seed system and link with the formal seed system, 
and a dynamic agency to enhance social capital and economic 
empowerment of local farmers. Community seed banks are also considered 
a locally-owned innovative mechanism to promote participatory variety 
selection and participatory plant breeding, and ensure the protection of 
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farmers’ rights to seeds and traditional knowledge, for example, by 
establishing their ownership to PGRFA through local registration in 
community biodiversity registers (Maharjan et al., 2013; Shreshta, 2007; 
Shrestha et al., 2008; Sthapit, 2012).  
A perception survey of 120 households – of which 90 households were 
involved in community seed banks closely working with LIBIRD and 30 
not involved – establishes that such banks function locally with greater 
positive impacts on local seed and food security, livelihood enhancement, 
conservation of local PGRFA and the protection of farmers’ ownership over 
local genetic resources (Table 10.1) (Paudel et al., 2012).   
Table 10.1: Farmers’ views on the effectiveness of community seed 
banks  
 Negative 
(%) 
No effect 
(%) 
Positive 
(%) 
Very 
positive 
(%) 
Do not 
know 
(%) 
Access to local varieties   59 (50) 37 (31) 23 (19.3) 
Access to modern 
varieties 
 18 (14.8) 66 (54.5) 10 (8.2) 27 (22.3) 
Support for 
development of new 
varieties 
  66 (55.9) 19 (16.1) 33 (27.9) 
Conservation of local 
landraces 
  65 (54.6) 23 (19.3) 31 (26) 
Identification of local 
landraces 
  72 (61) 10 (8.4) 36 (30.5) 
Protection of ownership 
of local genetic 
resources 
 2 (1.6) 64 (53.7) 5 (4.2) 48 (40.3) 
Strengthening of local 
seed system 
1 (0.85)  54 (46.1) 2 (1.7) 49 (41.8) 
Self-storage of seeds in 
households 
14 (11.6)  45 (37.5) 2 (1.6) 30 (25) 
Exchange of seeds with 
neighbours 
9 (7.62)  26 (22) 5 (4.2) 30 (25.4) 
Exchange of seeds with 
other villages 
11 (8.66)  23 (18.1) 1 (0.78) 35 (27.5) 
Source: Paudel et al. (2012) 
 
 
Before we come to any conclusion regarding the effectiveness or 
significance of community seed banks, we should also understand that not 
all community seed banks may have similar or all of these effects. 
Community seed banks come in different forms and with different 
objectives, functions and impacts. Hence, it is important to understand how 
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community seed banks with different objectives and functions operate 
locally within Nepal’s seed system.   
10.8 Initial objectives: reviving traditional seed system 
In Nepal, community seed banks were initially created to counterbalance the 
loss of local, native seeds and traditional knowledge. According to a 
participant of the focus group discussion in Pokhara:  
“The principal idea of initiating community seed banks in Nepal was to 
reduce farmers’ exposure to or growing dependence on improved, 
modern varieties and chemical fertilisers of the formal seed system. 
Examples of such community seed banks are those that are found in 
Kachorwa, Dalchoki, Lamra and Talium villages” (FGD#2).  
The focus group discussions with farmers revealed that the initial 
community seed banks have come into operation as an organised local-level 
initiative to make farmers self-reliant on local seeds, and not on hybrids and 
other exotic high-yielding varieties. For this purpose, the prime objective of 
such community seed banks is to identify, collect, document, conserve, use, 
multiply, exchange and sell native seeds for promoting farmer-to-farmer 
exchange within the traditional seed system that has existed for generations. 
In order to revive and strengthen the traditional seed system, such 
community seed banks also aim to:  
• promote an active and dynamic community-managed process of on-
farm maintenance of local seeds and traditional knowledge, including 
under-utilised and neglected crop seeds of buckwheat, sorghum and 
finger millet;  
• create an accessible resource centre, repository and backup of local 
seeds and traditional knowledge;  
• establish seed and food sovereignty at the local level; and  
• empower farmers, including women farmers, dalits and indigenous 
people to create a sustainable seed system, and increase their adaptive 
capacity in agriculture and protection of the environment.  
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10.8.1 Identify, collect, document, conserve, use, multiply, 
exchange and sell local seeds 
Most of the community seed banks have built upon the local seed system of 
identifying, collecting, documenting, conserving, using and multiplying 
local seeds as a common cultural heritage. Such seed banks conserve a wide 
range of local crops, including cereals, vegetables and pulses, expanding 
farmers’ choices to access these varieties (Table 10.2).  
Table 10.2: Conservation of local varieties by three community seed 
banks 
Community seed banks Varieties and crops 
Dalchoki, Laitpur 17 varieties of 7 cereals, 12 varieties of 6 
legumes, 6 varieties of 3 oilseed crops, and 22 
varieties of 14 vegetables 
Kachorwa, Bara 88 varieties of rice only, 5 varieties of sponge 
gourd, 2 varieties of millet (kodo), and 2 varieties 
of pigion peas (rahar)  
Thumpakhar, 
Sinchupalchowk 
72 varieties of cereals and vegetables 
Source: Fieldwork data 
 
The conservation and use of local seeds are promoted based on a number of 
factors such as agro-ecology, land type, and local socio-economic and 
cultural requirements. In order to identify and collect local seeds, 
community seed banks informally contact local farmers and farming groups, 
or organise diversity fairs in a village site, where farmers participate to 
demonstrate seeds they have been conserving in their lands. As in the case 
of the traditional seed system, farmers share and provide their seeds to the 
community seed banks without any condition.  
Following the collection, community seed banks document the features of 
local seeds and traditional knowledge for the purpose of conservation and 
further use, generally in a community biodiversity register or any other 
register such as a Red Registry being maintained by the Kachorwa 
Community Seed Bank in the Bara district to track the annual trends of 
genetic erosion of local varieties. Community seed banks believe that these 
types of local registers establish knowledge about the place of origin or 
diversity of local varieties, and also provide information about the 
significance of such varieties and their owners and users.   
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Farmers involved in community seed banks store and display seeds in a 
room of their small local administrative office, usually in traditionally made 
earthen or straw pots, bamboo sticks and containers, jute sacks, or plastic 
holders with labelled information about the salient features of seeds. The 
stored seeds are generally planted and replenished by members to maintain 
and sustain the richness of plant varieties and enable the varieties to adapt to 
changing climatic and soil conditions.  
In order to avoid duplications of varieties stored, and to assess 
morphological characteristics, generate passport data, and regenerate seeds, 
the community seed banks generally maintain diversity blocks in farmers’ 
fields. This practice does depend on their resources to maintain such blocks. 
According to a farmer of the bank in Kachorwa:  
“Farmers of the banks observe and record the past and evolving traits of 
these seeds drawing on their economic, social, cultural and 
environmental values. The diversity blocks help farmers to select 
appropriate parent plants and a seed source for crossing and 
participatory plant breeding programmes” (FGD#4). 
The local seeds stored through the local administration of the seed banks are 
exchanged with members and non-members of the same area on a loan 
basis, with a collectively agreed rule of returning one and half or two times 
the amount of seeds of the same variety after harvesting the crop. In some 
cases, members of the seed banks also sell seeds to generate some income 
for the work of community seed banks. In the words of a farmer of the bank 
in Bara:   
“We sell the stored/multiplied seeds outside the local area on a cost-
recovery basis or to generate some fund for the operationalisation of the 
bank. Such sales enable us to generate incomes that we generally use in 
support of the mobilisation of a revolving fund (community biodiversity 
fund). This fund helps us in supporting the conservation activities of the 
bank. We also use this community fund for the purpose of providing 
loan to members of the banks so that they get some financial support for 
livelihood enhancement” (Interview with CSBM#2).  
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In the case of the bank in Kachorwa, farmers also said that such a loan is 
often with a condition that loan-receiving members agree to at least 
conserve one or two local varieties being maintained by the bank.  
10.8.2 Promote an active and dynamic community-managed 
process of on-farm maintenance of local seeds  
Community seed banks have evolved as local-level institutions to promote 
an active and dynamic community-managed process of on-farm 
maintenance of local, native seeds that fulfil their economic, social and 
cultural requirements, and meet environmental objectives. For this purpose, 
these banks function not only to save and exchange seeds that have 
economic benefits, but also those that have socio-cultural importance, and 
environmental features.  
For example, in Bara, a native rice variety called Sathi is being conserved 
and used for its specific features and regular local needs of the Terai 
community, be they rich or poor. This rice variety is drought- and pest-
resistant, and can be harvested within two months118. It also has a religious 
value since it is offered every year to goddess Chhati Maiya at the Chhat 
festival of the Madhesi community, an ethnic minority group. Similarly, 
local landraces such as Lajhi and Basmati have been conserved for their 
taste, especially to prepare rice pudding, a popular cultural dish in Nepal. 
Native rice varieties such as Kariya Kamod and Lalka Basmati for aromatic 
values, and Bathi and Nakhi Saro for their adaptability, are also being 
conserved by the Kachorwa Community Seed Bank.  
While using local seeds, community seed banks generally follow ecological 
farming practices and do not use external inputs, such as chemical fertilisers 
and pesticides, which may affect soil fertility. They generally also assign 
each of their members to cultivate at least one local variety so that on-farm 
conservation and use of the stored seeds is maintained. Also important is the 
way community seed banks have been working towards the conservation 
and use of neglected and underutilised crops such as buckwheat, sorghum 
and finger millet. They collect and store the seeds of such crops in their 
store room, and assign members to grow and return the seeds periodically so 
118  http://himalmag.com/seeding-the-future/#sthash.MsZWtRBS.dpuf (last accessed 2 January 2016). 
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that their dynamic evolution is promoted in the changing environment of the 
local area.  
10.8.3 Create an accessible resource centre through repository, 
backup and development of local seeds and traditional knowledge 
Community seed banks operate to serve as accessible agro-biodiversity 
resource centres, and a repository and backup system of local seeds and 
traditional knowledge. They create conducive local environments to safely 
handle, store, regenerate and multiply local seeds, along with optimum use 
of traditional knowledge in all stages of conservation and use.  
Local farmers are not required to make any cash payments while accessing 
seeds, and can return the agreed amount of seeds to the banks after their 
harvest. Thus, this exchange system not only provides for easy access to 
local seeds by members and non-members of the local area, but also enables 
poor farmers of the community to benefit by accessing local seeds in times 
of planting needs. For example, in 2008, out of all the  farmers accessing the 
seeds of 34 local crops from the community seed bank in Dalchoki, 25 
percent were relatively very poor (LIBIRD, 2010). In 2011, 70 farmers, of 
whom 37 were female, deposited seeds in the same bank and 21 farmers, of 
whom 14 were female, accessed the seeds stored by the bank (Shrestha et 
al., 2012b). 
In cases of gradual or rapid loss of seeds, or in times of crisis or any 
disaster, farmers of the seed banks use their seed system to promote farmer-
to-farmer exchange and use of local seeds. As a dynamic resource centre, 
seed banks also generate opportunities for exchange of information and 
expertise on in situ conservation among and between farmers, breeders, 
researchers, government officials, non-government organisations, inter-
governmental bodies, and donor agencies at local, national and international 
levels.  
Importantly seed banks work to seek opportunities for participatory variety 
selection and participatory plant breeding. For example, the farmers of the 
Kachorwa Community Seed Bank, in collaboration with technical experts 
and breeders from community-based research organisations and the 
National Agriculture Research Council, are engaged in breeding local 
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varieties of rice for variety enhancement and increased productivity. 
According to a farmer of the bank:  
“By using the positive traits such as taste and adaptation to rain-fed 
conditions of a rice landrace called Dushisaro and an improved rice 
variety BG1442, we have already developed a new variety. We have 
given it a name of the village itself, Kachorwa-4. We are also 
conducting other participatory breeding programmes for the 
improvement of other native rice varieties such as Mansara and Lajhi” 
(Interview with CSBM#2).     
10.8.4 Establish seed and food sovereignty at the local level 
Working towards seed and food sovereignty at the local level is one of the 
major objectives and functions of community seed banks. Through 
conserving local seeds and traditional knowledge for use and exchange 
among farmers, they promote availability of, access to and utilization of 
local seeds and foods, which also meet their socio-economic, cultural and 
environmental needs. Those involved in community seed banks also see 
their local-level initiatives as being important to establishing seed and food 
sovereignty at the local level. These banks empower local farmers to be 
self-reliant and prime deciders of which seeds to conserve and use, and what 
to cultivate and eat.  
Through community seed banks, farmers exercise the rights of access to 
seeds, and ownership and control over local seed and food production 
systems. An example of this is the initiative taken by the farmers of the 
Dalchoki Community Seed Bank to officially register and establish local 
ownership over two local varieties of broad-leafed mustard called Dunde 
Rayo and Gujmuje under the Seed Act of the government of Nepal. Another 
example is the registration of local varieties under community biodiversity 
registers by most of the community seed banks initiated by LIBIRD and 
USC Canada Nepal. The farmers of the community seed banks believe that 
such registration will not only establish their ownership over local genetic 
resources and traditional knowledge, but will also discourage biopiracy and 
misappropriation of traditional knowledge. 
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10.8.5 Empower farmers, including women farmers, dalits and 
indigenous people 
The managers, members, users and beneficiaries of community seed banks 
include women farmers, as well as the poor, dalits and indigenous people. 
Collectively, they contribute to the administration, management and overall 
activities of the banks. For example, farmers, including women, from ethnic 
minorities such as Chamar, Dushad, Hajam, Muslim, Teli and Tatma, along 
with Yadav, Kalawar, and Koiri, are involved in the management and 
functioning of the Kachorwa Community Seed Bank in Bara. Similarly, in 
the Dalchoki Community Seed Bank in Lalitpur, more than 45 farmers from 
indigenous groups, including dalits and women, provided seeds to the bank, 
and around a dozen from the same groups obtained seeds for planting 
between 2011 and 2012.  
Community seed banks have emerged as important sites of networking 
amongst farmers. Through these networks farmers function as a dynamic 
and empowered group for on-farm conservation and use of local plant 
genetic resources and traditional knowledge. The empowerment of farmers 
of all castes and groups, including poor ones, has helped local and 
indigenous communities to harness their potential to further contribute to 
ensuring an enabling environment for sustainable local seed and food 
systems. Other gains include increased adaptive capacity in agriculture, and 
protection of the environment. For enhanced learning, they also organise or 
engage in regular meetings, workshops and diversity fairs at the local level, 
and participate in workshops, seminars, exchange visits and training at 
local, national and international levels.    
10.9 Shifting objectives: from informality to formality 
Over the past few years, there has been a significant change in the 
objectives of community seed banks. Along with the involvement of 
additional external agencies, non-government organisations, and 
importantly, the Department of Agriculture, the prime objective of 
conservation and use of local seeds and traditional knowledge has changed 
or expanded to focus on improved, modern seeds, including hybrids. This is 
being done in the name of modernisation. As a result, either most of the old 
community seed banks have adapted to also produce and market improved, 
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modern seeds of the formal seed system, or new community seed banks 
have come into existence with one of the following two objectives:  
• conserve and use local seeds, and also produce and market 
improved, modern seeds; or  
• produce and market improved, modern seeds.  
10.9.1 Conserve and use local seeds, and also produce and market 
improved, modern seeds  
When the first community seed bank was established in Dalchoki in 1996, 
the objective was to conserve local seeds and traditional knowledge to 
prevent genetic erosion and loss of traditional knowledge, and reduce 
farmers’ exposure to improved, modern seeds. However, over a period of 
time, most community seed banks have not only been conserving and 
exchanging local seeds, but have also started to promote the use of 
improved seeds and chemical fertilisers through sales within the village and 
outside. The same executives and members of community seed banks are 
actively engaged in creating and operating profit-motivated seed enterprises 
such as Hariyali Samudayik (Green Community) Seed Company Pvt. Ltd. 
in Sindhupalchowk, Sustainable Agriculture Saving and Credit Cooperative 
Ltd. in Bara and Dalchoki Organic Agriculture Cooperative Ltd. in Lalitpur.  
The first community seed bank in Dalchoki has itself started to purchase the 
improved seeds during the planting time and selling the same after cleaning 
and packaging to local farmers of the area and other districts such as 
Rasuwa, Sindhuli and Humla. In 2011, more than a ton of seeds, which 
included an improved variety of maize, Manakamana-3, was purchased and 
later on sold by the bank.  
Similarly, in 2011 alone, some 15 LIBIRD-supported community seed 
banks of different development regions transacted  42,924 kg of improved 
seeds (mainly rice and wheat) from 971 users/farmers, and 2,110 kg of local 
seeds  (mainly vegetables) from 1,839 users/farmers (Shrestha et al., 
2012b). Mobilisers and members of the banks view that the community seed 
banks have to cater to the demands by local farmers for improved, modern 
seeds and chemical fertilisers, and also need to make profits for the 
operationalisation of their ground-level activities. 
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10.9.2 Produce and market improved, modern seeds  
In 2009, following the establishment of community seed banks supported by 
the Department of Agriculture and then Oxfam Nepal, a major focus has 
been the production and marketing of improved, modern seeds through 
locally-formed seed producers groups. For example, in 2011, three 
community seed banks of Dadeldhura, Okhaldhunga and Sindhupalchwok 
districts had produced 142 metric tons of improved seeds of paddy, wheat 
and maize, which were purchased by local and non-local farmers, agrovets, 
non-government organisations and District Agriculture Development 
Offices (Shrestha et al., 2012b).  
In the same manner, since 2009, the 90 Oxfam Nepal-established 
community seed banks at the village and ward levels in Dadeldhura and 
Dailekh districts, have come to the fore in terms of formal seed production 
and dissemination. In collaboration with District Administration Offices of 
the government, Oxfam Nepal-supported community seed banks provide 
source seeds of improved varieties of paddy, maize, wheat, etc. to local 
seed-producing farmers for the production of foundation seeds. Such seed-
producing farmers then sell seeds to farmers in the village, as well as to 
district-level seed cooperatives and development agencies operating in other 
districts.  
In line with the government’s vision, Oxfam Nepal also considers this 
approach essential to improve farmers’ access to quality seeds. Oxfam says, 
it does not neglect the significance of conserving local seeds and traditional 
knowledge, but addresses food security needs by increased production 
through the supply of improved, modern seeds. 
10.10 Building a case of the typologies of community seed 
banks within informality and formality  
Based on their objectives and functions, we can illustrate that a complex 
typology of community seed banks, interacting with both informal and 
formal seed systems, is emerging in Nepal. As we see in Figure 10.2, the 
local, traditional seed system, in the form of de facto community seed 
banks, remains a dominant sector of Nepal’s seed system, operating through 
traditional, self-help, unregulated and informal system of selection, 
246 
 
production, use, exchange and sale of local, native seeds at the household 
and community level. When the local, traditional seed system started to 
suffer from farmers’ increasing exposure to improved, modern seeds and 
fertilisers, or the formal seed system’s outreach into farmers’ fields through 
public and private seed entities, the idea of community seed banks was 
adopted from the various international experiences with such banks to 
establish an organised set of local, native variety-focussed community seed 
banks in a particular local area.  
Figure 10.2: Emergence of a complex typology of community seed 
banks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to the household- and community-level practices within the local, 
traditional seed system, this type of organised community seed bank 
manages the conservation, selection, production, use and exchange of seeds 
of local, native varieties. Such local, native seeds rarely qualify for release, 
registration, certification or formal sale and marketing under the seed law of 
the country, but are highly important for conservation of local genetic 
diversity, as well as having customary and socio-cultural value. 
Some of these community seed banks have not continued to rely only on the 
conservation, use and exchange of local seeds. They have  also started to 
expand their focus on the production and marketing of improved seeds of 
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the formal seed system through the mobilisation of local seed producers’ 
groups, small local private seed companies, or saving and credit/agriculture 
cooperatives, for example in Kachorwa and Dalchoki.  
Such organised community seed banks, with an integrated seed sector 
approach within informal and formal seed systems, can now be understood 
as local, native and modern variety-focussed community seed banks. These 
community seed banks, on the one hand, deal with the improved, formal 
seeds, and on the other hand, traditional, informal seeds, thereby integrating 
the formal and informal seed systems. Most of these improved seeds are 
generally sourced from released, registered or certified varieties, and some 
others from food security projects or programmes of non-government or 
government or donor organisations in local areas. 
Since 2009, a new, organised set of community seed banks has also 
appeared in Nepal, their only focus being on the production and 
dissemination of the formal sector’s improved seeds. These modern variety-
focussed community seed banks do not give priority to saving and 
exchanging the seeds of local landraces. Instead the focus is on the 
production and local marketing of improved seeds, often in consultation and 
coordination with central- or district-level government units or locally-
formed cooperatives.  
Given these developments within the typology of community seed banks, 
there are some important issues to consider. First, local, native-variety 
focussed community seed banks are not necessarily completely 
disconnected from the formal seed system. In fact, some of today’s open-
pollinated varieties have come to their areas from the formal seed system. If 
such varieties adapt to local conditions and farmers prefer to use, reuse and 
exchange their seeds, community seed banks keep them within their 
portfolio for in situ conservation and regular use. In some cases, these seed 
banks also use formal varieties to cross with native varieties in their 
participatory plant breeding programmes.  
These community seed banks, however, fear that the formal sector’s high-
yielding varieties are expensive, and at the same time, demand the use of 
chemical fertilisers and well-managed irrigation. Their fear is also from the 
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use of hybrids, which farmers cannot reproduce and conserve as open-
pollinated seeds.  
Second, local, native-variety focussed community seed banks do not 
consider modern-variety focussed ones as community seed banks. 
According to them, modern variety-focussed community seed banks are like 
any other local seed business operating as a formal agency to breed or 
multiply or market seeds in a formal seed system process. An example is the 
community-based seed production programmes being implemented in Nepal 
to produce and multiply improved seeds through seed producers groups. 
Local, native-variety focussed community seed banks criticise the 
government for developing an operational guideline that does not provide 
policy and financial support for their conservation efforts and only aims to 
create and expand modern variety-focussed community seed banks. 
Third, the shift of local, native variety-focussed community seed banks to 
also produce and market improved seeds of the formal seed system reduces 
local farmers’ ability and scope to conserve local, native varieties, 
particularly when the seeds from the formal system are hybrids or do not 
meet farmers’ needs, or are not preferred locally due to factors such as taste, 
cost and socio-cultural aspects.  
10.11 An analysis of the typologies of community seed 
banks and PGRFA knowledge commons  
As we discussed in Chapter 8, Nepal’s governance of PGRFA is likely to be 
affected largely by the international regulatory instruments governing the 
access, use and commercialisation of PGRFA such as the CBD, TRIPS and 
ITPGRFA. With the existing seed laws and draft bills on access, benefit 
sharing, plant variety protection and farmers’ rights, Nepal is heading 
towards a regulatory path that departs from the state of PGRFA as a positive 
inclusive commons to a complicated scenario of multiple layers of other 
commons of both inclusive and exclusive nature.  
De facto community seed banks, being closely integrated within the self-
regulatory practices of the traditional seed system, support a vision of 
positive inclusive commons. These banks, operating within household and 
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community levels, openly save, exchange, reuse and sell seeds of local plant 
varieties without any discrimination as to race, class and geography or 
exclusive rights to use PGRFA. However, over time, with different 
objectives and a complex typology, organised community seed banks have 
become subject to different types of PGRFA knowledge commons.  
For example, organised community seed banks that work only or also to 
conserve and use local, native seeds are emerging as local institutions to 
make local, native PGRFA a community-level positive exclusive commons. 
These community seed banks, by collecting and storing germplasms from 
individual farmers and households of local areas, document and register in 
community biodiversity registers, claiming rights over seeds and traditional 
knowledge. While the distribution and dissemination of physical, tangible 
seeds are carried out by these community seed banks for on-farm 
conservation and use of local seeds, community biodiversity registers 
enable them to register traditional knowledge, and also document landraces 
as local varieties, recognising the place of origin and diversity as well as the 
owners and rightholders of such varieties.  
Specially, the community seed banks that only focus on local landraces and 
traditional knowledge have not only become the saviours of local PGRFA 
knowledge commons, but have also enabled local farmers to become the 
positive exclusive commoners of their local PGRFA. Such community seed 
banks, like the ones established in the Jumla district by SEDA and 
ActionAid, strongly believe in establishing seed and food sovereignty as a 
fundamental right of farmers, and are dedicated to prevent biopiracy and 
commercial use of the conserved and stored germplasms without their prior 
informed consent and benefit sharing.  
Note that between 2012 and 2013, the LIBIRD-supported Kachorwa 
Community Seed Bank had raised concerns when a number of community 
seed banks were contacted by the national gene bank in order to encourage 
them to submit samples of their germplasms for ex situ conservation and 
characterisation. At that time, the Kachorwa Bank had asked for a formal 
letter and process as an assurance from the national gene bank that there 
would not be any misappropriation and commercialisation without the prior 
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informed consent of and benefit sharing with the owners and holders of 
local PGRFA, that is, the local farmers.  
Another case in point in this regard is the initiative being taken by a 
coalition of more than 40 community seed banks in the country. In their 
national meeting held in July 2013, these 40 community seed banks not only 
decided to call for the development of rules and mechanisms, including a 
locally-agreed material transfer agreement, for the transfer of materials from 
one community seed bank to another community seed bank, but also from 
community seed banks to the national gene bank and other organisations. 
As community seed banks have empowered local farmers to become 
positive exclusive commoners of the varieties that are, for example, under in 
situ conditions and public domain, these issues and developments also have 
implications for the government’s commitment and willingness to include 
Nepal’s PGRFA in the multilateral system of the ITPGRFA.  
However, there may be other property rights implications too, for example, 
in the case of those community seed banks that are involved in participatory 
or other plant breeding programmes. The Kachorwa Community Seed Bank 
has already improved and developed a native rice variety through 
participatory plant breeding (a few other varieties are in the pipeline). Along 
with the development of such varieties, the bank, together with other 
collaborators, has applied for registration of such varieties under the Seed 
Act, 1988. However, due to the silence of the existing seed law about 
ownership rights over the registered varieties, it is not clear what types of 
property rights would be given to the bank (together with other 
collaborators).  
The same applies, as mentioned above, in the case of two local varieties of 
broad-leafed mustard called Dunde Rayo and Gujmuje. These have been 
registered for farmers of Dalchoki without any details as to the scope of 
ownership rights under the Seed Act. Thus, it is important to highlight that 
such variety development, breeding and registration initiatives of the 
community seed banks will surely have implications for the access, use and 
management of the PGRFA knowledge commons, including the rights of 
farmers. This will be especially true once Nepal implements the CBD-
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compatible access and benefit sharing law and the TRIPS-compatible plant 
variety protection and farmers’ rights law.  
In the case of the organised community seed banks that work only to 
produce and market the improved, modern seeds of the formal seed system, 
it is very likely that they will become or remain at a greater risk of being the 
users and promoters of the seeds protected by plant breeders’ rights. So far, 
these community seed banks are involved in the production and marketing 
of the seeds of open-pollinated improved varieties (and to some extent 
hybrids) and chemical fertilisers, just like a local seed trader or agrovet.  
However, in the future, as Nepal implements plant breeders’ rights, the 
modern variety-focussed community seed banks may also be inclined to 
emerge as local seed traders and users of the seeds of breeders’ rights-
protected plant varieties, including the chemical fertilisers required for the 
planting of such seeds. Note that in Chapter 7, we already discussed the 
strategic plan of USAID and Monsanto to sell and market hybrid seeds of 
maize under a pilot project proposed to be implemented together with the 
Ministry of Agriculture. It would not be a surprise if a similar project would 
be designed in the future to mobilise community seed banks in the interest 
of the seed industry.  
10.12 Conclusion  
The case of Nepal shows that community seed banks do not work in 
isolation but in a complex setting influenced or determined by different 
international, national and local dynamics of policy and practice. The 
international movement of seed savers’ networks and community seed 
banks in the developed and developing world has a strong relevance, as well 
as influence on the origin, expansion and functions of community seed 
banks in Nepal.  
Specifically, the mission of the seed savers’ networks to promote the use 
and exchange of heirloom and open-pollinated varieties in opposition to the 
trend of the growing industrialisation of the seed sector is similar to the 
opposition being mounted by local, native variety-focussed community seed 
banks in Nepal. The same is also the approach taken by many community 
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seed banks around the developing world. The seed banks’ objective of 
establishing seed and food sovereignty by empowering farmers to obtain 
ownership and control over local seed and food systems in the developing 
world, including South Asia, is also visible in the case of some community 
seed banks in Nepal.  
However, similar to the case of a few community seed banks of the 
developing world, not all community seed banks in Nepal are directed 
towards conservation of local and native varieties. In fact, over time, as the 
typology in this chapter shows, different types of community seed banks 
have come into play with diverse objectives, functions and impacts. While 
some community seed banks are still conserving local varieties, some others 
have taken on or specialise exclusively in the production and marketing of 
improved seeds, just like a local seed trading enterprise. It also means that 
some community seed banks in Nepal are working as a field-level gene/seed 
bank, as well as a community-level seed production and marketing entity.  
There are benefits and costs attached to this variety of seed banks and their 
actions for both the informal and formal seed systems. It is important to 
understand that the more community seed banks gradually shift towards or 
concentrate on the formal seed system, the greater the possibility of creating 
dependency of local farmers on formal seeds. This may then reduce 
farmers’ ability to conserve agricultural biodiversity, sustain climate-
resilient agriculture and promote organic food through the use and exchange 
of local seeds.  
In the case of PGRFA knowledge commons too, the ability of a community 
seed bank to protect the rights of local, indigenous and farming 
communities from the threats of industrialised agriculture and intellectual 
property depends on its objectives and functions. With varied objectives and 
a complex typology of community seed banks, the management of PGRFA 
knowledge commons becomes much more contested. The danger of the 
contest is that seed banks that support the informal sector will become the 
long-term losers. While native variety-focussed community seed banks have 
emerged as positive exclusive commoners, establishing local registries, 
rules and norms for ownership, access, use and exchange of PGRFA, the 
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modern variety-focussed community seed banks are at a greater risk of 
being used by the seed industry to promote their modern seeds and inputs, 
including hybrids and chemical fertilisers.  
Given these issues, as Nepal is moving ahead to implement its commitments 
under the CBD, ITPGRFA and TRIPS, it is important that related national 
laws, along with the Operational Guideline to support the seed banks by the 
government, are discussed and reviewed bringing them into a governance 
framework that recognises the importance of informality and allows it to 
flourish.  This will help the government as well as non-government 
organisations to assess their objectives, functions and impacts, and will also 
enable the local farmers and their groups to prepare a roadmap for 
community seed banks that address their local needs and preferences.  
  
254 
 
Chapter 11 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the global, national and local trends and dynamics 
of seed regulations which scholars often discuss in the context of formality 
and informality of the seed system, commons and property notions of 
PGRFA and community seed banks. The thesis makes an important 
contribution to these three streams of scholarly writing by offering insights 
into how Nepal’s seed regulation is being shaped and what has been the role 
of networks, local communities and informality.  
11.1 Key results and findings  
Nepal’s current seed regulation has been largely influenced by global 
trends and fails to address local needs. The thesis shows that Nepal has 
been greatly influenced by global trends in its attempt to promote the 
formality of the seed system through a state-led seed regulation. Following 
the global trends described by the thesis, right from the 1960s, successive 
governments of all the political regimes in Nepal have endorsed and worked 
on a mission to initially establish and then strengthen the public sector-led 
formal seed system. As a result, the country’s seed sector development 
strategy, inspired by the Green Revolution of the 1960s, always focussed on 
acquiring high-yielding plant varieties from CGIAR centres and other 
countries. Since the mid-1980s and the 1990s, the seed regulation, under the 
influence of the neo-liberal development paradigm and support for seed 
sector development from external agencies, has been focussing on the 
involvement of the private sector for the import of new, improved varieties 
like hybrids.  
The thesis shows that in all of these processes, Nepal has pursued a linear 
regulatory model to promote the formality of the seed system, largely 
failing to understand, protect and promote local, customary norms and 
dynamics of use and exchange of native and local plant varieties. This may 
have further implications for the maintenance and use of local plant genetic 
diversity and for farmers’ traditional rights to use and exchange seeds 
within the local seed system.    
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There is a greater role of traditionality, customary norms and farmer-to-
farmer seed exchange networks, but the situation may change. While the 
state-led regulatory developments might lead one to think that Nepal’s seed 
sector should be largely dominated by the formal seed system, the thesis 
reveals that so far, there is a different situation on the ground. Irrespective 
of the pressure from the formal seed system, the traditionality of agriculture 
and local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange continue to remain 
the key features of farmers’ seed system in Nepal.  
A majority of farmers are poor, live in rural areas, hold less than 0.5 
hectares of land and depend on subsistence farming for livelihoods. Most of 
these farmers do not rely on formal seed markets to access and use seeds, 
but continue to depend on farm-saved seeds and farmer-to-farmer exchange 
networks for seed and food security at the local level. These practices create 
an environment of trust, reciprocity and communication within farming 
households and communities. This is also reflected in the fact that farmers 
in Nepal do not possess any exclusive rights over seeds, and for generations, 
have worshipped and shared seeds of both formal and informal seed systems 
as a common cultural heritage. There are, however, continuous pressures for 
farmers to gradually rely more on formal seed markets and most of them 
may also do so as the interaction between formality and informality is likely 
to change due to the emerging regulatory dynamics. 
The emerging regulatory dynamics may affect the interaction between 
formality and informality. Because of the notion that seeds are commonly 
shared resources, there exists a close interaction between the formality and 
informality of the seed system in Nepal. Farmers not only provide 
germplasms to formal seed actors for breeding and development of 
landraces, but they also use and exchange formal seeds if they find them 
adaptive to the local environment and appropriate to meet their needs and 
preferences in local contexts. In recent years, programmes like participatory 
variety selection and breeding programmes too have strengthened the 
interaction between formal and informal seed systems. However, the thesis 
suggests that the interaction between the formal and informal seed systems 
may change due to the following two regulatory developments.   
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First, the fact that the government continues to encourage the private sector 
to import and register improved seeds (including hybrid) of both cereal and 
vegetable crops under the Seed Act may significantly affect the local, 
customary dynamics of the use and exchange of native and local seeds. If 
more and more farmers come to rely on formal seed markets for varieties 
like hybrids that do not breed true (uniformly) in the next season, their 
ability to reuse and exchange farm-saved seeds will become restricted, 
thereby also impacting on farmer-to-farmer seed exchange networks.  
Second, as the government is preparing for the introduction of national 
regulations to implement its global obligations concerning the management 
of PGRFA, new conditions for the management of the seed system may 
complicate farmers’ practices of seed use and exchange at the local level. 
As the thesis argues, such new conditions have important linkages with 
what scholars discuss as the first and second enclosure movements. 
There are implications of the first and second enclosure movements for the 
regulation of PGRFA. Nepal has never remained free of the effects of the 
first and second enclosure movements that many countries have witnessed 
in the course of the implementation of their seed regulations. The first 
enclosure movement in Nepal saw enclosures of physical, tangible 
resources such as lands and forests, where plant genetic diversity lies as 
physical resources for access and use by farmers and other actors.  
The second enclosure movement, which scholars discuss as having placed 
intellectual property boundaries around the use and exchange of intangible 
resources, has led Nepal to initiate a number of legislative initiatives to 
design its seed regulation for establishing the rights of state, private and 
community actors over PGRFA. As PGRFA possess tangible as well as 
intangible property, these enclosure movements have implications for the 
governance of the seed system, including the local seed system. The thesis 
argues that the more Nepal moves towards a stricter property rights regime, 
the greater is the possibility of further restrictions on farmers’ ability to 
continue to promote local, customary norms of the use and exchange of 
PGRFA within farmer-to-farmer seed networks. 
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There is no way out than to govern the use and management of PGRFA 
under different visions of commons and property. Provisions of intellectual 
property in the TRIPS Agreement and the UPOV Convention, and state 
sovereignty and the rights of local, indigenous and farming communities in 
the CBD and the ITPGRFA have led to complicated regimes of property 
rights to regulate PGRFA. Being a WTO member and a contracting party to 
the CBD and the ITPGFRA, Nepal is not in a position to remain away from 
the implementation of different notions of property and commons in this era 
of globalisation. However, the thesis shows that it would not be easy for 
Nepal to regulate the use of PGRFA as these resources, unlike physical 
resources discussed by commons scholars, are complex to govern because 
they lie somewhere between a tangible and an intangible resource.  
Drawing on a typology of intellectual commons of Drahos (1996, 2006), 
this thesis has developed an analytical framework of four types of PGRFA 
knowledge commons: positive inclusive, positive exclusive, negative 
inclusive and negative exclusive. The thesis used this framework to explain 
how the international agreements are underpinned by different visions of 
commons and property to regulate the use and exchange of PGRFA. As we 
have seen, the global regulations have tended to move away from open 
access-based positive inclusive commons to the different categories of 
property rights-based restrictive commons of exclusive and negative nature.  
In the case of Nepal, irrespective of geography, race and culture, an 
important finding is that farmers use and share seeds as a common heritage 
– that is, as a positive inclusive commons. Such practices are not only visible 
among farmers themselves, but they also openly share seeds with visitors, 
including people from government, non-government and international 
organisations. However, the elements of positive inclusive commons found 
within local, customary practices may change as Nepal begins a process of 
national implementation to fulfil its obligations under the CBD, TRIPS and 
ITPGRFA. As the provisions of the CBD-compatible Genetic Resources 
Bill of 2002 suggest, regulatory principles for access, prior informed 
consent and benefit sharing signal a departure from the exchange and use of 
plant genetic resources as a positive inclusive commons. This vision of the 
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commons looks to be replaced by different layers of commons, that is, state-
level and community-level positive exclusive commons.  
The regulation of PGRFA in Nepal is likely to be also influenced by the 
legislative initiatives undertaken for the protection of plant varieties. What 
is interesting to observe is that unlike the UPOV Convention, the TRIPS-
compatible Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill of 2005 has 
created options of property rights for both breeders and farmers. While 
breeders’ rights have been provided over new plant varieties, farmers’ rights 
too have been recognised over such varieties. It is an important empirical 
point that the idea of a negative commons has been used in Nepal to 
advance the interests of local farmers, for example, by allowing them to use, 
reuse and exchange seeds of the breeders’ rights-protected plant varieties.  
The thesis argues that Nepal needs to understand and assess the implications 
of different visions of commons when it designs and implements its 
regulatory framework for the use and exchange of PGRFA. The same 
argument also applies when it comes to the implementation of Nepal’s 
obligation to include certain PGRFA in the multilateral system of the 
ITPGRFA. The fundamental concern of Nepal should always be to seek 
options to provide support to the traditionality of the seed system, and not 
erode any possibility for farmers to promote seed use and exchange. This is 
what a number of community seed banks in Nepal are also doing at the local 
level, but with different typologies and impacts. 
A complex typology of community seed banks has been emerging with 
diverse objectives, functions and impacts in relation to the notions of 
formality, informality, commons and property. As we have seen, the 
objective of creating community seed banks to establish seed and food 
sovereignty by empowering farmers to obtain ownership and control over 
local seed and food systems in the developing world is also visible in the 
case of a number of community seed banks in Nepal. However, similar to 
the case of a few community seed banks of the developing world, not all 
community seed banks in Nepal are working towards conservation of local 
varieties. In fact, over time, a complex typology of community seed banks 
has come into play with diverse objectives, functions and impacts.  
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Initially, the idea of creating organised community seed banks was 
cultivated in the 1990s to promote the use and exchange of local varieties. 
Over time, the very objective of protecting local varieties has, however, 
been changing due to their interaction with either informal, or formal, or 
both seed systems. The thesis argues that the more community seed banks 
gradually shift towards or concentrate on the formal seed system, the greater 
is the possibility of the loss of local genetic diversity and associated 
customary rights of local farmers.  
With varied objectives and a complex typology of community seed banks, 
there are implications for the management of PGRFA knowledge commons 
too. For example, local and native variety-focussed community seed banks 
have emerged as positive exclusive commoners, enabling these banks to 
self-identify and exercise rights over local varieties by establishing local 
registries as well as rules and norms for ownership, access, use and 
exchange. These initiatives may help local farmers to exercise their 
traditional rights over seeds and traditional knowledge. However, if the 
formality of the seed system intensifies and incorporates intellectual 
property rules into its operations, there is a risk that modern variety-
focussed community seed banks would be extensively used by the seed 
industry and other formal actors to promote modern seeds and chemical 
fertilisers, rather than to strengthen the farmers’ seed system.  
As Nepal is moving ahead to implement its commitments under the CBD, 
ITPGRFA and TRIPS, it is important that the existing seed regulation as 
well as the draft bills are discussed and reviewed in the light of the 
emerging regulatory trends and dynamics of formality, informality, 
commons, property and community seed banks. In this process, an 
important task would be to look for a model of a seed regulation that seeks 
to promote the use and exchange of local varieties and protect farmers’ 
customary practices and rights over seeds and traditional knowledge.  
11.2 Towards a networked model of seed regulation  
As we discussed, a deliberately constructed linear model of seed sector 
development has failed to recognise that customary practices of seed use 
and exchange represent a historic example of self-regulation that Nepali 
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farmers have developed and continue to practice with their own values and 
rules. In this era of the globalisation of seed and intellectual property 
regulation, the way Nepal’s seed regulation is being shaped, it is clear that a 
number of actors and networks underpin and/or affect the governance of the 
seed system, including PGRFA and community seed banks.  
There is network confrontation among the strategic actors of different 
sectors, nationally and internationally, in regard to the regulatory domains 
(sites) dealing with formality, informality, property and commons. 
Government and private actors have been working together to the support 
the formality of the seed system, whereas non-government organisations 
and networks of local, farming and indigenous communities are working 
towards the protection and promotion of the informality of the seed system, 
including the creation of organised community seed banks.  
As international actors, there are CGIAR centres and external agencies such 
as USAID, GTZ, FAO and many others which have played a key role in the 
evolution and expansion of the formal seed system. Multinational seed 
companies such as Monsanto are also engaged in the governance of the seed 
system in Nepal, seeking, for example, entry into the Nepali seed market.  
In the case of the emerging regulation of PGRFA that Nepal is considering 
in view of global agreements too, networked activities among various actors 
are visible. A number of civil society actors are engaged in policy discourse 
to design and draft the national laws so that Nepal can fulfil its 
commitments under the TRIPS Agreement and capitalise on the provisions 
of the CBD and ITPGRFA. An important finding of the thesis is that if civil 
society actors and local people want to resist the logic of enclosure, they 
will have to use networked monitoring and resistance. As an example of 
meta-regulation, non-governmental organisations have been active in 
monitoring and influencing regulatory behaviours and steering the flow of 
regulatory events in relation to the protection of customary norms of seed 
use and exchange.  
For example, civil society actors, including media, played a key role as 
watchdogs by launching a nationwide campaign during accession 
negotiations for WTO membership in 2003. Nepal had witnessed an attempt 
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of regulatory capture when it came under pressure to join the UPOV 
Convention during accession negotiations. Ultimately, the No to UPOV 
campaign helped the government to negotiate a sui generis national law that 
provides flexibilities to protect farmers’ customary rights to save, use and 
exchange seeds within the local seed system.  
The case of Nepal, however, shows that the outcomes of multilateral 
negotiations do not alone provide a conducive regulatory environment to 
capitalise on the flexibility and policy space provided in the WTO 
agreements. A classic example is the No to Monsanto campaign which was 
initiated by civil society organisations in 2011. This campaign exposes that 
countries do not only face WTO processes when it comes to preserving 
policy space. External actors – in this case USAID – also play a key role. 
For example, USAID made systematic attempts to introduce Monsanto’s 
hybrid seeds into Nepal using a pilot project to be implemented by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, in addition to recommending to the government to 
strengthen breeders’ rights in the seed law. Under the pretext of investment 
and technology transfer, seed associations and companies from Europe and 
the US also networked with the domestic private sector to argue for a strong 
plant variety protection law, undermining the role of informality and 
farmers’ self-regulatory practices of seed use and exchange.  
The importance of civil society organisations, as in the case of No to UPOV 
and No to Monsanto campaigns, lies in their capacity to act as watchdogs 
and gatekeepers, thereby helping to ensure that the government has support 
when it needs it or does not secretly do deals that affect the interests of poor 
and disempowered people within the country. The role of civil society 
organisations in protecting farmers’ rights is also reflected in Nepal’s 
preparation to implement the ITPGRFA. Such initiatives also show how 
networked governance has helped the strategic actors of the civil society 
sector to enrol and establish partnership with the government actors to 
design and draft seed laws and policies. The revision of the country’s 
National Agriculture Biodiversity Policy, which now includes provisions on 
farmers’ rights, was made possible after state and civil society actors 
collaborated to work together through an expert committee of the Ministry 
of Agriculture.  
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The role of third-party gatekeepers has also been instrumental in setting up 
and mobilising organised community seed banks across different parts of 
the country. These seed banks have emerged more as an institutional effort 
to strengthen the self-regulatory practices of seed use and exchange at the 
local level. However, there is a need to assess the growth and functioning of 
such organised community seed banks in Nepal. Due to the networked 
activities of the non-government organisations and the government, a 
complex typology of community seed banks, as we discussed earlier, is 
emerging interacting with both formal and informal seed systems.  
Particularly, the government and non-government organisations like Oxfam 
need to reconsider whether their models of community seed banks, which 
promote the use of formal varieties for increased production, dilute the 
original objectives of creating such networks – that is, promoting the use 
and exchange of native and local varieties. If community seed banks start to 
merge with the networks of the formal seed system without focussing on the 
conservation, use and exchange of native and local varieties, there may be 
implications for local genetic diversity, as well as the local, customary 
dynamics of seed use and exchange within farmers’ seed system. Such 
implications could be further complicated by how Nepal’s regulation of 
PGRFA would move away from seeing these resources as open-access 
based positive inclusive commons to restrictive types of exclusive commons.  
Given all these dynamics of networked activities and the failure of the 
existing seed laws to address local needs, it is desirable that Nepal’s seed 
regulation draws upon a model of networked governance to address the 
interests of the state, the private sector, and importantly, local, indigenous 
and farming communities and civil society actors. The concept of 
networked governance, in particular, reveals the important role of third 
parties in protecting the interests of indigenous and farming communities. It 
shows how they can have a voice in regulatory outcomes, even in outcomes 
of the agenda that has come from global organisations like the WTO.  
11.3 Significance of the research 
An important theoretical contribution of this thesis is to build an argument 
that the categorisation of formal and informal seed systems is not 
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appropriate, at least when it comes to the question of the notion of 
informality and its implications. Note that the local, customary dynamics of 
seed use and exchange have already been formally recognised in 
international treaties like the ITPGRFA and the CBD. Why and to what 
extent then are local, customary dynamics of seed use and exchange 
informal?  
Moreover, the notion of informality of the seed system is an issue to be 
reconsidered also because such a categorisation generally provides a kind of 
negative connotation in that recognition of the socio-cultural, economic and 
environmental values and self-regulatory norms of the local seed system 
remains neglected in seed laws. Importantly, such a notion not only leads 
the state-led regulation to undermine the trust, reciprocity and 
communication dynamics of the local seed system, but also to restrict the 
rights of local communities over PGRFA and traditional knowledge, for 
example, by disallowing farmers to use, save, exchange and sell farm-saved 
seeds.  
Another important theoretical contribution of the thesis comes from its 
analysis of commons and property notions that scholars discuss in regard to 
enclosure movements. With a detailed analysis of their concepts and how 
the commons discourse developed in support of collective action and local 
community, the thesis highlights the limitations of the knowledge commons 
framework to explain PGRFA as a new commons. The thesis shows that the 
classic goods quadrant of public, private, club and common goods – often 
used in commons discourse – does not capture the essence of the commons 
notions of PGRFA. Unlike physical resources of the traditional commons 
discourse, it is not their overuse that is a problem since this leads to 
conservation and developmental benefits, but rather their underuse. 
In this respect, in order to deal with the complexity of the commons notions 
applicable for the study of PGRFA, this thesis, as mentioned earlier, 
develops an analytical framework of the typology of PGRFA knowledge 
commons. This framework builds on a conceptual scheme of intellectual 
commons designed by Drahos (2006) and an analysis of Roa-Rodríguez and 
Van Dooren (2008). The framework used in this thesis, in particular, helps 
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to analyse how property rights dynamics at global, national and local levels 
restrict access to PGRFA with implications for their further use and 
exchange.  
The thesis also makes an important contribution to the study of community 
seed banks, which is mostly limited to the discussion of their significance 
for the conservation and use of local genetic diversity and linkages with the 
informal seed system. The thesis builds a case of a typology of community 
seed banks categorised as de facto community seed banks and organised 
community seed banks. In this typology, while de facto community seed 
banks represent the self-regulatory norms of seed use and exchange within 
the farmers’ seed system, organised ones have been further classified as 
native variety-focussed, native and modern variety-focussed, and modern 
variety-focussed community seed banks. The typology that has come out of 
this research provides a basis to analyse the implications of de facto and 
organised community seed banks based on their objectives, functions, and 
importantly, the varieties they use and exchange under formal and informal 
conditions.  
Last but not least, it is important to highlight that most of the debates around 
the issues analysed in this thesis take place within the discourse on 
formality and informality of the seed system; or commons and property 
notions; or the significance of community seed banks. This thesis may be 
the first comprehensive attempt to study the implications of these three 
important regulatory trends and dynamics as these collectively impact local, 
customary dynamics of seed use and exchange and the rights of local, 
indigenous and farming communities in Nepal. This thesis thus provides a 
detailed national experience of Nepal on these trends and their implications.  
In this regard, probably, a better conclusion of this thesis would be to 
highlight that the idea of conducting this research, as mentioned in the 
methodology chapter, was triggered by my participation in the Fourth 
Session of the Governing Body of the ITPGRFA in 2011. A resolution 
adopted by this Session on farmers’ rights had requested all contracting 
parties to share their experiences on how national measures affect farmers’ 
rights to seeds and traditional knowledge. So far, as many other contracting 
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parties, Nepal has not been able to prepare any account of such national 
experiences. This thesis may contribute towards the implementation of this 
Resolution agreed to by all the contracting parties of the Treaty, at least 
from the viewpoint of how seed regulations that affect local, customary 
dynamics, farmers’ rights and the PGRFA knowledge commons are being 
shaped in Nepal.  
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